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1.1 Quantum & Cognition?
‘Quantum’ and ‘cognition1’ are two words one would not expect in col-
location, and yet, their concatenation is the topic of this doctoral disser-
tation. While both terms belong to fields (subatomic physics and social
sciences) that could hardly be further apart, we will show that the latter
can learn a lot from the former2. In quantum cognition we will use the
mathematical framework from quantum mechanics minus the physics. In
the beginning of the twentieth century physicists were confronted with
experimental data that seemed paradoxical in classical physics. As a re-
sult, a new mathematical framework, with new notions for concepts such
as ‘measurement’ and ‘state of the system’, was constructed. Likewise,
experimental situations in cognitive science that seem paradoxical from
a traditional rational point of view occur frequently. The most common
expression of such a paradoxical situation is a violation of a classical prob-
abilistic rule. Quantum cognition uses the mathematical tools constructed
for the paradoxes in physics to model the paradoxes in cognition. While
the connection between the two fields seems surprising at first, this idea
dates back to the origins of quantum mechanics. Bohr himself drew in-
spiration from psychological phenomena, such as ambiguous images. To
quote directly from Bohr (1948):
[...] in psychology, where the conditions for analysis and syn-
thesis of experience exhibit striking analogy with the situation
in atomic physics.
We believe, agreeing with Bohr, that quantum theory does not only
have the mathematical means of exhibiting statistical paradoxes of in-
terest, but can help explain this perceived ‘irrational’ behavior. While
there are multiple examples of classical models exhibiting paradoxes, the
difference is that in quantum theory they are not considered paradoxes
anymore, but are now naturally implied behavior. At the core of the
quantum-like approach lies the possibility of being in an indeterminate
state. Classical cognitive models assume us to be in a definite state con-
cerning decision situations. The stochasticity enters the model because
this definite state is unknown. Performing the relevant measurement sim-
ply records this unknown state. In quantum theory the state can be inde-
1By cognition we mean the wide field of cognitive science, examining the human
mind and behavior.
2The question if modern quantum mechanics can learn something from cognitive
science, should be asked to a quantum scientist.
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terminate, exhibiting the potential of certain states to be realized. This
idea intuitively seems to reflect psychological reality, with somebody be-
ing conflicted, confused or uncertain, better than physical reality. This
concept of an indeterminate state has profound consequences. It means
that performing a measurement constructs rather than records an out-
come. It makes the system realize the potential of one of its states. As
pointed out in Busemeyer & Bruza (2012), this is in line with modern
psychological theories of emotion and decision making. For example, in
Schachter & Singer (1962) it is shown that a person can be ambiguous
about his feelings, but after being asked about them, the ambiguity is lost
and the state of emotion becomes definite. Likewise, Payne et al. (1992)
show that beliefs and preferences are not necessarily directly recorded,
but are constructed opportunistically. This points to (measurement of)
human experimental behavior being contextual, depending on the specific
experimental setup and measurement performed, rather than absolute.
The same concept of contextuality lies at the heart of “the magic of quan-
tum computation” (Howard et al., 2014). So while the remainder of this
thesis might focus more on mathematical adequacy of quantum models
in social sciences, we wish to express the belief that the connection be-
tween the two goes deeper than well-fitting numbers and formulas. This
is reflected in the fact that the observed classical paradoxes in human be-
havior cease to be paradoxes in the quantum light. While classical models
might explain the inconsistencies, with a possible nice fit to experimental
data, in quantum cognition these inconsistencies are natural consequences
of the way human cognition is assumed to work.
We also wish to stress that this dissertation is not about the ‘quantum
mind’ in the vein of, for instance, Hameroff (2007). We do not talk about
quantum mechanical interactions in the brain, we only use the mathe-
matical framework. One of the striking successes of quantum cognition
is the wide variety of fields in which it has been applied. In this thesis
we will venture into human recollection and game theory, but successful
applications have been constructed in, e.g., decision making (Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al., 2009), concept combinations (Aerts et al., 2012), simi-
larity judgments (Barque-Duran et al., 2016) and semantic representations
(Widdows & Cohen, 2015).
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1.2 The Quantum Formalism
We will give a short introduction in the mathematics behind the quantum
approach in social sciences. The limited space reserved for this makes it
impossible to be complete. However, the ground covered should suffice to
understand the coming chapters. For a meticulous explanation of quantum
theory we refer to Busemeyer & Bruza (2012) for its use in social sciences
and to Nielsen & Chuang (2010) for its use in physics.
As the quantum toolbox is concerned with assigning probabilities to
events, we will need a way to represent events and rules to calculate prob-
abilities from these representations. In a classical approach, events are
represented by sets of elements of a sample space. A probability function
assigns a probability to these events, adhering to the Kolmogorov axioms.
In quantum theory all these notions are redefined. As such, events are
represented by subspaces in a Hilbert space. A Hilbert space is a vector
space with a well-defined inner product, allowing the concepts of length
and angle to be defined and measured. In this thesis we will only work
with real vectors, even though in quantum mechanics Hilbert spaces are
considered complex. We will also work with Dirac’s bra-ket notation, in
which 〈V | is a row vector , |W 〉 is a column vector, and 〈V |W 〉 denotes
their inner product. Subspaces larger than vectors can also represent out-
comes. For example, the disjunction3 of events V and W , represented by
|V 〉 and |W 〉, is represented by the subspace spanned by |V 〉 and |W 〉.
The state of the system is represented by the state vector, which plays
the role of the probability function in classical theory. The state vector is
a normalized vector defined in the Hilbert space spanned by the vectors
and subspaces representing the relevant events. Intuitively, the closer the
state vector is to a subspace representing an event, the more likely the
occurrence of that event is. To formalize this, we will use the projector onto
the subspace representing an event. The probability of an event E, with
associated subspace E and projector matrix PE , given the state vector S,
is defined as:
P (E) = 〈S|PE |S〉.
After an event has occurred, a state revision takes place. The state vector
is orthogonally projected onto the subspace E representing the occurred
event and is normalized. This effectively changes the post-measurement
state of the system , transforming the state vector |S〉 into a new normal-
3Assuming both events are compatible, see later.
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ized state vector |S′〉:
|S′〉 = PE |S〉||PE |S〉|| .
This is called the collapse of the state.
This collapse is one of the key non-classical features of quantum the-
ory. It represents the evolution of the system from an indeterminate to a
definite, recordable state.
1.2.1 One Measurement
Let us now apply this to a simple system in which a measurement A has
two possible outcomes A1 and A2. Outcomes of a single measurement
are represented by orthogonal subspaces. Thus, the two outcomes are
represented by the orthogonal vectors |A1〉 and |A2〉. These two outcome
vectors form an orthonormal basis, spanning the Hilbert space HA, in
which we define the state vector |S〉. As |A1〉 and |A2〉 form a basis, we
can express |S〉 as a linear combination of |A1〉 and |A2〉, with respective
coordinates a1 and a2:
|S〉 = a1|A1〉+ a2|A2〉.
The system is said to be in superposition between the outcomes A1 and
A2. This means that the system is not in a definite recordable state A1
or A2, as is supposed in classical theory. The system is in neither of the
two states. However, when measurement A, which can only result in A1
or A2 is performed, the system is forced into either A1 or A2, changing
the system. This is what the collapse of the state vector represents. In
cognition, this superposition is used to model, for instance, uncertainty,
doubt or ambiguity, as will become evident in future examples.
To calculate the probabilities associated with the outcomes, we con-
struct the relevant projectors PA1 and PA2 :
PA1 = |A1〉〈A1| =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and
PA2 = |A2〉〈A2| =
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
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|A2〉
|A1〉
|S〉
a1
a2
Figure 1.1 Outcome A1, represented by the vector |A1〉, has proba-
bility a21 of being observed. Outcome A2, represented by the vector |A2〉,
has probability a22 of being observed. The state vector being normalized
makes the probabilities sum to one.
This results in the probabilities P (A1) and P (A2), as shown in figure 1.1:
P (A1) = 〈S|PA1 |S〉 = 〈A1|S〉2 = a21 (1.1)
P (A2) = 〈S|PA2 |S〉 = 〈A2|S〉2 = a22. (1.2)
The simple form 〈Ai|S〉2 always holds when the relevant outcomes are
represented by a vector.
The fact that the state vector is normalized ensures that the probabili-
ties sum to one. Suppose now that outcome A1 was observed. To transform
the state vector |S〉 into the new post-measurement state vector |S′〉, we
project orthogonally (using projector PA1) onto the subspace spanned by
the observed outcome vector |A1〉 (step (i) in figure 1.2). We then nor-
malize the projected vector (step (ii) in figure 1.2), resulting in the new
normalized state vector |S′〉. Note that in the simple case of outcomes
being represented by vectors (as opposed to bigger subspaces), the state
vector is transformed into the vector that is associated with the observed
outcome. This can easily be seen in figure 1.2, where
|S′〉 = |A1〉. (1.3)
One can easily see that after the collapse of the state vector on |A1〉, a
repetition of measurement A will again yield the previously obtained A1,
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|A2〉
|A1〉 = |S′〉
|S〉
a1
a2
(i)
(ii)
Figure 1.2 Outcome A1 is observed. This transforms the starting state
vector |S〉, after projecting (i) and normalizing (ii) into the new state
vector |S′〉, which lies in the subspace representing the observed outcome.
as, due to the orthogonality of |A1〉 and |A2〉,
P (A1|A1) = 〈A1|A1〉2 = 1 (1.4)
P (A2|A1) = 〈A1|A2〉2 = 0. (1.5)
This property is called repeatability or first kindness.
Let us now consider a slightly more complex measurement situation:
a measurement A′, with three possible outcomes A′1, A′2 and A′3. The
relevant Hilbert spaceHA′ is now 3-dimensional, with the outcome vectors
|A′1〉, |A′2〉 and |A′3〉 forming an orthonormal basis. The event of obtaining
outcome ‘A1 or A2’ is represented by the plane A′1,2 spanned by the
vectors |A1〉 and |A2〉. The projector P ′A′1,2 associated with this event
projects orthogonally onto the plane A′1,2:
P ′A′1,2 =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 .
The resulting probability, given a state vector |S〉,
|S〉 = a′1|A′1〉+ a′2|A′2〉+ a′3|A′3〉,
is therefore:
P (A1 ∪A2) = 〈S|P ′A′1,2 |S〉 = a
′2
1 + a′22 .
This can be seen in Figure 1.3. If A′1 ∪ A′2 is observed, the state vector
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|A′2〉
|A′1〉
|A′3〉
a′1
a′3
|S〉
a′2
Figure 1.3 The probability of observing A′1 ∪ A′2, represented by the
plane A′1,2 spanned by |A′1〉 and |A′2〉, given the state vector |S〉, is
a′21 + a′22 .
|S〉 is projected and normalized into the new state vector |S′〉, which lies
in the plane A′1,2:
|S′〉 =
P ′A′1,2 |S〉
||P ′A′1,2 |S〉||
= a
′
1|A1〉+ a′2|A2〉√
a′21 + a′22
.
Note that the resulting probabilities do not differ from a simple classical
system. This means that so far the quantumness has not added anything
interesting in terms of modeling. We will come back to this in Chapter 2.
1.2.2 Multiple Measurements
We will now look at how we can model different measurements performed
in one system. In these examples, the difference between the quantum
and classical approaches will be more clear and interesting than the single
measurement case discussed previously. At the core of this non-classicality
lies the existence of incompatible measurements. A pair of measurements
is incompatible when there is at least one pair of outcomes (one from
each measurement) that is incompatible. Incompatible outcomes cannot
be observed simultaneously, because the order in which the relevant mea-
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surements are performed, influences the outcome. We will construct small
examples showing how to model both compatible and incompatible mea-
surements. When two measurements are completely incompatible, the
measurements are said to be complementary. This means that no outcome
of one measurement can be observed together with any outcome of the
other measurement. The most famous example of complementary proper-
ties in physics is the position and the momentum of a subatomic particle.
Determining the position of a particle alters the information about the
particle’s momentum4 and vice versa.
Compatible Measurements
Suppose we have measurement A, with possible outcomes A1 and A2, and
measurementB, with possible outcomesB1 andB2. If these measurements
are compatible and therefore can be performed at the same time, the
system can be in a state that is definite over the two measurements. As
such, the event of, for instance, observing A1 and B1 together has to be
represented by a subspace in a Hilbert space, which we define as HA,B .
As the same holds for the other possible combinations of outcomes, it
should be clear that HA,B has dimension 4, with |A1B1〉, |A1B2〉, |A2B1〉
and |A2B2〉 forming an orthonormal basis. The state of the system is
represented by the state vector |S〉
|S〉 = s1,1|A1B1〉+ s1,2|A1B2〉+ s2,1|A2B1〉+ s2,2|A2B2〉.
Note that we changed the notation of the coordinates to si,j , as they do not
refer to a single specific measurement. We will now discuss three different
measurement situations with these two measurements. The situations not
discussed are similar.
The event of obtaining A1 for measurement A and B1 for measurement
B is associated with the vector |A1B1〉 and projector P1,1
PA1,B1 = |A1B1〉〈A1B1| =

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
4The notion of complementarity in physics that we briefly discuss here is closely
associated with the Copenhagen interpretation, which is the most widely accepted
interpretation of quantum mechanics. We do not wish to go into detail and/or dis-
cussion of other interpretations of quantum mechanics, as this is not relevant for our
applications in social sciences.
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The associated probability is
P (A1 ∩B1) = 〈S|PA1,B1 |S〉 = s21,1 (1.6)
If this outcome is obtained, the state vector |S〉 is projected and normal-
ized into the new state vector |S′〉
|S′〉 = PA1,B1 |S〉||PA1,B1 |S〉||
= |A1B1〉.
Now suppose that only measurement A is performed. The subspace asso-
ciated with outcome A1 is the plane A1 spanned by |A1B1〉 and |A1B2〉.
This makes the associated projector PA1,·
PA1,· = |A1B1〉〈A1B1|+ |A1B2〉〈A1B2| =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
The associated probability is
P (A1) = 〈S|PA1,·|S〉 = s21,1 + s21,2 (1.7)
If this outcome is obtained, the state vector |S〉 is projected and normal-
ized into the new state vector |S′〉, which lies in the plane A1.
|S′〉 = PA1,·|S〉||PA1,·|S〉||
= s1,1|A1B1〉+ s1,2|A1B2〉√
s21,1 + s21,2
. (1.8)
Finally, we will consider the case in which measurement B is performed
after measurement A has yielded A1. The projector associated with out-
come B1 is
P·,B1 = |A1B1〉〈A1B1|+ |A2B1〉〈A2B1| =

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 .
Note that, since outcome A1 was obtained, the state vector |S′〉 now has
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the form 1.8. The associated probability is therefore:
P (B1|A1) = 〈S′|P·,B1 |S′〉
=
(
s1,1 s1,2 0 0
)√
s21,1 + s21,2

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0

(
s1,1 s1,2 0 0
)T√
s21,1 + s21,2
.
=
s21,1
s21,1 + s21,2
. (1.9)
Note that equations 1.6, 1.7 and 1.9 follow Bayes’ rule. This is an example
of the fact that if all outcomes of a system are compatible, the resulting
probabilities are classical (see Busemeyer & Bruza (2012, Chapter 2.1.1.4).
The space, subspaces, projectors and probabilities we have just defined,
can also be constructed starting from the smaller Hilbert spaces represent-
ing the individual measurements (as constructed in Section 1.2.1). To do
so, we will tensor the relevant spaces and matrices. First define HA as the
Hilbert space associated with measurement A, with a state vector |SA〉
|SA〉 = a1|A1〉+ a2|A2〉
and HB as the Hilbert space associated with measurement B, with a state
vector |SB〉
|SB〉 = b1|B1〉+ ab|B2〉.
We can now define HA,B as
HA,B = HA ⊗HB,
in which ⊗ denotes the tensorproduct. The state vector |S〉 now looks like
|S〉 =
∑
i,j
si,j (|Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉).
The projector PA1,B1 , associated with obtaining A1 and B1, is defined as
PA1,B1 = PA1 ⊗ PB1 ,
with PA1 and PB1 the relevant projectors in HA and HB. The projector
PA1,·, associated with obtaining A1 and not performing measurement B
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is defined as
PA1,. = PA1 ⊗ I25.
The other constructions are similar. It should be clear that the construc-
tion starting from the 4-dimensional space and the construction tensoring
the two 2-dimensional spaces result in an identical model.
Incompatible Measurements
The more interesting case is when we model incompatible measurements.
Suppose we still have measurement A, with outcomes A1 and A2 and
measurement B, with outcomes B1 and B2. Now, however, no outcome of
measurement A can be observed simultaneously with an outcome of mea-
surement B, as performing one measurement would influence the outcome
of the other measurement. This means that there is no subspace repre-
senting, for instance, the event ‘A1 and B1’. This is modeled by having the
orthonormal basis, |A1〉 and |A2〉 representing measurement A, and the
orthonormal basis, |B1〉 and |B2〉 representing measurement B, defined in
the same 2-dimensional Hilbert Space. We will use coordinates relative to
the basis associated with measurement A, making the state vector |S〉
|S〉 = a1|A1〉+ a2|A2〉.
Note that this choice is arbitrary. Using coordinates relative to the basis
associated with measurement B would yield identical results. Suppose
that the angle between |A1〉 and |B1〉 is θ. This gives
|B1〉 = cos θ|A1〉+ sin θ|A2〉,
|B2〉 = − sin θ|A1〉+ cos θ|A2〉,
with their respective projectors
PB1 = |B1〉〈B1| =
(
cos2 θ cos θ sin θ
cos θ sin θ sin2 θ
)
,
PB2 = |B2〉〈B2| =
(
sin2 θ − sin θ cos θ
− sin θ cos θ cos2 θ
)
.
This can be viewed in figure 1.4. Note that there is indeed no vector
representing anything of the form ‘Ai and Bj ’.
5Throughout this thesis we define In as the n× n identity matrix.
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|A2〉
|A1〉
|S〉
a1
a2
|B1〉
|B2〉
θ
Figure 1.4 The incompatible measurements A and B are each repre-
sented by an orthonormal basis in the same Hilbert space. The state of
the system is represented by state vector |S〉, described in coordinates
relative to the basis associated with measurement A.
The probability of obtaining outcome B1 (without having performed
measurement A), given a state vector |S〉, can now be calculated directly:
P (B1) = 〈S|PB1 |S〉
= a21 cos2 θ + a22 sin2 θ + 2a1a2 cos θ sin θ
= (a1 cos θ + a2 sin θ)2. (1.10)
Or, using the simple forms from 1.1 and 1.2:
P (B1) = 〈B1|S〉2
= (a1 cos θ + a2 sin θ)2. (1.11)
If we now wish to calculate the probability of obtaining outcome B1 after
having obtained A1 (making the state vector |S′〉 = |A1〉, see result 1.3),
we get:
P (B1|A1) = 〈A1|PB1 |A1〉
= 〈A1|B1〉2 (1.12)
= cos2 θ. (1.13)
Note that this has a different form from equation 1.9. Likewise, the prob-
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ability of obtaining outcome B1 after having obtained A2 is:
P (B1|A2) = 〈A2|PB1 |A2〉
= 〈A2|B1〉2
= sin2 θ. (1.14)
This leads to an interesting observation. Combining 1.1 with 1.13, 1.2
with 1.14 and comparing to 1.10, we get the surprising result
P (B1|A1)P (A1) + P (B1|A2)P (A2) = a21 cos2 θ + a22 sin2 θ
6= a21 cos2 θ + a22 sin2 θ + 2a1a2 cos θ sin θ
= (a1 cos θ + a2 sin θ)2
= P (B1).
This is a clear violation of classical probability rules. The extra term
2a1a2 cos θ sin θ is called the interference term. The act of performing
measurement A, regardless of the outcome, influences measurement B.
The mathematical reason for this violation is that the projectors PAi and
PBj do not commute, meaning that the order in which the measurements
are performed influences the outcomes. Naturally emerging violations are
the prime reason why quantum models are considered in social sciences,
as in human behavior many similar violations are observed.
1.3 Two Examples
We will briefly discuss two applications of the quantum framework in cog-
nition, to show the strength of the formalism. We will give no in-depth
background or statistical fit of these paradigms, but briefly sketch how
a certain classical statistical violation arises in human behavior and how
quantum theory explains it. This should provide context to the previous
section. As these two examples are well-known examples in quantum cog-
nition literature, more background can easily be found in the references
provided.
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1.3.1 The Trustworthiness of Clinton and Gore - Order
Effects
This example is discussed thoroughly, with statistical fit to data in Wang
& Busemeyer (2013). In a Gallup poll, conducted September 6-7, 1997,
participants were asked two separate yes-no questions: if they thought
Clinton was honest and trustworthy and if they thought Gore was honest
and trustworthy. The data show that the order of these question, influ-
ences the outcome. If the Clinton question was the first to be asked, the
trustworthy-rating of Clinton was 53%, when second it increased to 59%.
If the Gore question was the first, the trustworthy-rating of Gore was
76%, when second it decreased to 67%. This is explained in the original
article (Moore, 2002) as a consistency effect: when the second question is
linked to first, the difference between the two becomes smaller. As such,
Gore’s trustworthiness diminishes when measured after Clinton’s trust-
worthiness, while Clinton’s trustworthiness increases when measured after
Gore’s trustworthiness. We will view the two questions as incompatible,
as answering one of them, influences the outcome of the other. This shows
how both questions are contextual and not absolute. They depend on the
context of the other question being asked.
The Hilbert space we will use will have coordinates relative to the
Clinton question and is thus spanned by the orthonormal basis consisting
of the vector |C+〉, representing that Clinton is trustworthy and the vector
|C−〉, representing that Clinton is not trustworthy. As the questions are
considered incompatible, we will define a second orthonormal basis, con-
sisting of the vectors |G+〉 and |G−〉 which represent the Gore question
similarly, as
|G+〉 = cos θ|C+〉+ sin θ|C−〉
|G−〉 = − sin θ|C+〉+ cos θ|C−〉.
We define θ = 0.15666 and the state vector |S〉 as
|S〉 = 0.7798|C+〉+ 0.6261|C−〉.
6The parameter θ = 0.1566 and all following parameters are obtained by minimizing
an appropriate χ2-statistic. This process fits the derived probabilities to the observed
proportions reported previously. As this is an introductory example, we will not go into
further details. A thoroughly discussed statistical fit, using a complex Hilbert space,
can be found in Wang & Busemeyer (2013).
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Performing the Clinton question first results in the probabilities
P (C+) = 〈S|C+〉2 = 0.6080
P (C−) = 〈S|C−〉2 = 0.3920.
Performing the Gore question first results in the probabilities
P (G+) = 〈S|G+〉2 = 0.7532 (1.15)
P (G−) = 〈S|G−〉2 = 0.2468
However, performing the Gore question after the Clinton question gives
us
P (G+|C+) = 〈C+|G+〉2 = 0.9757
P (G+|C−) = 〈C−|G+〉2 = 0.0243,
as the state vector now has first collapsed on |C+〉 or |C−〉. So the probabil-
ity of thinking Gore is trustworthy after replying to the Clinton question
(regardless of the outcome) is
P (G+|C+)P (C+) + P (G+|C−)P (C−) = 0.6028. (1.16)
Comparing results 1.15 and 1.16 shows that the quantum-like model in-
deed predicts a diminishing trustworthiness rating of Gore, when mea-
sured as a second question.
1.3.2 Linda, the Bank Teller - Conjunction Fallacy
There is an in-depth discussion of this example in Busemeyer et al. (2011),
Franco (2009) and Busemeyer & Bruza (2012). It concerns the famous
“Linda” problem, a conjunction fallacy discussed first in Tversky & Kah-
neman (1983). In the experiment, participants are provided a brief story
about a woman named Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also par-
ticipated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
The participants are then asked to rank the likelihood of a list of events.
Two of these are
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(a) Linda is a bank teller
(b) Linda is active in the feminist movement and is a bank teller.
Classical probability theory says that the probability of (a) is always
higher than (or equal to) the probability of (b), due to the conjunc-
tion form of (b). However, participants regularly deem (b) more probable
than (a). We will show that a simple quantum-like model can account
for this conjunction fallacy, by assuming that the feminist assessment
and the bank-teller assessment are incompatible. We will work in a two-
dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by the basis |F+〉 and |F−〉, represent-
ing the participant thinking Linda is a feminist (F+) or is not a feminist
(F−). The participant is represented by the state vector |S〉
|S〉 = f+|F+〉+ f−|F−〉.
The bank-teller assessment is represented by another basis in the same
Hilbert space, in which the assumption that Linda is a bank teller (B+)
or is not a bank teller (B−) is respectively represented by
|B+〉 = cos θ|F+〉+ sin θ|F−〉
|B−〉 = sin θ|F+〉 − cos θ|F−〉.
Therefore, the probability associated with (a) is
P (a) = P (B+) = 〈B+|S〉2 = (f+ cos θ + f− sin θ)2. (1.17)
When resolving the likelihood of (b), the participant is supposed to first
assess Linda’s ‘feminism’ and then her ‘bank tellerism’.
P (b) = P (F+)P (B+|F+) = 〈F+|S〉2〈B+|F+〉2 = f2+ cos2 θ. (1.18)
Note that after assessing Linda as a feminist, the state vector transforms
into |F+〉. It is perfectly possible for P (b) (1.18) to be greater than P (a)
18 Chapter 1
(1.17). For instance, using the following values of f+, f− and θ7
f+ = 0.987
f− = −0.1564
θ = 25pi,
gives us
P (a) = (f+ cos θ + f− sin θ)2 = 0.0254
P (b) = f2+ cos2 θ = 0.0932.
1.4 Aim and Outline
We believe that the quantum formalism has already shown its worth in
social sciences. The previous two short examples are only the tip of the
iceberg of what has been done in this field. Therefore, the focus of this the-
sis is not to show that quantum cognition works, but to investigate what
its strengths and weaknesses are. We wish to determine when a quantum-
like model yields interesting predictions or when there is a clear natural
classical equivalent, making the quantum nature of model not the core
of a models strength. We also wish to investigate the boundaries of this
approach. When will the quantum approach not suffice to model certain
situations? These questions, and the answers we provide, are small steps
towards a (utopian) ‘general quantum recipe’ for making it evident both
when to use a quantum framework and how to implement it. We opted
for an application-driven approach. We investigate two paradigms, each
from a distinct field in social sciences, where quantum-like models are con-
structed and we take a critical look at their successes and shortcomings.
In both cases, we propose improvements to remedy the identified short-
comings. This approach has two clear advantages. First, the examples are
valuable on their own. The resulting models yield interesting outcomes
in their respective fields, even when not framed in the larger discussion
on the use of quantum cognition. Second, we avoid an all too theoretical
discussion, that might cloud any prospect of applicability. The core of this
thesis consists of three chapters. As Chapters 2 and 3 are published arti-
7The high coordinate f+ signifies the description of Linda reflecting a feminist
stereotype. The fact that θ puts |F−〉 and |B+〉 close, signifies the participants’ difficulty
of blending ‘the feminist’ and ‘the bank teller’ into one mental picture. These values
are taken from Busemeyer & Bruza (2012).
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cles and Chapter 4 is an extension of a published paper, they can be read
separately. This means that overlap in content will occur. However, we do
recommend reading them consecutively, as Chapter 4 continues ideas first
explored in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2 quantum-like models for a memory experiment are con-
structed and commented upon. The memory experiment itself concerns
the human episodic memory. Participants were asked to memorize and
recollect word lists. During this recollection, they exhibited a disjunction
fallacy, pointing to a quantum-like treatment. A first attempt at capturing
this experiment and explaining the disjunction fallacy using a quantum-
like model was performed in Brainerd et al. (2013). After introducing this
first model, we show that it has interpretational problems and we con-
struct a classical equivalent showing that the explanation of the fallacy
provided by Brainerd et al. is not quantum-like in nature. We also con-
struct an alternative quantum-like model, by assuming complementarity
between certain memory types. This way we are able to capture the in-
trinsic relationship between the two memory types in a satisfactory way,
taking into account their mutual interference. We prove that our new
model also exhibits the fallacy of interest. We show that our alternative,
while having a slightly better statistical fit than model of Brainerd et al.,
has no clear classical equivalent.
Chapter 3 concerns a sequential prisoner’s dilemma experiment, dis-
cussed originally in Blanco et al. (2014). In this experiment the strategic
moves of participants are recorded. However, in a subgroup of the partici-
pant, the beliefs concerning opponents’ behavior are also elicited. The ob-
tained data show a violation of the sure-thing principle, which we explain
by assuming the incompatibility of participants’ moves and beliefs. We
show that a straightforward translation of the paradigm into a quantum-
like setting results in an unsatisfactory, overparametrized model. We solve
this problem by going beyond the standard quantum-like approach and
use projectors similar to a POVM approach, which makes use of the or-
dered nature of the outcomes of the belief measurement. POVMs are an
extension of the typical PVM approach and are frequently used in physics
to model noise in a measurement. This noise in a measurement is now re-
flected in an unsharp measurement, where it is possible for a participant
to not completely distinguish between two possible answers to a question.
Chapter 4 aims at placing the alternative solution constructed in Chap-
ter 3 in a more general light. We show that the problems arising from the
construction the straightforward quantum-like model in Chapter 3 also
20 Chapter 1
emerge in other settings. We then investigate if the solution to these prob-
lems in Chapter 3 also works more generally. This results in a new type
of quantum-like measurements, outside the realm of standard quantum
theory, which can take into account the ordered structure of outcomes.
These three chapters together shed a light on what exactly propels
this formalism to its success. By contrasting what works and what is
problematic, we aim to further this new field as it shows in what funda-
mental ways (both mathematical and interpretational) the quantum-like
approach differs from classical approaches. This should clarify the role of
concepts such as ‘superposition’ and ‘complementarity’ in these models
and showcase why they are so adequate at explaining human behavior.
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Abstract. We comment on the use of the mathematical formalism
of Quantum Mechanics in the analysis of the documented subad-
ditivity phenomenon in human episodic memory. This approach
was first proposed in Brainerd et al. (2013). The subadditivity of
probability in focus arises as a violation of the disjunction rule of
Boolean algebra. This phenomenon is viewed as a consequence of
the co-existence of two types of memory traces: verbatim and gist.
Instead of assuming that verbatim and gist trace can combine into
a coherent memory state of superposition as is done in the QEM
model, we propose to model gist and verbatim traces as Bohr com-
plementary properties of memory. In mathematical terms, we rep-
resent the two types of memory as alternative bases of one and
the same Hilbert Space. We argue that, in contrast with the QEM
model, our model appeals to the one essential distinction between
classical and quantum models of reality namely the existence of in-
compatible but complementary properties of a system. This feature
is also at the heart of the quantum cognition approach to mental
phenomena. We sketch an experiment that could separate the two
models. We next test our model with data from the same word list
experiment as the one used by Brainerd et al.. While our model
entails significantly less degrees of freedom it yields a good fit to
the experimental data.
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2.1 Introduction
In this article we will extend the work done in Brainerd et al. (2013) in
using the quantum formalism to explain phenomena in human memory.
In Brainerd et al. (2013), a memory analogue to the superposition prin-
ciple of quantum mechanics is proposed and formally tested. The phe-
nomenon that is studied concerns a two step experiment dealing with
human episodic memory, where autobiographical memories are stored. In
the first step participants memorize various word lists. In the second step
participants are asked to accept or decline statements about these mem-
orized word lists. These can be specific statements, asking the agent if
they remember a word being part of a specific list or be more general
statements, regarding the presence of a word on any of the remembered
lists. Participants are shown to exhibit episodic subadditivity, a violation
of the classical disjunction rule, which is attributed to the episodic mem-
ory consisting of two distinct memory types: verbatim memory and gist
memory. We will discuss these two memories types more extensively in
Section 2. The authors of Brainerd et al. (2013) view this experiment as
a memory analogue to the classic double slit experiment in Physics. We
will summarize and discuss this approach in Section three and use it as
an example to introduce the quantum formalism.
In Section 2.4 we propose an alternative view on subadditivity, where
we view different types of human episodic memory as complementary
properties of human memory. This idea was first proposed in Lambert-
Mogiliansky (2014) and chapter 6 of Busemeyer & Bruza (2012) and was
used as an example of the importance of non-orthogonal vectors as the
distinction between quantum and classical models presented in Denolf
(2015). Here we will flesh out this view in the form of a new model, called
the Complementary Memory Types (CMT) model. We will fit this model
to the data of an experiment discussed in Section 2. In our view, this CMT
model elegantly models the overdistribution. We also claim that the CMT
model is easily adjustable to be applied to other datasets, which might
express different forms of additivity in their disjunction rule. We briefly
suggest an extension of the previously discussed experiment, where we
include the possibility of measuring order effects. These order effects are
viewed as an expression of the non-classical nature of human memory and
are naturally modeled within the CMT model.
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2.2 The Source Memory Experiment and Overdis-
tribution
Experiments and literature concerning human episodic memory are classi-
cally divided in two types, item memory and source memory. The former
deals with the ability to remember previously acquired information, e.g.,
if a word was previously seen, the latter also deals with contextual infor-
mation, e.g., where a word was previously seen. In these episodic memory
experiments participants are asked to memorize different sets of words
and recollect these afterward. Doing so, two types of memory distortions
are exhibited, false memories and overdistribution.
To define these two memory distortions, we will expand on an ex-
ample by Brainerd et al. concerning item memory. Suppose participants
memorized a list of target words containing, amongst others, the words
Pepsi, 7up and Sprite and are presented the test word Coke. They are
then asked to categorize the given test word as a target word, where a
target word denotes a word that was studied, a related distractor or an
unrelated distractor. Since Coke was not on the list of target words, but
shares semantic features with target words, it should be categorized as
a related distractor. When a participant wrongly remembers Coke as a
target word but not as a related distractor, we denote this distortion as
false memories.
In addition to false memory, it can occur that participants remem-
ber Coke as both a target word and a related distractor. Here, memory
retrieval is distorted by past experience, which are in this case, other
memorized words. This form of memory distortion is denoted as overdis-
tribution.
These two forms of memory errors are fundamentally different since
the total error can be divided in these two types of mistakes, as shown in
Brainerd et al. (2010).
Since participants know that a word cannot be both a target word
and a related distractor, overdistribution can not be directly observed.
We have to rely on the classic disjunction rule to measure the amount
of overdistribution participants exhibit. Therefore, after presenting the
participant a test word, the participant is also presented with one of three
possible recognition statements. The participant is then asked to either
accept or reject the statement they received. The three possible statements
are: (a) the test word is a target word, (b) the test word is a related
distractor and (c) the test word is a target word or related distractor. This
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way, the following quantities can be defined and measured for each test
word: Pw(T ) as the proportion of participants remembering the test word
w as a target word, Pw(R) as the proportion of participants remembering
the test word w as a related distractor and Pw(T ∪ R) as the proportion
of participants remembering the test word w as a target word or a related
distractor, without specifying which of the two. This way the probability
that a participant would remember the test word w as both a target word
and a related distractor can be defined as:
Pw(T ∩R) = Pw(T ) + Pw(R)− Pw(T ∪R). (2.1)
With this definition, the overdistribution phenomenon can be mathemat-
ically expressed as a violation of the disjunction rule, since participants
with perfect memory would exhibit Pw(T ) + Pw(R) − Pw(T ∪ R) = 0
for each test word w. Viewing overdistribution as a disjunction fallacy,
it is shown in Brainerd & Reyna (2008) and Brainerd et al. (2010) that
overdistribution can be seen as a consequence of dual-trace distinctions
from Fuzzy-Trace Theory developed in Reyna & Brainerd (1995). This
theory postulates that human episodic memories are stored in two differ-
ent types of memory. The first memory type is referred to as verbatim
memory, encompassing the presentation and phonology of a memorized
word. The second memory type is referred to as gist memory, encompass-
ing the semantic meaning of a memorized word. Target words and related
distractors can share the same gist trace (e.g. coke and sprite are both soft
drinks). Since both verbatim and gist traces are used in deciding if a word
is a target word, these gist traces account for words being viewed as both
target words and related distractors, resulting in episodic overdistribu-
tion. For a more complete overview of episodic distribution, including the
implementation of other theories than the Fuzzy-Trace theory, see Kellen
et al. (2014).
In this paper we will focus on an experiment reported in Brainerd
& Reyna (2008) and extended in Brainerd et al. (2012), concerning the
overdistribution of the source memory. As this experiment concerned
source memory, participants were tasked not only with remembering if
a word was studied, but also with remembering where (e.g. which list)
the word was first presented on.
Seventy participants were asked to memorize three distinct word lists,
containing different words. Each of these lists contain 36 words (2-word
starting and ending buffers, 32 target words), a different background color
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and a different font in which the words were printed, to ensure that each
list was distinctive. Each of these participants was then presented a list of
192 test items. A test item comprises a combination of a test word and a
recognition statement. These test words originated from 1 out of 4 differ-
ent sources: one of the three memorized lists or a non-memorized list of
unrelated distractors. The four possible recognition statements were, (a)
the test word is on list 1, (b) the test word is on list 2, (c) the test word
is on list 3 or (d) the test word is on one of the lists. Each of these test
words was presented with 1 out of these 4 recognition statements, such
that, across all participants, each test word had probability .25 of being
presented with each of the recognition statements. The experiment also
varied the test words between word concreteness (abstract/concrete) and
word frequency (high/low frequency use in common language), resulting
in 4 different word types. These manipulations were done for theoretical
reasons, since it was predicted that abstract and low frequency words cre-
ate weaker verbatim traces than concrete high frequency words, resulting
in a clearer overdistribution for abstract low frequency words, see Brain-
erd et al. (2012) and Brainerd & Reyna (2005) for more details. This gives
us 16 experimental conditions (4 word types × 4 possible sources), each
with four possible measurements (the four recognition statements).
For the participant responses, the following proportions were calculated,
for each type of test word: p1, p2, p3 which were the proportions of ac-
cepted statements of resp. type (a), type (b) and type (c) and p123 which
was the proportion of accepted statements of type (d). These proportions
are seen as the probability of the event that an agent thinks that the test
word is on a certain list for proportion pi (similar to P (T ) and P (R) from
the item version of overdistribution) or the probability of the event that
the agent thinks that the test word is on any of the lists, for p123 (similar
to P (T ∪R) from the item version of overdistribution). These results can
be found in table 2.1. Because of the structure of the recognition state-
ments, the event associated with p123 can be seen as the disjunction of
the events associated with pi.
Now we can express the overdistribution in the source memory as a
violation of the disjunction rule, with the conjunction part equal to 0,
since agents know that none of the words appear on more than one list :
p1 + p2 + p3 = p123. (2.2)
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From this expression we define the subadditivity effect as:
S = p1 + p2 + p3 − p123. (2.3)
This is shown in Brainerd et al. (2012) to be significantly differing from
0.
2.3 Quantum Episodic Memory
2.3.1 Introducing Quantum Models
In order to define a cognitive model based on the quantum formalism,
the notion of state, measurement, outcome and probability need to be
defined. These notions differ markedly with the corresponding notions
commonly employed within cognitive science. Recently, different aspects
of the quantum formalism have had encouraging success in producing
models in areas such as game theory (Martínez-Martínez, 2014), decision
theory (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2009) and models for the human men-
tal lexicon (Bruza et al., 2009), domains within cognition having links to
human memory. In addition, the quantum formalism, has proven useful
in modeling logical fallacies, such as the inverse fallacy (Franco, 2007). As
the experiment previously described reveals the disjunction fallacy within
human memory, it seems a feasible candidate for a quantum model. For an
overview of the use of the quantum formalism in social sciences, see Buse-
meyer & Bruza (2012). Note that different interpretations can be given to
what exactly happens in a quantum system on a subatomic scale. We are
agnostic in this discussion and just borrow the mathematical framework
devised for describing said events. The defining difference between our
use of quantum techniques and classical models is that the subject, e.g.,
a particle in physics or in our case, a human, is not in a definite state.
Take a simple system where a measurement A has two possible outcome
states A+ and A−, e.g. the spin of a subatomic particle. In a non-quantum
model, the system has a definite state, which can be measured by the ob-
server. This state can evolve over time. Using quantum techniques, it is
possible to model a system that can be in an indefinite state between dif-
ferent definite states or outcomes. This phenomenon is referred to as the
superposition principle. When an observer performs a measurement, the
act of measuring itself changes the system fundamentally and forces it to
leave the superposition and become a possible outcome, or in quantum
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jargon, collapse onto a definite state. This collapse is probabilistic in na-
ture. This notion of measurement fundamentally changes the role of the
observer of a system, which can not be seen as a separate entity, but is
an intrinsic part of the system.
This is mathematically modeled by replacing the classical subsets of
the sample space containing all the possible outcomes of the measurement
by a Hilbert Space H1, which is spanned by normalized vectors represent-
ing the possible outcomes. The probability function, which maps outcomes
to their associated probabilities, is replaced by a normalized state vector
|S〉 within H. Here we introduce Dirac’s bra-ket notation, where 〈V | is
a row vector and |V 〉 is a column vector. To continue our previous ex-
ample, we have a Hilbert Space HA = 〈|A+〉, |A−〉〉 and a state vector
|S〉 = a+|A+〉 + a−|A−〉, before measurement. This represents that, be-
fore measurement, the system is between two possible outcomes A+ and
A−. When the measurement is performed, the system has to collapse on a
possible outcome, so the state vector transforms into either |S〉 = |A+〉 or
|S〉 = |A−〉. Generally speaking, when an event is observed, the state vec-
tor gets projected orthogonally onto a subspace representing the observed
outcome and is then normalized. This subspace is spanned by the vectors
representing the events, which form the disjunction of the observed event.
Here, in the most simple case, the event of observing outcome Ai is asso-
ciated with the projector PAi = |Ai〉〈Ai|, which projects the state vector
orthogonally onto the vector associated with the observed outcome, after
normalizing:
PAi |S〉
||PAi |S〉||
= |Ai〉. (2.4)
If, for example, the disjunction of events A1, . . . , Ak is observed, the state
vector is projected onto the subspace spanned by {|A1〉, . . . , |Ak〉}, with
|Ai〉 representing event Ai. Collapse is probabilistic. The closer a state
vector is to an outcome vector, the higher the probability that the outcome
will be observed. Expressing this idea of distance as a probability, we define
the probability pi of |S〉 collapsing on |Ai〉 as pi = ||PAi |S〉||2 = 〈S|PAi |S〉.
In our example, we have p(A+) = p+ = a2+ and p(A−) = p− = a2−, as can
be seen in figure 1. The normalization restriction of the state vector makes
the sum of the probabilities across all possible outcomes of measurement
A equal to 1 2.
1A Hilbert Space is a vector space with a inner product defined on its vectors. Here
we will only consider real vector spaces with the Euclidean inner product.
2This is a direct consequence of the Hilbert Space being spanned by an orthonormal
base.
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|A−〉
|A+〉
|S〉
a+
a−
Figure 2.1 Observing outcome A+, with probability a2+, projects the
state vector |S〉 onto |A+〉
2.3.2 The QEM Model
We will illustrate this formalism by constructing the QEM model of Brain-
erd et al. (2013), where it is fitted with the data from the three list experi-
ment described previously. Here the authors describe the state of memory
as being in superposition between different memory traces, represented
by orthonormal basis vectors, spanning the Hilbert Space. These traces
consist of a verbatim trace for each of memorized lists, represented by
|V1〉, |V2〉 and |V3〉, a gist trace for the semantic features represented by
|G〉 and an unrelated distractor trace, represented by |U〉. We have the
memory state represented by:
|S〉 = v1|V1〉+ v2|V2〉+ v3|V3〉+ g|G〉+ u|U〉. (2.5)
Since a state vector is always normalized, we can consider u as a function
of v1, v2, v3 and g. Here, the QEM model has 4 parameters for each of the
16 experimental conditions. Since at least two types of statement do not
match the test word, the associated coordinates of the verbatim traces
of lists not containing the test word are considered equal and will be
denoted as vnt. Likewise, we will denote the coordinate associated with
the verbatim trace of the list the test word is found on as vt. This way
when a test word from list 1 (similarly for list 2 and 3) is presented, the
memory state is represented by the state vector:
S1 = vt|V1〉+ vnt|V2〉+ vnt|V3〉+ g|G〉+ u|U〉 (2.6)
and when a unrelated distractor word is presented the memory state is
represented by the state vector:
S4 = vnt|V1〉+ vnt|V2〉+ vnt|V3〉+ g|G〉+ u|U〉. (2.7)
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Now we need to define the projectors associated with each of the possi-
ble outcomes of each of the possible measurements. Since the dual trace
distinction theorizes that agents use both gist and verbatim traces when
recognizing test words as being on a memorized list, accepting a statement
that a test word was on a list will project the memory state vector on a sub-
space spanned by the vectors associated with both the relevant verbatim
trace and the gist trace. Accepting a statement of type (a), that the test
word was on list 1, will therefore be represented by the projection on the
plane spanned by |V1〉 and |G〉. Since these vectors are basis vectors, span-
ning the Hilbert Space, the projector matrix isM1 = diag(1, 0, 0, 1, 0). The
projector matrices associated with accepting statements of type (b) and
(c) are calculated similarly and are respectively M2 = diag(0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
and M3 = diag(0, 0, 1, 1, 0). The projectors associated with rejecting a
statement of type (a), (b) or (c) are defined as Mi = I5−Mi, with I5 the
5× 5 identity matrix.
The projector associated with accepting a statement of type (d), the
OR statement, is constructed by viewing this acceptance as a decline of
the conjunction that the test word is not on list i, for i = 1, 2, 3. Straight-
forward calculation gives us M123 = I5− (I5−M3)(I5−M2)(I5−M1) =
diag(1, 1, 1, 1, 0). We also define the projector associated with rejecting a
statement op type (d) as M123 = I5 −M123. We define the probability of
accepting a statement as pi, with i = 1 . . . 3 for statements of type (a),
(b) or (c) respectively and, abusing notation, i = 123 for statements of
type (d) . This gives us pˆi = 〈Sj |Mi|Sj〉, for a test word from list j, with
j = 4 for words not on any of the lists.
For the 12 out of 16 experimental conditions where a test word from
a list is presented, the QEM has 3 parameters: vt, vnt and g. For the 4
experimental conditions where an unrelated distractor is presented, the
QEM model has 2 parameters: vnt and g. This leads to a total of 44
parameters. The fit of this model to the observed proportions has been
established by Brainerd et.al. in Brainerd et al. (2013), by calculating a
G2 statistic we will define in Section 4.4. This G2 statistic compares the
QEM model to a saturated model. A saturated model is a model with as
many parameters as data points, therefore having a perfect fit of the data.
This way, the G2 statistic calculates how close the proportions estimated
by the QEM model are to the observed proportions. Here, the QEM model
does not predict significantly worse than a saturated model in 13 out of
16 experimental conditions at the α = .05 level. The QEM model also
does not significantly differ from the saturated model summed across all
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experimental conditions (p-value equal to .14), giving strong evidence that
the QEM model fits the data well.
2.3.3 Discussion of the QEM Model
In this paper we only use the QEM model to compare its fit of the ex-
perimental data to the CMT model, which is defined in the next session.
For this reason we will only summarize the two major criticisms leveled at
this model. For a detailed critical analysis of the QEM model, see Denolf
(2015),
The first criticism relates to the chosen representation. When modeling
the three alternative verbatim traces and the gist trace as basis vectors
in one and the same basis, by force of the mathematics they are defined
as mutually exclusive. Theoretically, after the respondent would retrieve
V1, the probability for G is zero because the measurement (with V1, V2,
V3, U and G as a response) has already been performed and the outcome
was V1. But in our view retrieving purely orthographical memory is not
inconsistent with retrieving semantic memory: verbatim and gist are not
mutually exclusive even if they cannot be simultaneously retrieved. In
what follows, we assume that after theoretically obtaining response V1
you should have a non-zero probability in obtaining G in a next following
measurement.
The second criticism relates to a technical issue: the orthogonality of
the verbatim and gist vectors. It can be shown (as in Denolf (2015)) that
performing one measurement, with all relevant vectors orthogonal, leads
to a distribution which always has a classical equivalent. This classical
equivalent has identical resulting predictions and fit, with it’s parameters
having a one-to-one connection to the parameters of the QEM model.
Here, the classical distribution has a sample space of 5 discrete events,
each with a probability as denoted in Table 2.2. The agent accepting a
statement of type (a) is now represented by the event V c1 ∪G. The corre-
sponding parameters can also be easily calculated: vc1 = v21 and gc = g2.
Statements of type (b), (c) and (d) have a similar representation. It can
also be shown that all relevant matrices in the QEM model commute, so
even extending the model to incorporate multiple measurements, would
not lead to a model without a classical equivalent. Since these matrices
commute, it is impossible to model order effects, which we consider a prime
example of the non-classical nature of quantum measurements. We will
briefly discuss the role of these order effect at the end of Section 4. This
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Event Probability
V c1 v
c
1
V c2 v
c
2
V c3 v
c
3
Gc gc
U c uc
Table 2.2 A classical equivalent to the QEM model
reasoning holds for all quantum models with all relevant vectors orthogo-
nal: one can always easily define a simple equivalent classical distribution,
with the respective probabilities being the square of the coordinates of
the state vector.
The QEM model, while having a good fit, does not seem to fully utilize
the advantages the quantum formalism has. On both the interpretational
level as the mathematical level, concerns can be raised. All of these con-
cerns seem to have root in the fact that all relevant vectors are orthogonal.
In the next section, we will propose a new model, where the introduction of
one vector non-orthogonal to the other relevant vectors, will significantly
enhance the use of the quantum formalism.
2.4 Complementary Memory Types
2.4.1 Complementarity
The term complementarity was introduced in quantum mechanics by Niels
Bohr. It is also referred to as Bohr complementarity to distinguish it from
the common notion of complementarity. Two properties of a system are
said to be Bohr complementary if they cannot be measured simultane-
ously, that is the system cannot have a definite value with respect to both
of the properties at the same time. Yet the properties are not mutually
exclusive in the sense that they capture aspects that complement each
other in the description of the system. The most well-known such pair is
position and momentum. This feature central to quantum mechanics has
other expressions. In particular, since complementary properties cannot
have definite value simultaneously, measurements affect the system imply-
ing that the order of measurements matters to the outcome. This in turn
leads to violations of the classical law of probability and generates phe-
nomena of sub(super)additivity of the kind exhibited in the experiment
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under consideration in this paper.
The idea that mental phenomena exhibit Bohr complementarity is at
the basis of most works within quantum cognition and consistent with
the intuition of the grounding fathers of quantum mechanics, including
Niels Bohr himself. This hypothesis has also shown itself very successful
in explaining a wide range of psychological and behavioral phenomena
(see for example Franco (2007) and Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2009)).
The psychological interpretation is that the human mind cannot be fully
decomposed into separated pieces but tends to function as a whole piece.
As a consequence it exhibits “cognitive limitation"3. In particular, it can-
not aggregate/combine all relevant perspectives on a phenomenon into
a single synthetic mental picture, which is not unlike notions from dual
trace theory. When we are determined with respect to one perspective
another might get blurred. A stark illustration is provided by ambiguous
pictures: two images can be true but you cannot see them simultaneously.
When it comes to memory, the mind may be in the gist trace perspective
and switch to the verbatim trace. But it is difficult to simultaneously re-
trieve a clear gist value and a clear verbatim trace value. The memory of
a stimulus is more like one single system that cannot be addressed from
one perspective without being affected i.e., without that operation affect-
ing the value of future retrievals from other complementary perspectives.
As a consequence the order of retrieval matters and the laws of classical
probability can be violated. The idea of verbatim and gist traces being
complementary has already been applied to item memory in Busemeyer &
Bruza (2012) and Busemeyer & Trueblood (2010)4. It has been proposed
in Lambert-Mogiliansky (2014) and Denolf (2015) to use complementarity
between a verbatim and a gist trace in source memory.
2.4.2 The CMT Model
Two complementary measurements are represented by different orthonor-
mal bases in the Hilbert Space. Applied here, the verbatim and gist traces
3It is limited in the sense that human cognition produces a mental picture that is
not necessarily correctly reflecting the actual object in the outside world. In particular
properties of an object that are fully compatible in nature may not be compatible in the
mind. So as the mind creates a mental picture by processing information, it needs not
converge to a single complete picture but can keep on oscillating as in the perception
of ambiguous pictures.
4Note that it would be hard to do a formal comparison between item memory
models and source memory models. We list these as inspiration, since these models
also assume complementarity between a verbatim and a gist trace.
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are now considered to be represented by different orthonormal bases in
the same Hilbert Space. Their relationship is represented by a base change
matrix. We will keep |V ′1〉, |V ′2〉, |V ′3〉 and |U ′〉 as basis vectors, giving us a
four dimensional Hilbert space, one dimension less than the QEM model.
We shall call |V ′1〉, |V ′2〉, |V ′3〉 and |U ′〉 the verbatim base. To build the ro-
tation that shifts the basis, we need to define the basis vectors of the gist
base in terms of the verbatim base. This seems like an empirical question,
giving us 4 orthonormal vectors to fit to the experimental data. However,
we opt for a more theoretical approach in which we will build the gist base
by discussing some constraints we wish to put on these 4 gist basis vectors.
In this way, the CMT model is more compact as it involves less parame-
ters. These restrictions also let us build the new model as similar to the
QEM model as possible. We will only change the form of the gist vector,
by making it non-orthogonal to the verbatim vectors. This allows us to
investigate the role of this non-orthogonality, as any difference between
the QEM model and the new model can be attributed to this change. The
resulting theoretical gist base will then be tested, next to other features
of CMT model in Section 2.4.3.
Most importantly, we want a gist base that gives us predictions ex-
hibiting subadditivity, this will be verified later in this section after a
particular form of the gist base is constructed. We also want to retain the
idea that gist traces are represented by only one vector |G′〉 = vg1 |V ′1〉 +
vg2 |V ′2〉+vg3 |V ′3〉+ug|U ′〉, like in the QEM model. The resulting coordinates
vgi and ug are functions that might depend on word frequency/concrete-
ness (4 possibilities), test word type (4 possibilities) and the verbatim
traces (3 possibilities). As such, the coordinates for the gist vector needs
to be, in the worst case, calculated for 4× 4× 3 = 48 different conditions,
this inflates the number of parameters in a dramatic way. This also com-
plicates the construction and form of the relevant projectors and resulting
probabilities. We will therefore explore a simple case of this construction
as an exploratory first step. As we will show in Section 2.4.3, even this
simplest form will result in an acceptable fit, while we still retain ample
room for improvement.
To construct this simplest form, we will first take a look at the de-
pendency of the gist vector on word concreteness/frequency. When cer-
tain words attribute differently to the gist trace due to their frequency
in everyday use or their concreteness, we assume that this effect is word
dependent and does not say anything about the relationship between ver-
batim and gist traces in general. This effect will therefore be incorporated
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in the state vector coordinates (and not in the form of the gist vector),
as we will fit a different state vector for each of the 4 different frequen-
cy/concreteness combinations. We keep the same reasoning for the form
of the gist vector depending on the type of test word: we assume that
different attributions to the gist trace for different test words are word
dependent (again not saying anything about the verbatim/gist relation in
general) and will likewise fit a different state vector for each of the test
word types. This gives us together 16 state vectors to fit to the data. The
last possible dependency we will discuss is the idea that the 3 different
(verbatim) word lists attribute differently to the gist trace. To construct
the most simple form, we will assume that the three word lists from the
experiment play a symmetrical role, as there is no experimental reason
to assume there are key differences between the word lists. Therefore, we
want the coordinates of |G′〉 associated with the verbatim traces to be
equal, giving us vg1 = v
g
2 = v
g
3 . We will call this the symmetry assump-
tion. Next to this restriction, we also argue that ug = 0, since unrelated
distractor traces should not leave any gist traces. Keeping in mind that,
since |G′〉 is a basis vector, it needs to be normalized, we get:
|G′〉 = 1√
3
|V ′1〉+
1√
3
|V ′2〉+
1√
3
|V ′3〉+ 0|U ′〉. (2.8)
This leaves us with defining the three remaining basis vectors to complete
the gist base. These should all represent the participant not retrieving
any gist traces. Since we won’t be using these vectors in the following,
we will just define them as three random orthonormal vectors |NG1〉,
|NG2〉 and |NG3〉, all orthogonal to |G′〉 and to each other. The obser-
vation that a participant does not exhibit any gist traces is seen as de-
generate and is represented by the 3 dimensional hyperspace spanned by
〈|NG1〉, |NG2〉, |NG3〉〉 = |G′〉⊥. This effectively gives us the most simple
gist base possible, as it is parameter-free. This clearly is a rough estima-
tion of how gist and verbatim truly relate, but will suffice as a first step
and comparison with the QEM model, given the data. This also leaves
the door open for more complex models, possibly with new experimental
data.
Now we will combine the idea of complementary measurements, rep-
resented by the different bases, with the way the projectors are defined
in the QEM model. This way we can adjust the model for the item ver-
sion of episodic overdistribution from Busemeyer & Bruza (2012) to fit
the data from the source version of episodic overdistribution. Note that
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we work with the gist base proposed previously, while the dimensional-
ity of the gist trace subspace and the symmetry assumption still needs
to be tested. When a statement of type (a), (b) or (c) is accepted, we
will still project on the subspace spanned by the relevant verbatim trace
vector |V ′i 〉 and the gist vector |G′〉 (this in contrast with sequential pro-
jection as done in the item versions in chapter 6 of Busemeyer & Bruza
(2012) and Busemeyer & Trueblood (2010)). Since we redefined the gist
vector, the projectors will be different from the projectors of the QEM
model. The projector associated with accepting a statement of type (a)
will project the state vector on the subspace spanned by {|V ′1〉, |G′〉},
where |G′〉 = (1/√3, 1/√3, 1/√3, 0). We will now derive the form of this
projector using basic algebraic geometry: An orthonormal base for the
plane spanned by {|V ′1〉, |G′〉} is {|V ′1〉, 1√2 |V ′2〉+ 1√2 |V ′3〉}. So, the orthog-
onal projection on the subspace spanned by this orthonormal base is:
M ′1 =

1 0
0 1√2
0 1√2
0 0
 .
(
1 0 0 0
0 1√2
1√
2 0
)
(2.9)
=

1 0 0 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 12
1
2 0
0 0 0 0
 . (2.10)
The projected state vector now does not have a unique decomposition
in terms of verbatim and gist vectors. This reflects that when a participant
accepts that a word was on list 1, we can not determine how much of this
decision can be attributed to verbatim memory and how much to gist
memory.
Similarly, the projector matrices associated with accepting statements
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of type (b) and (c) are equal to:
M ′2 =

1
2 0
1
2 0
0 1 0 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
0 0 0 0
 (2.11)
M ′3 =

1
2
1
2 0 0
1
2
1
2 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 . (2.12)
We will also retain the idea from the QEM model that the projec-
tor associated with accepting a statement of type (d) is constructed by
viewing this acceptance as a decline of the test word being an unrelated
distractor, not on any list i, for i = 1, 2, 3. This means that the state
vector gets projected on the orthogonal complement of |U ′〉. This gives
us:
M ′123 = I4 −

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
 (2.13)
=

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 . (2.14)
With the relevant projectors now defined, we can calculate the prob-
abilities of all possible outcomes. Using the same notation as the QEM
model for these probabilities, we get for a starting vector |S′〉 = v′1|V ′1〉+
v′2|V ′2〉+ v′3|V ′3〉+ u′|U ′〉:
pˆ′1 = ||M ′1|S′〉||2 = (v′1)2 + (v′2 + v′3)2/2 (2.15)
pˆ′2 = ||M ′2|S′〉||2 = (v′2)2 + (v′1 + v′3)2/2 (2.16)
pˆ′3 = ||M ′3|S′〉||2 = (v′3)2 + (v′1 + v′2)2/2 (2.17)
pˆ′123 = ||M ′123|S′〉||2 = (v′1)2 + (v′2)2 + (v′3)2. (2.18)
While we argued that a complementarity approach suits the descrip-
tion of the human episodic memory better for interpretational reasons and
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the CMT has less parameters, we still need to check whether the CMT
model allows for the subadditivity in its resulting probabilities (as this
was the incentive for constructing these quantum models). Straightfor-
ward calculations easily give us that:
pˆ′1 + pˆ′2 + pˆ′3 = (v′1)2 + (v′2)2 + (v′3)2 (2.19)
+(v′2 + v′3)2/2 + (v′1 + v′3)2/2 + (v′1 + v′2)2/2(2.20)
= 2(v′1)2 + 2(v′2)2 + 2(v′3)2 (2.21)
+v′1v′2 + v′1v′3 + v′1v′2 (2.22)
≥ (v′1)2 + (v′2)2 + (v′3)2 (2.23)
= pˆ′123, (2.24)
showing that the CMT model exhibits subadditivity in its disjunction
rule. Note that this inequality is derived under the symmetry assumption.
Relaxing this assumption will make it possible to construct alternative
models not expressing subadditivity. This shows that subadditivity is not
a property inherently present within the complementarity approach, but
merely a phenomenon that can be modeled within this approach. Subaddi-
tivity is however predicted by the symmetry assumption, as we demanded
in the construction of our gist base. Situations were agents express addi-
tivity, or even superadditivity, could be modeled with a differently defined
gist base. In the QEM model, the only case were subadditivity is not an
inherent mathematical property, is the limit case where a subject does not
express any gist traces. Here the QEM model does adhere to the classical
disjunction rule.
As is well known, one of the expressions of the complementarity of
properties, is order effects revealing the impact of measurements on the
state of the system. In our context it means that the questions put to the
participants affect their state of memory. A series of questions that only
differ in the order in which they are put would yield different answers.
In both Kellen et al. (2014) and Busemeyer & Bruza (2012), it is argued
for the item memory case that agents first use their verbatim memory,
before consulting their gist memory. So, it is reasonable to predict like-
wise behavior for our source memory version. This suggests an experiment
that could distinguish the CMT, naturally modeling order effects, from
the QEM, not naturally modeling order effects, by generating different
predictions which could be confronted with the actual behavior. This ex-
periment would be a variation on the one described before, but where, in
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a subset of the sample, a question only involving gist memory is posed
before the actual list recollection is performed. This gist measurement ma-
nipulation might, for example (with the idea taken from Stahl & Klauer
(2008)), be along the lines of confronting the participant with a test word
of which they need to decide if it relates to a studied word. These actions
are assumed to rely on gist memory, again, see Stahl & Klauer (2008).
The CMT model predicts different outcomes in this subset in comparison
with the rest of the sample. Detecting these differences would be a formal
comparison of the CMT and QEM, next to the statistical one we perform
in the next section. Conducting new experiments, however, falls outside
of the scope of this paper.
2.4.3 Results and Discussion
We will now fit the data of the word list experiment, summarized in table
1, to the CMT model. These are the same data to which the QEM model
was fitted in Brainerd et al. (2013), allowing for a comparison between
the fit of the QEM model and that of the CMT model.
As was done in Section 3.2 for the QEM model, we will compare the
CMT model to a saturated model. If the CMT does not significantly
differ from a saturated model, it can be considered to have a good fit.
We calculated a G2 statistic, representing the difference between the pro-
portions calculated from the data and the proportions estimated from
the model, for each of the 16 experimental conditions: 4 types of test
words for each of the 4 word types. Each of the experimental conditions
had 4 possible statements, leading to a total of 64 obtained probabili-
ties of accepting the presented statement. Therefore the saturated model
has 4 degrees of freedom for each of the possible experimental condi-
tions, leading to 64 degrees of freedom in total. As in the QEM model,
we will consider the coordinates v′nt associated with verbatim traces of
lists not containing the test word as equal. The CMT model estimates
2 parameters, v′t and v′nt for the experimental conditions where a non-
distractor word was presented, leading, e.g., to a state vector of the form
|S′〉 = v′t|V ′1〉+ v′nt|V ′2〉+ v′nt|V ′3〉+ u′|U ′〉, in the experimental conditions
where a list 1 test word was presented. Since the state vector has to be
normalized, we have u′ =
√
1′ − (v′)2t + 2(v′)2nt.
Since we don’t have a word list playing a special role in the experimen-
tal conditions where an unrelated distractor is presented, we lose the v′t
parameter, leaving only 1 parameter v′nt to be estimated in the state vector
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|S′〉 = v′nt|V ′1〉+v′nt|V2〉+v′nt|V ′3〉+u′|U ′〉. We now have u′ =
√
1− 3(v′)2nt
to normalize |S′〉. This leads to a total of 28 parameters to be estimated
in the CMT model. These parameters were estimated by minimizing the
G2 statistic using R.
The calculated G2 statistic is:
G2 = 2
(
m× n
4∑
i=1
(
Oi ln
Oi
Ei
+ (1−Oi) ln 1−Oi1− Ei
))
. (2.25)
With m being the number of observations per participant in each ex-
perimental condition and n being the number of participants. Here, the
experiment consisted, for each experimental condition, of n= 70 partici-
pants each accepting or rejecting m = 2 statements, with Oi the observed
proportion of accepted statements of type (a), (b), (c) and (d) for respec-
tively i = 1, 2, 3 and 4; and Ei the estimated proportion by the CMT
model of accepted statements of type (a), (b), (c) and (d) for respectively
i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. The critical value for the three experimental conditions
where target words are presented is 5.99 (χ2 distribution, d.f.=2) at the
α = .05 level. For each G2 < 5.99, there is no significant difference in pre-
diction between the CMT model and the saturated model, with perfect
prediction. For the experimental conditions where an unrelated distractor
is presented, we have a critical value of 7.81 (χ2 distribution, d.f.=3) at
the α = .05 level. Table 2.3 shows that in three experimental conditions
we see a significant difference from the saturated model, the same amount
as the QEM model. The total G2 statistic, summed across all experimen-
tal conditions, is 50.4029, which is just smaller than the critical value 51
(with 64-28 = 36 degrees of freedom) at the α = .05 level, with the p-value
equal to .06, showing an acceptable fit.
The fact that the CMT model fits the same number of experimental
conditions well as the QEM model (both differ significantly from a satu-
rated model in three experimental conditions), but its overall fit is slightly
worse, can be attributed to one very problematic experimental condition
(list 3 test word, high frequency and concrete words). The G2 statistic
in this condition (14.2251) inflates the resulting G2 statistic dramatically.
Leaving out only this experimental condition gives us a total G2 statistic
of 36.1778 (critical value is 48.062, df=34) with a p-value of 0.36. As the
fit of this condition so vastly differs from the other conditions, we can
suspect this experimental condition to be an anomaly within the data.
Note that this statistical analysis is done under the symmetry assump-
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tion, with the gist memory vector defined as |G′〉 = 1√3 (|V ′1〉+ |V ′2〉+ |V ′3〉).
Relaxing this assumption might improve the fit even more. To formally
compare the QEM and CMT model, with both having a different number
of parameters, we calculated the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for
both models. The BIC adds a penalty term for the number of parameters
to the G2 statistic. The resulting BIC for the QEM model is 244.17, while
the BIC for the CMT model is 188.72. The CMT model is clearly favored.
2.5 Comparison and Conclusion
The QEM model proved to be an interesting and promising foray into the
use of the quantum formalism, when modeling human episodic memory.
We attempted to improve these findings by borrowing additional insights
and techniques from quantum mechanics into this field. As such we re-
tained the idea of the human episodic source memory to consist of two
parallel distinct memory traces, as illustrated by an experiment concern-
ing memorized words. The first, called the verbatim trace, encompasses
the lexical and phonological components of these memorized words. The
second, called the gist trace, encompasses semantic features of these mem-
orized words. This approach stems from Fuzzy Trace Theory which posits
that people form two types of mental representations about a past event.
We also take from the QEMmodel the notion that a memory measurement
is an intrusive act, influencing the agent. This makes the quantum formal-
ism a prime candidate for this paradigm, as this role of measurement is
the defining difference between quantum and other models, leading to the
superposition principle.
However, we have two major issues with the QEM model. Firstly,
there is a simple classical equivalent, as shown in Denolf (2015). As such,
it seems that the QEM model does not fully utilize the possibilities that
a quantum model offers. Next to this, we also argue that the structure of
the relationship between verbatim and gist traces, each being represented
by different basis vectors of the same base, does not accurately repre-
sent their relationship within the discussed experiment. As both traces
are represented by vectors within the same base, it seems as they can
not be activated at the same time. This way, expressing verbatim traces
automatically leads to an impossibility of expressing gist traces. This is in
contrast with the notion that gist and verbatim are parallel traces, both
possibly expressed when an agent recollects a memorized word.
Considering both traces as complementary and representing these as
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different bases within the same Hilbert Space, resulted in a model which
expresses the complex relationship between traces in a, to us, more elegant
way. This CMT model kept the method of how the different memory
traces were represented in the QEM model. Verbatim traces were still
represented by one vector for each of the memorized lists and by one
vector for unrelated distractors. Gist traces were still represented by one
vector. This way, an agent can express both types of traces, while the
expression of one of the two traces will influence the other. This leads
to a view where both traces are present but can not be measured at the
same time, as the measurement of one trace influences the other trace.
This idea, together with the fact that both traces are needed for a full
description of the memory state of the agent, fits perfectly the concept
of complementarity. The CMT model shows, next to these interpretative
arguments, the ability to model the subadditivity the human episodic
memory exhibits. A formal fit to the experimental data shows that the
CMT model does not predict significantly worse than the saturated model,
while having 28 degrees of freedom, i.e., 16 less than the 44 degrees of
freedom of the QEM model. The ability of the CMT model to model order
effects, showcases its non-classicality. These order effects might prove an
interesting subject for future research, as similar item versions of human
episodic memory do incorporate these order effects.
Next to the these order effects, further research might shed light on
the role of the symmetry assumption within the CMT model. As this is
the most simple form within the complementarity approach, relaxing this
assumption might lead to a better statistical (at the cost of more parame-
ters) fit, more insight in human memory by investigating and interpreting
different forms of the gist memory vector and applications of this approach
to other datasets.
As these improvements were realized by just making one vector non-
orthogonal to the other relevant vectors, this complementarity approach
to human memory seems to more fully incorporate the distinct features
of quantum techniques. As such, we believe that complementarity might
prove successful in a vast array of domains within cognition and makes
this notion of complementary measurements one of the main advantages of
using the quantum formalism. Specifically other applications of the Fuzzy-
Trace Theory, which is also used in, e.g., decision theory and the modeling
of beliefs, seem prime candidates for this approach, as the idea of two
types of mental representations seems to fit the notion of complementary
measurements well.
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Abstract.We propose a formal model to explain the mutual influ-
ence between observed behavior and subjects’ elicited beliefs in an
experimental sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Three channels of in-
teraction can be identified in the data set and we argue that two of
these effects have a non-classical nature as shown, for example, by a
violation of the sure-thing principle. Our model explains the three
effects by assuming preferences and beliefs in the game to be com-
plementary. We employ non-orthogonal subspaces of beliefs in line
with the literature on positive-operator valued measure. Statistical
fit of the model reveals successful predictions.
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3.1 Introduction
During the recent decade, there is an increasing interest in decision-
making and cognitive models that employ a quantum probabilistic (QP)
framework. In fact, the application of quantum-like concepts to portray
human information processing was considered since the early development
of quantum mechanics. For example, Bohr (1948) defended the idea that
some aspects of quantum theory could provide an understanding of cog-
nitive processes but never provided a formal cognitive model in light of a
QP hypothesis. The so called quantum cognitive theories have only begun
to emerge as of late. This development encompasses publications in major
journals (Deutsch, 1999; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2014;
Yearsley & Pothos, 2014), special issues, and dedicated workshops, as well
as several comprehensive books (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Khrennikov,
2010; Haven & Khrennikov, 2013).
QP is defined as the set of mathematical rules used to assign probabil-
ities to events from quantum mechanics (Hughes, 1989; Isham, 1989), but
without any of the physics. As it is derived from a different sets of axioms
than classical probability theory, it is subject to alternative constraints
and has the potential to be relevant in any area of science where a need
to formalize uncertainty arises. Since encoding uncertainty is a major as-
pect of cognitive functions in psychology, QP shows potential for cognitive
modeling. These studies are not about the use of quantum physics in brain
physiology, which is a disputable issue (Litt et al., 2006; Hameroff, 2007)
about which we are skeptical. Rather, we are interested in QP theory as
a mathematical framework for cognitive modeling.
Applications of QP theory have been presented in decision-making
(White et al., 2014; Busemeyer et al., 2006, 2011; Bordley, 1998; Lambert-
Mogiliansky et al., 2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood & Buse-
meyer, 2011; Yukalov & Sornette, 2011), conceptual combination (Aerts,
2009; Aerts & Gabora, 2005; Blutner, 2009), memory (Bruza, 2010; Bruza
et al., 2009), and perception (Atmanspacher et al., 2004). For a detailed
study on the potential use of quantum modeling in cognition, see Buse-
meyer & Bruza (2012) and Pothos & Busemeyer (2013). The majority of
models presented in the quantum cognition literature addresses standard
aspects of decision-making processes: similarity judgments (Barque-Duran
et al., 2016; Pothos et al., 2015; Yearsley et al., 2014), the constructive
role of articulating impressions (White et al., 2014, 2016), and order ef-
fects in belief updating (Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011) among numerous
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other applications.
Little literature has focused on strategic decision-making or game the-
ory. Whenever two or more agents interact, one agent is not only reacting
to the information that he receives, but is likewise generating informa-
tion towards other players. These strategic environments are unique in
relation to standard decision-making scenarios under uncertainty, since
every agent needs to reason on two parts of the problem: his own ac-
tions and his expectations on the opponent’s actions. Few studies ap-
plying QP instruments to model the way agents process the information
in a game have been published with regards to this particular matter
(Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Pothos et al., 2011; Busemeyer & Pothos,
2012; Martínez-Martínez & Sánchez-Burillo, 2016). Other approaches in
which the quantumness enters through an extension of the classical space
of strategies and/or signals have also been discussed, e.g., by La Mura
(2005), Brandenburger (2005), and Brunner & Linden (2013); as well as
a model to analyze games with agents exhibiting contextual preferences
(Lambert-Mogiliansky & Martínez-Martínez, 2015).
In this paper, we describe the application of QP theory to modeling
the mutual influence between preferences and beliefs in sequential social
dilemmas. This idea was first explored in Martínez-Martínez et al. (2015).
We present a quantum-like model for preferences and beliefs (QP&B)
that replicates the experimental results from Blanco et al. (2014) while
providing a novel theoretical approach on cognitive dynamics in strategic
interactions. Our model asserts that the relationship between a player’s
beliefs and his preferences is inherently non-classical and continues the
work done in Pothos & Busemeyer (2009) exploiting the ideas of mea-
surement utilized in quantum theory. We redefine these two properties as
complementary. In that capacity, they cannot be measured at the same
time, as the act of measuring one property alters the state of the other
property. The non-classical nature of such a relationship and its applica-
tion in cognition has already been discussed in, e.g., Denolf & Lambert-
Mogiliansky (2016).
3.2 Experimental Design
The data set that our QP&B model deals with is provided by Blanco
et al. (2014). Their experiment was designed for explicitly testing different
channels through which preferences and beliefs of an agent immersed in
a social dilemma may influence each other. As the authors motivate, this
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experimental evidence is novel and its main interest stems from the fact
that previous analyses of strategic interactions considered preferences and
beliefs to be independent. This fact implies that the choice of actions in
environments with uncertainty can be rationalized as just a best-response
to some particular form of belief about the possible states of the world or
about the action that is expected to be played by an opponent.
3.2.1 Standard Version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The symmetric prisoner’s dilemma game is a game involving two players,
player I and player II, who can choose among two actions: cooperate (C)
or defect (D). The normal form of this game is defined by the following
2× 2 payoff matrix
Player II
C D
Pl
ay
er
I C (pic, pic) (pib, pia)
D (pia, pib) (pid, pid)
(3.1)
where the payoff entries satisfy the inequalities pia > pic > pid > pib.
The scheme of possible results of payoffs is as follows. If player I de-
cides to cooperate, I can receive the second best possible outcome if the
opponent II also cooperates, but I ’s attempt to cooperate is exposed to
being exploited by II if II decides to defect. In the latter scenario, II
would collect the best outcome of value pia while leaving I with the lowest
payoff pib. If player I decides to defect, then this player is guaranteed not
to obtain the lowest payoff, but at least an amount pid if player II defects
as well. If player II decided to cooperate, then I is taking advantage of
the situation and obtaining the maximum benefit pia.
Technically, we say that mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium of
this game because there is no unilateral deviation that could make the
deviating player earn more, while mutual cooperation is the Pareto op-
timal situation. Therefore, this game represents a social dilemma for the
players: the individual choice of defection dominates the attempt to coop-
erate for any given choice of the opponent, which is not socially optimal.
Why is this a dilemma? Because this game formalizes a conflict between
the individual (the Nash equilibrium) and the collective (Pareto optimal)
level of reasoning: if both players actually choose to defect, both of them
generate a total payoff of 2 × pid, which is by definition lower than the
aggregate payoff if both of them coordinated in full cooperation, 2× pic.
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Figure 3.1 (a) Standard (simultaneous) Prisoner’s Dilemma. (b) Se-
quential Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The standard version of the prisoner’s dilemma game is a one-shot
strategic interaction with simultaneous moves by the opponents. This im-
plies that both players make their own individual decision (whether to
cooperate or not) without knowing what the opponent is choosing. Once
both players have chosen their strategy, both actions become public and
the payoffs are generated.
Each player reacts to his own belief or expectation on the opponent’s
intention, and as a consequence, the preferred action in the dilemma cru-
cially depends on the way players form their beliefs about the opponent
moves. Therefore, it is important to understand how beliefs and prefer-
ences do (or do not) influence each other in this decision-making process.1
3.2.2 Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma
The experiment conducted by Blanco et al. (2014) focuses on a varia-
tion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game discussed above: a sequential one. In
Fig. 3.1 we show the game tree of the game played in this sequential ex-
periment (b), and compare it to its standard (simultaneous) counterpart
with equivalent payoffs (a). In the sequential version, the solution concept
required is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), a usual re-
finement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) when turning to sequential games.
Solving by backwards induction, we see that it is in the best interest of
Player II to defect if given the chance to move, which would leave Player
I with a payoff of 7, and therefore I should choose defect at the beginning
of the tree, because 10 is a better outcome. Thus, the sequential game
1See Blanco et al. (2014, Section 1) about possible correlations between preferences
and beliefs in dilemmas with models of social preferences such as inequality aversion
and reciprocal preferences.
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Treatment Baseline Elicit_Beliefs True_Distribution
Task 1 2nd move (II ) 2nd move (II ) 2nd move (II )
Feedback on II No No Yes
Task 2 1st move (I ) beliefs (about II ) 1st move (I )
Task 3 beliefs (about I ) 1st move (I ) beliefs (about I )
# Participants 40 60 60
Table 3.1 Experimental treatments in Blanco et al. (2014, Table 1).
maintains the content of the social dilemma because the SPNE implies
that both players’ incentives drive them towards mutual defection, even
though they could obtain a higher social payoff if they coordinated on full
cooperation.
On the one hand, one can see how in the sequential variation, only the
player I is bearing the risk of her cooperative choice being exploited by
a selfish decision of player II. In order to restore the symmetry between
the players, all participants in the experiment play the game twice. Once
in role I and once in role II. After all decisions have been made, the
players are randomly matched into pairs, with the assignment of roles
being random as well. Subsequently, they earn the payoffs determined by
the relevant decisions, given their roles.
On the other hand, this procedural ‘complication’ is a small price to
pay if we compare it to the advantages it provides: because of the se-
quential structure in the decision-making, each choice can be observed
(measured) at a time. The authors design three treatments that inter-
sperse a belief-elicitation task with the choices of actions.2 As we discuss
now, the treatments differ in the order in which each task is performed
and this allows to measure different correlations between actions (which
are supposed to proxy the preferences of the players) and beliefs. We now
briefly explain the three different treatments, which are also summarized
in Table 3.1.
3.2.3 Experimental Treatments
Ten subjects participate in each session. For each of the following treat-
ments, several sessions were conducted. The total numbers of participants
are displayed in Table 3.1.
2In the belief-elicitation task, the players were asked how many of the other partici-
pants (potential rivals for the play of the game) cooperate in the role of Player II. This
task is incentivized with a quadratic scoring rule rewarding the accuracy of the stated
beliefs: players earn more the closer their prediction is to the actual rivals’ cooperation
rate (Blanco et al., 2014, Equation 3).
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Treatment Baseline Elicit_Beliefs True_Distribution Total
First mover (Player I ) 27.5% 55.0% 56.7% 48.8%
Second mover (Player II ) 55.0% 53.3% 55.0% 54.4%
Table 3.2 Average cooperation rates by treatment in the experiment
by Blanco et al. (2014), also labeled as Table 2 in their original paper.
Baseline. This treatment can be considered as a mere control group, such
that the subjects play the game in its natural structure, with no attention
paid to observing their beliefs. The players first choose what their action
II will be and no information is revealed to them so that the participants’
beliefs are not exogenously influenced. Subsequently, they choose what
their action for the role of I will be, and finally they are given a meaningless
question about their beliefs on the global rate of cooperation in the group
of first movers. The informational gain of this last task is void because
its only use is to balance the different treatments making their length
comparable (both in time and the number of tasks).
Elicit_Beliefs. In this treatment, the players first choose what their action
II will be, and then they have to reveal their belief about the rate of
cooperation that they will receive from the second movers. Finally, they
have to choose their action I. Thus, this treatment introduces a belief-
measurement between the two choices of actions. This allows us to explore
the effect of a measurement of the beliefs about the move by opponent II
on the choice of action I.
True_Distribution. This treatment presents a somewhat ‘similar’ sequence
of tasks for the players compared to the previous treatment Elicit_Beliefs.
The players begin by choosing their action II. Then, they are told what
the true cooperation rate for action II was in their group. They finish by
choosing the action I. This treatment differs from the previous one in that
this time, the forecast of the opponents’ move is not a belief generated
by the players themselves, but true information being released to them
exogenously.
3.3 Aggregate Behavior and Basic Modeling
Table 3.2 presents the aggregate results of the three experimental treat-
ments. First off, we cannot observe any significant difference in the cooper-
ation rates as a second mover between treatments. This is to be expected
as the question (measurement) regarding the choice of action in the role of
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player II is identical in all aspects over all treatments.3 The small variation
in the proportion of cooperation reported for the Elicit_Beliefs treatment
(53.3% vs. 55% in the others) can be attributed to sample variance.
The cooperation rates in the role of first mover (player I) show mean-
ingful differences. A chi square test across all three treatments yields a
p-value of 0.007886 (χ2 = 9.6853, df=2). Starting with the first move co-
operation rates of the Baseline treatment (27.5%) and the Elicit_Beliefs
treatment (55.0%), the null hypothesis of no difference between these two
proportions yields a p-value of 0.007 (χ2 = 7.3661, df=1), clearly in-
dicating a significant difference. There is only one procedural variation
between these two treatments: Elicit_Beliefs includes the elicitation of
beliefs about the cooperation rate expected from the rivals II before the
agents choose their action in the role of I. Thus, we can attribute the
difference in the player I cooperation rate to the effect that measuring a
subject’s beliefs about the opponent II may have on his attitude toward
the actions as first mover.
A similar result can be found for the first move cooperation rates
of the Baseline treatment (27.5%) and the True_Distribution treatment
(56.7%). The null hypothesis claiming no difference between these two
proportions can be rejected, as it gives us a p-value of 0.004 (χ2 = 8.2674,
df=1). For the first move cooperation rates (role I) of the Elicit_Beliefs
treatment (55.0%) and the True_Distribution treatment (56.7%), the null
hypothesis of no difference between these proportions yields a p-value of
0.85 (χ2 = 0.0351, df=1), indicating no significant difference between the
result in the two treatments. In this sense, the incentivized elicitation of
beliefs impacts the state of the subjects participating in the experiment
similarly to an update of beliefs via the acquisition of true information
revealed exogenously.
3.3.1 Violation of the Sure-Thing Principle
The differences in first move cooperation rates reveal the presence of a
violation of the sure-thing principle in the data, as
27.5% = p(CI) 6=
∑
i
p(CI |Bi) = 55%,
3Note especially that it is the first measurement performed in all treatments and
therefore, it is not subject to the effects targeted by this experimental design.
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with CI the event of the player cooperating on the first move and Bi
the event of the player answering that he thinks i opponents cooperate
during the belief elicitation. This in turn points out the interest in using
a quantum-like model to describe the behavior of the participants in this
experiment, since classical statistics cannot account for them in a simple
manner, while quantum-like easily do.
3.3.2 The Simplest Quantum-like Model
In the remaining of Section 3, we illustrate the basic mechanics of quantum-
like toy models designed to address the issue of measurement as well as
construct different building blocks that will be fully developed later. As
the reader will see, Section 3.4 integrates them in a unified model. Now,
we only show which aspects of quantum-like modeling can account for the
empirical effects observed in the dataset, without taking into account how
they correlate to form the proper model.
We introduce the most basic quantum-like model to represent con-
cepts such as actions, preferences and beliefs in quantum-like terms (ob-
servables, measurements and orthonormal basis of their outcomes) and
use projective measurements (with their resulting probabilities) to ex-
plain the first results observed in the data from Blanco et al. (2014). We
consider the preferences of an agent as the individual’s attitude toward
the different elements of a set of outcomes, to be reflected in the choices
observed along the sequence of decisions (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006).
In this case, and because of the strategic nature of this decision-making
process, the outcomes (possible payoffs to be obtained) depend on the
actions (cooperate or defect) a players chooses, but also on the choices
made by a rival.
The actions of a player can be represented by two orthogonal vectors
|C〉 (for cooperation) and |D〉 (for defection). The two vectors form an
orthonormal basis and span the Hilbert space Hi ≡ R2, with i ∈ {I, II}
denoting the role in the game as player I or II for which such action
is chosen.4 The player is considered to be in a superposition over these
4For the finite dimensional case, a Hilbert space H is a linear space endowed with
a scalar product 〈ψ1|ψ2〉 ∈ R. Its elements (or states) are denoted by |ψ〉 ∈ H. If the
state of the system is |ψ〉 we say it is in a pure state. The projector Pψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|,
an operator acting on H as Pψ |φ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉|ψ〉, has a bijective relation with |ψ〉, and
we can describe the state |ψ〉 in terms of Pψ . Any element or vector of the space of
states is called a ket-vector and represented by |·〉, and we have the dual space of the
bra-vectors, symbolized by 〈·|. Hilbert spaces are generally defined over the field of
complex numbers, but in this paper it is enough to work only with reals. Note that
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actions, being represented by a normalized state vector |S〉. The projection
of the state vector onto the elements of the orthonormal basis defines the
probability that the player chooses each of the actions, as a proxy of her
preferences.
We consider the beliefs as the subjective distribution with which the
agents judge the likelihood of realization of each possible relevant state of
the world. The possible states in this setting concern the possible cooper-
ation of opponents, as this, together with one’s own actions, determines
the outcome of the game. These beliefs are also represented by a set of
mutually orthogonal vectors {|Bj〉}, with the index j running from 0 to 9.
This j represents how many of the opponents (maximum 9) are believed
to cooperate. This orthonormal basis also spans a Hilbert space, HB , with
the player’s beliefs being represented by a normalized state vector: a su-
perposition over the orthonormal basis of beliefs. Straightforwardly, j/9
is the expected share of cooperation among the opponents, and 1− j/9 is
the expected rate of defection.
3.3.3 Projective Measurement
Quantum-like models use projective measurements to represent measure-
ments being performed on the system of interest.5 Here, we apply this to
model the observed behavior in the choice of action as player II in the
data from Blanco et al. (2014). The state of the player is represent by a
normalized state vector |SII〉 in the two-dimensional Hilbert space HII:
|SII〉 = cII|CII〉+ dII|DII〉. (3.2)
given a state |ψ〉 associated to a vector ψ ∈ RN , we obtain 〈ψ| associated to ψT , where
T is the operation of vector transposition. The name of bra-ket (or Dirac’s) notation
comes from splitting the bracket 〈·|·〉 representing the scalar product, which is the
crucial operation to compute probabilities in this framework.
5The probability of observing an outcome is calculated as the square of the norm of
the projection of the state vector onto the subspace spanned by the vectors representing
the outcome. When the outcome is represented by only one vector (simplest case), this
calculation reduces to the square of the inner product of the state vector and the
outcome vector. The act of measurement changes the state vector of the system from
an initial state to a post-measurement state, by projecting (and normalizing) the state
vector onto the subspace spanned by the outcome vectors. Projective measurements
deal naturally with incompatible measurements, and note also that when they are
performed on a density matrix diagonal in a particular basis, they are equivalent to
Bayesian updates.
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The probability p(CII) of the player choosing to cooperate is therefore:
p(CII) = ||PCII |SII〉||2 = 〈CII|SII〉2 = c2II, (3.3)
with PCII = |CII〉〈CII| = diag(1, 0) the projector on |CII〉. This outcome
would project the state vector unto its post-measurement state |S′II〉 =
|CII〉. The probability of the player defecting as second mover is:
p(DII) = ||PDII |SII〉||2 = 〈DII|SII〉2 = d2II, (3.4)
with PDII = |DII〉〈DII| = diag(0, 1) the projector on |DII〉. This outcome
would likewise project the state vector unto its post-measurement state
|S′II〉 = |DII〉. The normalization restriction on the state vector implies
that total probabilities add up to one, c2II + d2II = 1. From the cooperation
rates as player II reported in Table 3.2, we can estimate these through
our sample as:
cˆ2II = 0.544 and dˆ2II = 0.456. (3.5)
Note that we estimate by taking the average cooperation rates across the
treatments, because we have justified above that they are not significantly
different from one another.
We can model the choice of the players for their action as player I
in the Baseline condition in a Hilbert space HI ≡ R2, with the basis
{|CI〉, |DI〉}. The state vector is now
|SI〉 = cI|CI〉+ dI|DI〉, (3.6)
and we can infer from the data (Table 3.2, column 1) that
cˆ2I = 0.275, and dˆ2I = 0.725. (3.7)
In this case, we only consider the cooperation and defection rates in the
Baseline treatment. Because of the significant difference in the cooper-
ation rate as player I across treatments, considering the average is not
sensible (see discussion in Section 3.3).
Finally, we model the beliefs of the players in the Hilbert space HB ,
(spanned by {|Bj〉}). The normalized state vector is
|SB〉 =
9∑
j=0
bj |Bj〉. (3.8)
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#Cooperators (Belief) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Abs. frequency (out of 60 subjects) 5 2 5 5 12 9 9 6 4 3
Table 3.3 Number of players in treatment Elicit_Beliefs expecting
each possible number of cooperators in their session.
From the data regarding the Elicit_Beliefs treatment (see Table 3.3), we
get that
bˆ20 = 5/60, bˆ21 = 2/60, bˆ22 = 5/60, bˆ23 = 5/60, bˆ24 = 12/60,
bˆ25 = 9/60, bˆ26 = 9/60, bˆ27 = 6/60, bˆ28 = 4/60, bˆ29 = 3/60.
(3.9)
3.4 Building Blocks
3.4.1 Three Effects
Effect 1 (Consensus effect). Proof of and an extensive commentary on
the presence of this effect are presented in Blanco et al. (2014) where it is
shown that players’ beliefs are biased towards their own actions. As such,
a player who cooperates as second mover will expect a higher second-
mover cooperation rate amongst the other players. A visualization of this
effect can be found in Fig. 3.2. Viewing this in light of the performed
measurements, the consensus effect denotes the influence of second mover
action measurements on the beliefs of the same participant.
Effect 2 (Reasoned player). The second effect is the influence that
belief measurements have on action measurements. As these actions are
driven by one’s preferences, this effect encompasses the influence of the
belief measurements on the preferences of the same player. We claim that
the act of eliciting the beliefs of the player fundamentally changes this
player even when disregarding the exact outcome of this belief measure-
ment. When the player is asked to form an opinion about the cooperation
rate of his opponents, this changes him into a more reasoned state about
the opponent, in opposition to a more intuitive state when not explicitly
asked to form this opinion. In the data, this can be viewed in the vio-
lation of the sure-thing principle discussed in Section 3.3.1. The average
first move cooperation rate of players, after forming explicitly their beliefs
about the cooperation of the opponent (Elicit_Beliefs), is twice as large
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Figure 3.2 Second move defecting players (red line) believe that less
opponents will cooperate. Second move cooperating players (blue line)
believe more opponents will cooperate. The second move action was
measured before the beliefs.
as the average first move cooperation rate of players, in which beliefs were
not elicited (Baseline) (see Table 3.2). Nevertheless, this cooperation rate
in the Elicit_Beliefs group is not differing significantly from the coop-
eration rate in the True_Distribution group. In this group, participants
received full information about the cooperation rate of the opponents and
are therefore assumed to make a more deliberate decision. Since these co-
operation rates are similar, we can assume that players are in a similar
reasoned state in the Elicit_Beliefs group.
Effect 3 (Classical correlation). The third effect we discuss is the
correlation between a player’s first and second move. This is observed in all
three conditions, as noted in Results 1, 2 and 3 from Blanco et al. (2014).
That is, first move cooperators are likely to also cooperate on the second
move and vice versa. We concur with Blanco et al. that this correlation
is exhibited mostly through an indirect belief-based channel. This way,
we attempt to include the observed correlation as a logical consequence
of our previously described effects. The second move action measurement
influences the first move action measurement through a player’s beliefs.
We assume this correlation to be classical in nature, as opposed to the
two other effects.
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3.4.2 Compatible and Incompatible Measurements
Roughly speaking, two measurements M1 and M2 are considered incom-
patible if the order in which the measurements are done changes the
outcome, as the act of performing one measurement influences the other
measurements regardless of the outcome. Mathematically speaking, this
means that one or more projector matrices associated with outcomes of
measurement M1 do not commute with one or more projector matrices
associated with outcomes of measurement M2. If two measurements are
maximally incompatible, no projector matrix associated with an outcome
of measurement M1 commutes with a projector matrix associated with
an outcome of measurement M2, and they are called complementary. As
such, both measurements M1 and M2 cannot be performed together, as
the act of performing one of the measurements (without specifying its out-
come), influences the other measurement. These concepts elegantly deal
with situations where violations of the sure-thing principle emerge.
We will consider the belief elicitation to be complementary with the
action measurements, as this explains both the consensus effect and the
reasoned player effect. This approach should not come as a surprise. First,
using complementarity as an explanation for the consensus effect is ar-
gued in Busemeyer & Pothos (2012) where the consensus effect is seen
as a form of social projection. Second, the idea of the player being more
reasoned can be seen as a violation of the sure-thing principle. These vi-
olations are a prime indicator of measurements not commuting which is
the definition of incompatible measurements. We will now show how the
projective measurement formalism deals with our hypothetically compati-
ble (first and second move actions) and incompatible (actions and beliefs)
measurements.
When two measurements are considered compatible, the Hilbert spaces
representing the outcomes of these measurement can be tensored to con-
struct a larger Hilbert space spanned by vectors that now represent joint
outcomes. As argued before, we consider the first move action and second
move action to be compatible, as they are considered to be measurable
at the same time. Therefore, the Hilbert space which models the relation-
ship between both is HI ⊗ HII, spanned by {|CC〉, |CD〉, |DC〉, |DD〉},
with |CD〉 = |CI〉 ⊗ |DII〉 (other vectors defined similarly). The player is
represented by a normalized state vector:
|S〉 = sCC |CC〉+ sCD|CD〉+ sDC |DC〉+ sDD|DD〉. (3.10)
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We now provide two examples of how probabilities are calculated
within this Hilbert space. The other relevant probabilities are calculated
in a similar way. The projector and probability associated with a player
defecting on the role of I, but cooperating on the role of II is
PDC = PDI ⊗ PCII =
(
0 0
0 1
)
⊗
(
1 0
0 0
)
=

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 , (3.11)
so
p(DC) = ||PDC |S〉||2 = s2DC . (3.12)
The projector and probability associated with the player cooperating on
the second move (without specifying a choice as player I ), are:
P.C = I2 ⊗ PCII =
(
1 0
0 1
)
⊗
(
1 0
0 0
)
=

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 , (3.13)
and
p(.C) = ||P.C |S〉||2 = s2CC + s2DC . (3.14)
Directly from the data (for the Baseline treatment), we derive
sˆ2CC = 0.25, sˆ2CD = 0.025, sˆ2DC = 0.3, and sˆ2DD = 0.425. (3.15)
This models the (classical) correlation between first and second move, as
noted above in Effect 3.
Incompatible measurements are represented by different bases in the
same Hilbert space (as opposed to one tensored basis for compatible mea-
surements). To model the relationship between the choice of action in the
role of player I and the beliefs that a player holds, we could use a Hilbert
space HI,B of large enough dimensionality to present 10 orthogonal sub-
spaces, each one representing one belief. As such, we would need at least a
10-dimensional space, with 10 orthonormal vectors forming the belief ba-
sis. In such 10-dimensional Hilbert space, the 2 possible outcomes of the
first movement action are each represented by orthogonal 5-dimensional
subspaces.
The Hilbert space HII,B , which models the relationship between the
belief measurement and the second movement action would be similarly
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spanned by 10 orthonormal basisvectors, each one representing an out-
come of the belief measurement. The outcomes of the second movement
action are also represented by 5-dimensional subspaces. The rules for pro-
jection and calculating probabilities remain the same. The probability of
an outcome of a measurement is still the square of the norm of the projec-
tion of the state vector on the relevant subspace. The act of measuring still
changes the superposition of the state vector, projecting and normalizing
it onto the relevant subspace.
In summary, the relationship between the belief and action measure-
ment is represented by the description of the action subspaces in terms
of the belief basis. In such setting, the consensus effect would be repre-
sented by the form of the 5-dimensional action subspaces in HII,B , while
the effect of the player becoming more reasoned would be represented by
the form of the 5-dimensional action subspaces in HI,B .
3.4.3 A Very Basic Model
We can now attempt to construct a model which successfully incorpo-
rates all three effects, by combining how we modeled the compatible
action measurements, with how we could model the incompatible be-
lief and action measurements. The standard procedure from quantum-
like measurement theory tells us to construct the Hilbert space Horth =
HI,B ⊗HII,B . This is a 100-dimensional Hilbert space, with 2 orthogonal
50-dimensional subspaces representing the actions in role I, 2 orthogonal
50-dimensional subspaces representing the actions in role II, and 10 or-
thogonal 10-dimensional subspaces representing the possible beliefs. As
the first and second move actions are considered compatible, they can be
measured at the same time. As such, the 4 possible joint outcomes of the
action measurements are represented by four 25-dimensional subspaces.
The player would be represented by a normalized state vector in this
100-dimensional Hilbert space, from which the relevant probabilities can
be calculated. From a statistical point of view this state vector already
provides us with 99 degrees of freedom (we lose 1 as the state vector is
normalized), without even delving into how many degrees of freedom pop
up due to the different 10-, 25- and 50-dimensional subspaces used in this
construction. As we have 160 data points, this simple model would be
by no means elegant, and a statistical fit is not feasible because of being
greatly overparametrized. One solution is to impose further restrictions on
the state vector and/or the different outcome subspaces, for example, by
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allowing only state vectors within a certain subspace or assuming a certain
distribution over the resulting probabilities. The form of these restrictions
is, however, an open question at this point.
In the following section we show how a small deviation from the most
common quantum-like approach, using a less structured set of planes to
represent beliefs, allows us to reduce the complexity of the total Hilbert
space to only four dimensions and provides a truly intuitive connection
between the different elements of the model.
3.5 The Model for Quantum-like Preferences
and Beliefs
3.5.1 A New Belief Base.
To diminish the problematic dimensionality of HB we need to allow the
vectors |Bi〉 (the outcomes of the belief elicitation) to be non-orthogonal
because otherwise, the 10 orthogonal vectors would span a 10-dimensional
Hilbert space. Next to making the dimension of HB sufficiently small, this
modification will allow us to model some implicit structure between the
different outcomes and will link the construction of these beliefs directly
to the approach of Pothos & Busemeyer (2009) to the classical prisoner
dilemma. Roughly speaking, in Pothos & Busemeyer (2009), the emer-
gence and evolution of the player’s beliefs about his opponent’s behavior
is represented by a rotation of the state vector in the Hilbert space. While
in Pothos & Busemeyer (2009) this rotation is defined by a Hamiltonian
with a parameter γ, we now have the means to explicitly incorporate the
elicited beliefs into our model. To do so, we redefine the belief vectors |Bi〉
in a 2-dimensional Hilbert space, with |B0〉 and |B9〉 orthogonal and the
other |Bi〉 in between them. For simplicity, we will assume the distribu-
tion of the |Bi〉 (i 6= 0, 9), to be uniform between |B0〉 and |B9〉, yielding
an angle pi/(2 × 9) between all |Bi〉 and |Bi+1〉. This provides us with
an elegant, parameter free (as the ‘9’ is endogenous to the game) form of
the vectors representing the outcomes of the belief elicitation. This is a
simple first approach to the exact distribution of the |Bi〉, which can be
adjusted or made more complex if necessary. This effectively makes the
players development of her explicit beliefs to be represented by a rotation
of the state vector, as in Pothos & Busemeyer (2009). Our view differs
from Pothos & Busemeyer (2009) in the sense that we still want to make
predictions and derive probabilities from this rotation, using the standard
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|B0〉
|B9〉
|S〉
|B7〉
Figure 3.3 The redefined |Bi〉. A player thinking 7 out of 9 opponents
cooperate projects the state vector onto |B7〉.
rules of projective measurements: an outcome and its probability as de-
fined by a projector on the relevant subspace. Note that this approach also
models the implicit order between the different outcome vectors (e.g. |Bi〉
being ‘in between’ |Bi−1〉 and |Bi+1〉), something lacking in the previous
approach with all belief vectors orthogonal. This idea is depicted in figure
3.3.
With the redefined 2-dimensional Hilbert Space HB , we rebuild the
Hilbert space HQP&B which contains the representations of all measure-
ments, as well as their correlations. As we redefined our vectors |Bi〉 rep-
resenting the elicited beliefs, the projectors onto these vectors will also
have a new form:
|Bi〉〈Bi| =
(
cos2 ( ipi18 ) cos (
ipi
18 ) sin (
ipi
18 )
cos ( ipi18 ) sin (
ipi
18 ) sin
2 ( ipi18 )
)
, (3.16)
with i = 0, 1, . . . 9.
To incorporate a measurement with outcome vectors not orthogonal,
we will go beyond the basic procedure of quantum measurement as done
in Section 3.3.2. To do so, we present two options, one favoring quantum
theoretic consistency and one favoring a simpler experimental interpreta-
tion. Note that the resulting model and probabilities in these two options
are identical. Readers not interested in the derivation and discussion of
these options can skip to the last paragraph of this section.
In the first option we use positive-operator valued measures (POVMs),
a well known measurement framework within quantum theory, in which
non orthogonal outcome vectors can be used. These POVMs allow us to
easily build our smaller model with our newly defined belief space. For
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an introduction to these POVMs, as well as the mathematical details
and recipe on how to construct them, we refer to Yearsley (2016, Section
4). The following derivations rely on the derived probabilities given in
Yearsley (2016, Equation 56). In short, when using the POVM framework,
the measurement outcome is still represented by an outcome vector (and
its associated projector). If an outcome is observed, the state vector is still
projected onto the relevant subspace; however, the probability of obtaining
this outcome is calculated slightly differently. Assume that the player is
represented by a state vector |S〉, the probability of the player thinking
that i opponents have cooperated is now:
P ′(Bi) =
〈Bi|S〉2∑9
j=0 〈Bj |S〉2
. (3.17)
This form deviates from the probabilities derived in Section 3.3.2 only
in the factor
∑9
j=0 〈Bj |S〉2. This extra factor finds root in the fact that
projectors Pj forming a POVM need to adhere to completeness:∑
Pj = I,
with I the identity matrix. Equation 3.16 shows that the projectors onto
our belief vectors can never sum to the identity matrix, as the off-diagonal
elements can never sum to zero. To make sure that the relevant projec-
tors still form a POVM, a new projector (and outcome) is added to the
formalism. This projector is associated with the outcome ‘measurement
failed’. When this outcome is obtained the measurement is redone, ensur-
ing completeness. For details, see again Yearsley (2016).
The second option dismisses the idea of an extra ‘measurement fails’
outcome and allows the set of projectors |Bi〉〈Bi| to violate the complete-
ness criteria. This violation makes the probabilities of our possible belief
outcomes not sum to one:
9∑
j=0
P (Bi) = 〈Bi|S〉2 6= 1. (3.18)
As this is clearly problematic from a modeling point of view, we now
introduce a scaling factor. This scaling factor makes sure that the to-
tal sum of probabilities does sum to one, after the standard quantum
measurement (calculating probabilities and projecting the state vector) is
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done. This scaling factor is defined as:
C =
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |S〉2, (3.19)
making the probability of eliciting belief i, given the state vector |S〉:
P ′(Bi) = 〈Bi|S〉2/C. (3.20)
It is vital to note that the end result of both approaches is identical.
We have ten outcome vectors, representing the ten possible beliefs, in a
two dimensional Hilbert Space HB . The probability of eliciting the belief
that i opponents have cooperated, given the state vector |S〉 is:
P ′(Bi) =
〈Bi|S〉2∑9
j=0 〈Bj |S〉2
. (3.21)
If the result was i, the state vector gets projected onto |Bi〉. The difference
between the two options lies in the difference between an approach where
we remain firmly within the quantum theoretic setting at the cost of
adding an ad hoc new outcome (actually not present in the experimental
setting) and an approach slightly departing from the quantum sphere by
redefining the probabilities with an ad hoc scaling factor, but having a
clear interpretation of all the elements of its machinery regarding the
experiment. The choice between the options has no effect on the rest of
the paper.
3.5.2 The QP&B Model
With our belief measurement now adequately defined in the two dimen-
sional HB , we can redefine HQP&B . We still assume the second move
action and the belief elicitation to be complementary, representing them
by different bases in the redefined 2 dimensional Hilbert Space HII,B . Ad-
ditionally, we define the angle between |CII〉 and |B9〉 as βII (see figure
3.4). This allows us to derive estimated probabilities for a player replying
that he thinks i opponents cooperate, after the player has cooperated or
defected on his second move. As such, this models the consensus effect.
We assume βII to be close to 0, as the consensus effect tells us that peo-
ple who cooperate are more likely to assume that opponents cooperate as
well.
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|CII〉
|DII〉
βII
Figure 3.4 The redefined HII,B with both an action basis and the new
belief basis.
Now we can derive the estimated probabilities for the beliefs of a player
defecting on his second move (making the state vector |S〉 = |DII〉):
P (Bi|D) = 〈Bi|DII〉2/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |DII〉2 (3.22)
= cos2
(
βII +
i
9
pi
2
)
/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |DII〉2 (3.23)
and for the beliefs of a player cooperating on his second move (making
the state vector |S〉 = |CII〉):
P (Bi|C) = 〈Bi|CII〉2/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |CII〉2 (3.24)
= sin2
(
βII +
i
9
pi
2
)
/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |CII〉2, (3.25)
with i ∈ {0, . . . , 9}.
Similarly, we redefine HI,B as 2-dimensional with both a first move
action basis and a belief basis, with βI the angle between |CDM 〉 and
|B9〉. We once again assume βI close to zero, as players who explicitly
think their opponent will defect, are assumed to be more reasoned and will
defect as well. We can now derive the estimated probabilities of a player
cooperating or defecting on his first moves, after replying that he thinks i
opponents cooperated on their second move, which made the state vector
|S〉 = |Bi〉. Note that this first move measurement once again uses the
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more simple derived probabilities as defined in 3.3.2, as this measurement
has both outcome vectors orthogonal.
P (D|Bi) = 〈DI |Bi〉2 (3.26)
= cos2
(
βI +
i
9
pi
2
)
. (3.27)
The first and second moves are still considered to be compatible, al-
lowing for a tensoring of their respective Hilbert spaces to represent their
correlation. The projectors and probabilities associated with these mea-
surements are identical to the ones defined in the quantum-like model
from Section 3.3.2. This gives us a final model HQP&B = HI,B⊗HII,B . In
HQP&B , the belief that all opponents cooperate is represented by a plane
B9. The angle between B9 and the plane representing second move coop-
eration is βII. The angle betweenB9 and the plane representing first move
cooperation is βI. This also defines the plane B0, which is orthogonal to
B9, naturally representing the belief of all opponents defecting and the
planes Bi between B9 and B0. This incorporates the representation of all
3 measurements and their relationships (compatible or complementary)
into one 4 dimensional Hilbert space, with clear estimated probabilities
resulting from this representation.
3.5.3 Fitting the Data
We fit the experimental data of the three measurements to our model.
Note that the proportions of the second move actions are already incor-
porated in the starting state vector (Eqs. 3.15). Since we have derived
concrete dependencies of the beliefs on the second moves, and of the first
moves on the beliefs, we can formally fit the experimental data of the
Elicit_Beliefs group to our model. To do so, we shall estimate an optimal
β-value for the beliefs on the second moves, as well as for the first moves
on the beliefs. This can be achieved by minimizing the distance between
the counts observed in our data set and the expected frequencies based on
the equations derived above. Since a chi-squared test is typically used to
check whether or not an observed set of proportions sufficiently matches
the expected set, we will focus on minimizing this statistic.
Let us first focus on the two contingency tables representing the depen-
dencies of the beliefs on the second moves (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5). When
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i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Observed counts 1 0 0 0 3 6 9 6 4 3
Observed proportions 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.188 0.281 0.188 0.125 0.094
Expected proportions 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.058 0.099 0.144 0.187 0.223 0.248
Table 3.4 The observed counts, as well as the observed and expected proportions
of the beliefs of second move cooperators
a specific βII-value is provided, we can estimate the expected probabilities
P (Bi|D) and P (Bi|C) based on Eqs. (3.23) and (3.25), respectively, and
subsequently evaluate a chi-squared statistic for each of the two tables. In
order to estimate an appropriate βII, we optimize an algorithm in which
the sum of the two chi-squared statistics (one for the II defectors and one
for II cooperators) is minimized over a range of possible values for βII
(ranging from −pi/2 to pi/2). The βII-value for which this sum reaches
its lowest point equals −0.2048, corresponding to chi-squared statistics
of 14.13 and 14.24 for the two contingency tables (one concerning the
second move cooperators and one concerning the second move defectors),
respectively. As expected, our estimated βII is indeed close to 0.
Under normal circumstances, these chi-squared statistics can be trans-
lated into p-values, by relying on their asymptotic approximation of a
chi-squared distribution with I − 1 degrees of freedom (with I = 10 the
number of possible beliefs). For our data set, however, this asymptotic
procedure can be problematic because several of the expected frequencies
fall below five. As this induces concern about the accuracy of any p-value
obtained through asymptotic approximation, we will resort to a more ac-
curate estimation via Monte Carlo simulation. This technique simulates
the sampling distribution of the test statistic (in this case, chi-squared)
using Monte Carlo methods. In short, it will generate random contingency
tables with the same marginal distribution as our data (i.e. the same sam-
ple size), and calculate their chi-squared statistic. Subsequently, it is deter-
mined how many of these random samples display a test-statistic which is
larger than the one that was originally obtained. The resulting proportion
of more extreme chi-squared statistics represents our new and more accu-
rate p-value. Note that what can be calculated for one chi-squared statistic
can also be achieved for a sum of chi-squared statistics: we can simulate a
p-value corresponding to the proportion of summed test-statistics, which
are larger than the original sum (14.13+14.24 = 28.37). For our analyses,
we chose to rely on 10000 simulated samples.
According to the reasoning in the previous paragraph, these two test-
statistics allow us to calculate a p-value through Monte Carlo simulation:
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i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Observed counts 4 2 5 5 9 3 0 0 0 0
Observed proportions 0.143 0.071 0.179 0.179 0.321 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Expected proportions 0.156 0.163 0.160 0.147 0.127 0.101 0.072 0.045 0.022 0.007
Table 3.5 The observed counts, as well as the observed and expected proportions
of the beliefs of second move defectors
i Observed counts Totals Observed proportions Expected proportions χ2
9 5 5 1.000 0.997 0.016
8 2 2 1.000 0.947 0.111
7 5 5 1.000 0.844 0.925
6 5 5 1.000 0.699 2.153
5 6 12 0.500 0.530 0.044
4 3 9 0.333 0.358 0.023
3 1 9 0.111 0.202 0.464
2 0 6 0.000 0.083 0.542
1 0 4 0.000 0.014 0.056
0 0 3 0.000 0.003 0.010
Table 3.6 The observed number of cooperators, total number of participants, and
observed as well as expected proportions of first move cooperators. Note that the
observed number of defectors (as well the the respective observed and expected fre-
quencies) are not mentioned in this table since this information is redundant (the
observed counts of cooperators and defectors sum to the totals and the observed/ex-
pected proportions of both defectors and cooperators sum to one).
we obtain one of 0.071 for both tables combined. Their observed counts,
alongside the observed and expected frequencies, can be found in tables 3.4
and 3.5. The p-value testing the null hypothesis of no significant difference
between our observed and expected proportions on the α = 0.05 level
indicates an acceptable fit. As this p-value is estimated using simulation,
degrees of freedom are not taken into account, unlike a traditional p-value
where the chi-square distribution is used. As such, this p-value does not
take into account that 20 proportions are estimated using only 1 free
parameter, making our estimated p-value more favorable to accepting the
null hypothesis than the value suggests at first sight. See Tables 3.4 and
3.5.
When we aim to establish an optimal value of βI for modeling the first
move actions, we see that we have to deal with ten different contingency ta-
bles: one for each belief in the number of cooperators (i = 0, . . . , 9). Since
the observed and expected probabilities in each of these contingency ta-
bles sum to one, we only need to focus on the data counts and proportions
for the cooperators P (C|Bi). Similar to the beliefs of the second moves,
we establish an optimal value of βI for the first move cooperators by min-
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Figure 3.5 Observed frequency of first move cooperation versus
elicited beliefs on second mover cooperation (blue dots) and fitted model
(equation 3.27, red line).
imizing the sum of the ten chi-squared statistics using equation (3.27).
The optimal value of βI is 0.057 which is close to 0, as expected. Figure
3.5 plots the analytical prediction of the POVM model (equation 3.27)
for the relationship between first move cooperation rates and stated be-
liefs about second mover cooperation with βI = 0.057, and compares it to
the experimental observations.6 The chi-squared statistics and expected
proportions are displayed in Table 3.6; and the corresponding simulated
p-value equals 0.715 indicating a very good fit.
6Blanco et al. (2014, Figure 3) explain the observed relationship between both exper-
imental variables with a probit regression, obtaining a similar dependency. Neverthe-
less, our analytical curve has a deeper meaning because the functional form (equation
3.27) is a direct consequence of the geometrical structure of the POVM model.
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3.6 Discussion
Our decision to abandon the restriction that outcome vectors coming from
one measurement are orthogonal to each other has consequences. The most
important one is the loss of the repeatability of outcomes.7 Repeatability
entails that when a measurement is performed twice (without any ma-
nipulations of the system between two measurements), the same outcome
is observed twice. This is assured in a standard quantum-like model, as
the projection of a state vector onto an orthogonal subspace gives the null
vector. Repeatability seems a very logical and sensible restriction, but has
been called into question, specifically when applied in quantum cognition.
See for example Khrennikov et al. (2014) for a thorough discussion of this
problem and Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto (2016) about the use of POVMs,
which lack repeatability, in Social Sciences.
In our context, the loss of repeatability in the belief measurement
means that when a player replies that, e.g., 6 opponents cooperate, he
might reply 7 when the question would be posed again. To justify this,
we consider the measurements to be unsharp. Unsharp measurements are
measurements such that the outcome represents a bigger subset of a (pos-
sible non-discrete) set of outcomes. This is applicable in cases where a
subject is asked to form a precise opinion or belief (e.g. a discrete number),
but he is actually forming a more broad opinion or belief (e.g. ‘much’).
Applied to our dataset, we assume that when a player replies that, e.g.,
6 out of 9 opponents cooperate, this indicates the player believing ‘some-
where around 6 out of 9 opponents cooperate’. This implies that he would
not necessarily disagree with the opinion that 7 out 9 opponents have
cooperated. This structure can be viewed in the form of the belief vectors
|Bi〉. The state vector collapsing on |B6〉 does not preclude the outcome
associated with |B7〉, as they are close to each other, with the angle be-
tween them equaling pi/18. The closer two vectors are to being orthogonal,
the more the outcomes they represent do preclude each other. The vec-
tors |B0〉 and |B9〉 are the limit case: being orthogonal makes the events
associated with them (the opponent cooperating and defecting for sure)
completely preclude each other.
The use of these non-orthogonal outcome vectors also opens up new
research possibilities within quantum cognition. Inflated dimensionality is
a common obstacle in elegant model building. Once multiple (compati-
ble) measurements with more than two possible outcomes are taken into
7Also called first kindness in Danilov & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2008).
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account, any standard quantum model would require high dimensionality.
Next to the ease of reducing dimensionality, some extra structure can be
incorporated in the model. As can be seen in our model, implicit rela-
tionships between different outcomes can be represented. E.g., our model
allows to have the B1 outcome be ‘closer’ to the B2 outcome than it is
to the B8 outcome. In a standard quantum model, all outcome vectors
are orthogonal, so all outcomes play a similar role towards each other.
This works for all discrete examples in Physics, but in cognition there
are numerous examples of ordinal scales, where a kind of structure is
implied between the different outcomes. As there is, to our knowledge,
no known way of simply incorporating ordinal scales into the quantum
framework (preserving some sense of the notion of an order), constructing
bases similar to the one in this paper seems to be an interesting road for
future research. One obvious candidate for this treatment would be the
quantum-like modeling of Likert scales. They allow for (mostly) 5 or 7
different ordered outcomes and are an ordinal scale used widely within
cognition. Some first steps for Likert scales of this form are presented in
Yearsley (2016).
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we constructed a quantum-like model for beliefs and prefer-
ences in a social dilemma game. By taking a new look at data collected
by Blanco et al. (2014) during a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, we iden-
tified and discussed three distinct effects. These effects are all explained
as a specific type of relationship between the measurements performed in
the experiment. First, there is a direct positive correlation between the
player’s first and second move. As it is shown in Blanco et al. (2014),
however, this does not provide a complete picture of the player’s behavior
because this correlation is also driven by an indirect belief-based channel.
This indirect belief-based channel is made up of the two other effects: the
influence of the second move on the beliefs of a player and the influence
of the beliefs of a player on his first move. We called the former effect the
consensus effect and attributed the latter effect to the player becoming
more reasoned in his preferences.
The nature of these last two effects both pointed us towards a quantum-
like model. The quantum-like nature of the consensus effect is already
discussed in Busemeyer & Pothos (2012) where it is viewed as a form
of social projection. In Busemeyer & Pothos (2012), this is modeled by
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representing the construction of a player’s belief as a rotation of the state
vector in a Hilbert Space. This made the belief construction and the sec-
ond move action to be non-commuting (and thus incompatible) in nature.
The effect of the player becoming more reasoned can be seen as a viola-
tion of the sure-thing principle. The act of belief elicitation significantly
changes the cooperation rate of the first move action, regardless of the
beliefs elicitation outcome. This also pointed us towards viewing the be-
lief elicitation and the first move action as incompatible. Combining all
these observations, we constructed a Hilbert Space in which the action
measurements on the one hand and the belief measurements on the other
hand were viewed as incompatible measurements by defining a different
basis for each.
Following the more traditional recipe, we obtained a model within a
100-dimensional Hilbert Space, which was greatly overparametrized from
a statistical point of view. As a solution to this problem, we proposed to
redefine the belief base as two-dimensional. We draw inspiration from the
rotation idea from Busemeyer & Pothos (2012) but still define probabilities
and perform projections after measurements, as if dealing with projectors.
To define this new belief base, two options were discussed. The first option
constructed a POVM, which framed our model neatly into conventional
quantum theory, at the cost of defining a new ‘measurement failed’ out-
come. The second option dismissed this new outcome, staying closer to
the actual experiment, at the cost of leaving the standard quantum-like
framework. Both options resulted in identical models. This allowed us to
diminish the problematic dimensionality, incorporate the three discussed
effects, and yield elegant dependencies between actions and beliefs. The
statistical fit was positive for the dependency of the beliefs on the second
move action and satisfactory for the dependency of the first move action
on the beliefs.
As not all vectors associated with outcomes of the belief measurement
were orthogonal, we lose repeatability of outcomes: obtaining an outcome
does not exclude obtaining a different outcome when the same measure-
ment is performed again immediately. While this might have seemed prob-
lematic at first, there are other examples in which these techniques are
successfully used, again, see Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto (2016) and Yearsley
(2016). To this end, we defined unsharp measurements as measurements
where forcing the player to pick one outcome does not mean he disagrees
with another possible outcome. These unsharp measurements do not ad-
here to repeatability. By viewing our belief elicitation as an unsharp mea-
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surement, we showed that this loss of repeatability is not problematic
despite the complexity brought in by the experimental design. For more
on the need (or lack thereof) of repeatability in psychological measure-
ments, see Khrennikov et al. (2014).
As for future plans, a new experiment in which the missing treatment
with the sequence of measurements being ‘beliefs-second move-first move’
is also performed might shed new and conclusive light on the presumed
incompatibility of the action and beliefs measurements because the order
in which measurements are performed has an influence on the outcomes
in the quantum-like framework. Next to this final type of experimental
treatment, a more extended theoretical analysis could be given to the
consequences and possible applications of our non-orthogonal basis. As
mentioned previously, this approach could be a first step towards an im-
plementation of ordinal scales in a quantum-like way, as an implicit order
is present in how the outcome vectors were redefined.
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4Towards Ordered ProjectiveMeasurement
This chapter is an extension of work presented at the Quantum Interaction
2016 conference in San Francisco which will published in the proceedings
of said conference: Denolf, J. (in press). A First Attempt at Ordinal Pro-
jective Measurement, Quantum Interaction, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer International Publishing.
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Abstract. To our knowledge, all applications of the quantum frame-
work in social sciences are used to model measurements done on a
discrete nominal scale. However experiments in social sciences of-
ten produce data on an ordered scale, which implies some structure
between the possible outcomes. We show that in quantum cog-
nition, orthodox projection-valued measurement (PVM) lacks the
tools and methods to properly deal with these ordered scales. We
sketch out an attempt to incorporate the ordered structure of out-
comes into the subspaces representing these outcomes. This will
also allow us to reduce the dimensionality of the resulting Hilbert
spaces, as these often become too high in more complex quantum-
like models. To do so, we loosen restrictions placed upon the PVM
(and even POVM) framework. We discuss the two major conse-
quences of this generalization: scaling and the loss of repeatability.
We contrast this new approach with more traditional structures by
constructing different models for the data of game theoretic exper-
iment.
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4.1 Introduction
With the emerging success of applying the quantum probabilistic toolbox
in social sciences, there is also an increasing focus on its limitations. In
physics, the construction of the needed model is relatively straightforward.
However, in quantum cognition, the quite rigid recipe sometimes shows
its limits both mathematically and interpretationally (Khrennikov et al.,
2014). So, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that more recent work tries to
expand the reach of these tools by looking at possibilities beyond the stan-
dard projective measurement (PVM) principles. The best known general-
ization beyond PVM is the use of Positive Operator Valued Measurement
(POVMs) (Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto, 2016), but alternative, sometimes even
more general, approaches also arise (e.g. Matvejchuk & Widdows (2015)
and Aerts & de Bianchi (2015)). These ventures are mostly theoretical
in nature, with applications using experimental data being rather sparse.
None of these approaches, however, deals with the problem of representing
situations where there is structure in the set of outcomes.
In this paper we present an idea which also goes beyond orthodox
quantum-like techniques. This new technique was originally formulated
for a specific setting in Martínez-Martínez et al. (2015) and further devel-
oped and tested in Denolf et al. (2016). In these two papers, a model is
constructed which deals with the relationship of a participant’s beliefs and
preferences in a game theoretic setting, taken from Blanco et al. (2014)
and also discussed in Chapter 3. During this process, problems concern-
ing a too high dimension of a Hilbert space arose, which where solved
by drawing inspiration from a rotational solution presented in Pothos &
Busemeyer (2009) and (ab)using the ordered structure of the possible
outcomes. To do so, we opted to loosen certain restrictions which lead
to alternative types of projectors. While the solution to these problems
served an ad hoc purpose, the question whether this new technique could
be applied in different settings presented itself. This will deepen the dis-
cussion started in Chapter 3, where some of the details concerning, e.g.,
nature of scales were glossed over, as the focus of that chapter was the
game theoretic experiment.
Here we argue that this generalization of P(O)VM can be used to
model any situation where different outcomes of a measurement have some
ordered structure. After defining this generalization, we discuss two conse-
quences of using this new structure. Finally, we go back to game theoretic
setting this method was originally devised for and formulate some alter-
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native models within standard quantum theory. These other models are
then contrasted with our new approach, resulting in an overview of its
strengths and weaknesses.
4.2 Revisiting the Clinton/Gore Example
We take a fresh look at the quantum-like model concerning public opinion
on Bill Clinton and Al Gore. This is one of the go-to introductory exam-
ples in quantum cognition, see for example Busemeyer & Bruza (2012). In
a Gallup poll, conducted September 6-7, 1997, participants were asked two
separate questions: if they think Clinton is trustworthy and if they think
Gore is trustworthy. When the Clinton question is posed first, 53% of the
participants consider him to be trustworthy and 73% consider Gore to
be trustworthy. However, when the question order is reversed, 67% think
Gore is trustworthy and 59% think Clinton is trustworthy. This change in
attitude indicates an order effect, which suggests a quantum-like approach
by considering the Clinton and Gore questions to be incompatible. In the
resulting quantum-like model each question is represented by an orthog-
onal 2-dimensional basis, with each vector representing the relevant ‘yes’
or ‘no’ answer and by defining a 2-dimensional Hilbert space containing
both bases. The resulting model has a good statistical fit, with only two
parameters (one coordinate of the state vector, as the second coordinate
is fixed due to the normalization restriction, and one angle between the
two bases) to be estimated (see Section 1.3.1).
We now identify two properties of this experimental paradigm, which
become problematic when we leave this relative simple example for more
complex ones. First, the number of possible outcomes is low. Both ques-
tions only allow two possible replies, while trustworthiness of presidential
candidates could be considered far more complex. This gives the resulting
Hilbert space a manageable two dimensions. Note that as all measure-
ments are considered incompatible, no tensoring is required, which would
increase dimensionality exponentially. Second, there is no structure in the
outcomes. The yes and no outcomes are on a discrete nominal scale, with
no implicit relationship between them.
Let us make the situation a bit more complex. First, suppose we want
to add some more nuance to the questions and allow for more replies: very
trustworthy/quite trustworthy/somewhat trustworthy/neutral/somewhat
untrustworthy/quite untrustworthy/very untrustworthy. These outcomes
clearly have some structure, as they are ordered. This extension makes the
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resulting Hilbert space 7-dimensional. Second, suppose that, for whatever
research reasons, a third similar measurement is performed, which also
allows for a similar set of 7 outcomes, that does not produce order effects.
Even though the situation is not extreme from an experimental point of
view, the Hilbert space needed to model this situation would be (at least)
49-dimensional. This would increase the amount of parameters needed to
fit the state vectors and subspaces dramatically, resulting in an inoperable
model. Next to this unwieldy dimensionality, this approach lacks the tools
to incorporate the ordered structure of the outcomes. When we extended
the discrete ‘yes or no’ Clinton and Gore questions, no new modeling
concepts were introduced, so it is unclear what element of our model
should represent this ordered structure1.
In what follows, we propose a first attempt at modeling ordered out-
comes, within the quantum-like approach. This attempt also reduces the
problematic dimensionality that arises when measurements with more
than two outcomes are performed and tensoring is needed, when con-
structing the relevant bases.
4.3 Modeling an Ordered Structure
4.3.1 A New Type of Outcome Projector
Paraphrasing Kirsty Kitto in her QI15 talk (see Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto
(2016)), a quantum(-like) measurement M , with its set of possible out-
comes {Mi}, is represented by a set of subspaces {Mi}, where Mi rep-
resents outcome Mi. These subspaces Mi each define a projector Pi,
which projects any vector |S〉 on the relevant subspaceMi. The state of
a system (e.g. a participant in a psychological experiment) is represented
by a normalized state vector |S〉. Now, the mathematical rules are quite
straightforward:
(i) The probability of obtaining outcomeMi is 〈S|Pi|S〉 or, intuitively,
the closer the state vector is to the relevant subspace, the higher the
probability of obtaining that outcome.
1When in physics, e.g., ratio scales (which also have an order) are used, the eigen-
values of the projectors on outcome subspaces induce an ordering on the outcomes. As
eigenvalues, to our knowledge, are not used in quantum cognition, we will not introduce
this technique here. Note that our Clinton/Gore example is not on a ratio scale. It is
therefore unclear what the relevant eigenvalues, if introduced, would mean.
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(ii) After obtaining outcomeMi, the state after measurement becomes
Pi|S〉√
〈S|Pi|S〉
or, intuitively, when obtaining an outcome, the state vec-
tor becomes a normalized vector in the relevant subspace.
PVM structure. As is widely known, the orthodox quantum measure-
ment paradigm (Projection-valued measurement or PVM) demands that
all subspaces associated with one measurement are orthogonal and, per-
haps trivially, that these subspaces span the entire Hilbert space. This
ensures that probabilities sum to one and that when a measurement is
performed twice, without any manipulation between both measurements,
the same outcome is obtained twice. We call this last property repeatabil-
ity.
POVM structure. Perhaps less widely known, when we weaken the de-
mand that all subspaces associated with one measurement are orthogonal
but still ensure that all probabilities sum to one by demanding that all
relevant projector matrices2 sum to the identity matrix:∑
i
Pi = I, (4.1)
we obtain a more general class of measurements which we call Posi-
tive Operator-Valued Measurement (POVMs). This generalization is com-
monly used in physics to model noise, resulting in a measurement that
is not precise. Note that POVMs do not adhere to repeatability. This
first generalization gives us freedom to incorporate structure in the out-
comes, while reducing the dimensionality. However, this solution is still
more restrictive then one might think at first, as Restriction 4.1 is still
quite strong. More concrete, when a set of outcome vectors is defined,
typically an extra outcome vector has to be introduced to ensure all pro-
jectors sum to the identity matrix. Take, as an example, a simple two
dimensional case. When two non-orthogonal vectors |M1〉 = (1, 0) and
|M2〉 = (cos θ, sin θ), with respective projectors
P1 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and P2 =
(
cos2 θ cos θ sin θ
cos θ sin θ sin2 θ
)
,
2This implies that all elements of the POVM are projectors, which theoretically
does not need to be the case. However, if outcomes are associated with operators that
are not projectors, we lose the elegant geometric interpretation, as this means that
are no subspaces associated with the outcomes. As we will later define an order on
subspaces, non-projector operators would also become problematic there.
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are needed to model an experimental situation, their projectors sum to:
P1 + P2 =
(
1 + cos2 θ cos θ sin θ
cos θ sin θ sin2 θ
)
.
Having the diagonal elements equal to one can easily be achieved by appro-
priate scaling. However, to have the off-diagonal elements equal to zero, a
third outcome vector |M3〉 = (± cos θ,∓ sin θ) or |M3〉 = (± sin θ,∓ cos θ)
must be introduced, even when there is no third possible experimental
outcome! This is visualized in figure 4.1.
|M1〉
|M2〉
|S〉
|M3〉
Figure 4.1 A two dimensional POVM structure. Note the necessary
extra |M3〉 outcome vector.
Ordered scales. To solve this need for an extra outcome vector, we
propose to omit the demand that all projectors sum to the identity matrix,
effectively losing almost all structure, but use this freedom to add new
structure which reflects our ordered scale, while still adhering to our basic
quantum-like rules (i) and (ii). The necessity of generalizing measurement
beyond POVMs is not a new idea, as remarked in Khrennikov et al. (2014)
and discussed in chapter 8 of Nielsen & Chuang (2010).
As we only have two mathematical entities at hand (a state vector |S〉
and a set of subspaces {Mi} representing outcomes), this structure has
to be incorporated in these two. On the one hand, as the state vector is
supposed to represent the particular state of the system, the type of scale
of the measurement should not impact this state vector. On the other
hand, as the set of subspaces is representing the outcomes, any structure
between these outcomes, should be reflected in a structure between the
subspaces. This is why we allow subspaces associated with outcomes of
the same measurement to be non-orthogonal to each other. Now we can
define the notion of a subspaceMi being closer to a subspaceMj then to
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a subspaceMk, when M̂iMj , the angle3 betweenMi andMj , is smaller
then M̂iMk the angle betweenMi andMk. This gives us a natural way
of representing an ordered scale with outcomes Mi (admitting to a well
defined order ≺) by demanding that :
Definition 1. if Mi ≺Mj ≺Mk, then M̂iMj ≤ M̂iMk & M̂jMk ≤
M̂iMk.
Note that the maximum angle between two subspaces is pi/2, so or-
thogonal subspaces are considered to be the farthest away possible from
each other.
The exact value of these angles is an empirical question, which we
discuss later. When all relevant subspaces are orthogonal, which is the
case with a PVM structure, each subspace adds its own dimension to the
total dimension of the encompassing Hilbert space, which is the reason of
the exploding dimensionality in the introductory example. As the need for
orthogonality is now omitted, the resulting dimensionality can be greatly
reduced as compared to the traditional PVM approach. This makes the
dimension of the final Hilbert space also an empirical question and/or a
deliberate choice, taking into account, e.g., the number of data points or
certain demands for elegance or simplicity of the resulting model. The
concepts for calculating probabilities (i) and post-measurements states
(ii) remain identical to the ones used with PVMs and POVMs. Note that
as all considered Pi are projectors, they are still Hermitian positive semi-
definite, so 〈S|Pi|S〉 is real and positive. Because the state vector still
gets projected on the subspace representing the obtained outcome, this
approach keeps the quantum-like nature. As a result, all concepts (order
effects, contextuality, entanglement...) used in quantum cognition are still
a part of this approach because the regular PVM structure is now a specific
case of our more general framework.
4.3.2 An Example: Likert Scales
A natural candidate for this treatment is the modeling of Likert scales
(for an overview on Likert scales, see Spector (1992)). Likert scales are
used in polling of opinions and consist of multiple Likert items. A Likert
item consists of a statement, which the participant evaluates on a given
scale. This scale should be symmetric (a neutral option and equal number
3The angle M̂iMj between two subspaces Mi and Mj is classically defined as
min(V̂iVj), with Vi ∈Mi and Vj ∈Mj .
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of positive and negative options) and balanced (the perceived distance
between following options is equal). The format of a typical five level
Likert item looks like
strongly disagree (1) - disagree (2) - neutral (3) - agree (4) - strongly agree (5),
which is clearly on an ordered scale. These Likert scales are widely used
in psychology in general and in opinion polling surveys in particular. The
use of quantum-like techniques when dealing with these kind of surveys
is already established, as, e.g., they are prone to order effects (Moore,
2002). Some work has already been done to use quantum-like techniques
when dealing with Likert scales (Camparo, 2013). However, this approach
suffers from the two problems flagged before. First, the dimension of the
used Hilbert spaces very quickly increases and second, the implicit ordered
structure of the outcomes is represented in the state vector (or density ma-
trix), which should only represent the participant, and not in the outcome
vectors. Our view opens up new possibilities to tackle these Likert scales.
We construct one as an example, but keep in mind that this particular
form has not been tested against any experimental data. We only wish
to take some first steps to showcase the flexibility of our approach. When
looking at the (1)-(5) scale presented above, we argue that ‘strongly dis-
agree (1)’, ‘neutral (3)’ and ‘strongly agree (5)’ should exclude each other,
as we consider them in our example as non-nuanced, very clear opinions.
As such, they are represented by orthogonal vectors, called |1〉, |3〉 and
|5〉 respectively, giving us a 3-dimensional Hilbert space H. We also argue
that picking options (2) or (4), represented by the vectors |2〉 and |4〉, does
not necessarily mean that the participant disagrees with (1) and (3) or
(3) and (5) respectively. Keeping in mind the balanced property of Likert
scales, places |2〉 symmetrically between |1〉 and |3〉 and |4〉 symmetrically
between |3〉 and |5〉. Note that we can easily incorporate assumptions (e.g.
balanced) from Likert scale theory into our model. This naturally leads to
the structure depicted in figure 4.2.
Our implied structure in the outcomes does not impose restrictions
on the agents. We can still model a person who doubts between (1) and
(5) but not (3), by having a state vector equal to, for example, |S〉 =
(1/
√
2, 0, 1/
√
2).
Our arguments about the (non)-excluding outcomes and resulting di-
mensions here are very superficial. One could, e.g., argue that option (3)
should be symmetrical between (1) and (5), leading to a 2-dimensional
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|3〉
|5〉
|S〉
|4〉|2〉
|1〉
Figure 4.2 The outcome ‘(i)’ is represented by |i〉. The participant is
represented by state vector |S〉.
Hilbert space. A meticulous investigation of Likert scales in this paradigm
falls outside the scope of this paper. We only wish to show that it is pos-
sible to represent inherent ordered structure in the outcomes, possibly
combined with other theoretical assumptions or restrictions.
4.4 Consequences
Our loosening of restrictions used when defining P(O)VMs has significant
consequences. Here, we discuss the major two.
4.4.1 Sum of Probabilities
As we do not require restriction 4.1 to hold, it is possible that the sum of
the possibilities across all possible outcomes exceeds 1. While this seems
problematic at first, two solutions naturally present themselves. First, a
scaling factor can be introduced. This is the solution used in Denolf et al.
(2016). Keeping the notations defined as in the previous section, for all
|S〉 define CM as:
CM =
∑
j
〈S|Pj |S〉. (4.2)
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This allows us to scale appropriately. Now, we redefine the probability of
obtaining outcomeMi as
P ′(Mi) =
P (Mi)
CM
(4.3)
= 〈S|Pi|S〉∑
j〈S|Pj |S〉
. (4.4)
This gives us
∑
i
P ′(Mi) =
∑
i〈S|Pi|S〉∑
j〈S|Pj |S〉
(4.5)
= 1. (4.6)
While this approach lacks mathematical elegance, it effectively makes
the probabilities sum to one.
A second, more elegant, solution is inspired by classical logistic re-
gression. In logistic regression, a function f(x1 . . . xn) is derived, where,
given a number of predictors x1 . . . xn, the outcome of a binary variable
(A or ¬A) is estimated. The natural way of predicting a binary outcome
would be to estimate the probability of obtaining A. However, as there is
no way to ensure that the image of the derived function f(x1 . . . xn) is a
subset of [0, 1] (the same problem as with our non-orthogonal subspaces)
the odds P (A)P (¬A) are modeled, instead of the probability P (A). Since odds
only have the restriction that they are positive, this approach can also be
successfully introduced here:
ODDS(Mi) =
P (Mi)
P (¬Mi) (4.7)
= 〈S|Pi|S〉〈S|I − Pi|S〉 . (4.8)
Using odds does not introduce any new factors, making it more elegant
mathematically. One can easily calculate standard probabilities from these
odds since the scaling factor needed beforehand would disappear through-
out the calculations. However, odds might be more difficult to interpret.
To our knowledge, there are no quantum-like models where these odds
are used. It can be easily shown by calculating the odds with the newly
defined P ′(Mi) that both solutions are identical from a modeling point
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of view.
4.4.2 Loss of Repeatability
As a consequence of allowing non-orthogonal subspaces to represent out-
comes of the same measurement, we lose repeatability: when a measure-
ment is performed twice, without any manipulation between both mea-
surements, two different outcomes can be obtained. While repeatability
seems a necessity at first, multiple instances where it is not required (or
is even considered too strict) can be found in, among other fields, cogni-
tion. The best known approach lacking repeatability is the use of POVMs,
which we defined in Section 4.3.1. For an in-depth discussion of the use
of POVMs in cognition and the relationship to repeatability, we refer to
Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto (2016) and Khrennikov et al. (2014). More on the
application of POVMs in physics can be found in de Muynck (2007). Sum-
marizing, models not adhering to repeatability are not only feasible, but
also sometimes required within quantum cognition.
What could this loss of repeatability mean within our Clinton/Gore
example and ordered scales in general? When we go back to our 7 out-
come ordinal scale ‘very trustworthy/quite trustworthy/somewhat trust-
worthy/neutral/somewhat untrustworthy/quite untrustworthy/very un-
trustworthy’, we claim that some of these outcomes should not exclude
each other. To justify this, we introduce the notion of unsharp measure-
ment. This idea is already successfully implemented in Denolf et al. (2016).
We claim that when participants are forced to pick one of these outcomes,
their reply does not mean a complete dismissal of another option as these
opinions are not completely distinguishable (see also the discussion of ‘dis-
tinguishing quantum’ states in 2.2.4 of Nielsen & Chuang (2010)). When,
e.g., a participant replies that he thinks Gore is somewhat trustworthy,
the participant does not necessarily disagree with the notion that Gore is
quite trustworthy. The more probable it is that two options do not pre-
clude each other, the closer their respective vector spaces should be. While
the example might be too simple and underestimating the cognitive abili-
ties of the participants, there is always a tipping point where outcomes do
become psychologically indistinguishable. To construct an extreme exam-
ple, suppose that the trustworthiness question allows for an ordinal scale
ranging from 1 (untrustworthy) to 1000 (trustworthy). There is no partic-
ipant that could successfully fathom the difference between, e.g., replying
503 and replying 504. This is similar to noise in a measurement, for which
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POVMs are used in physics. Even though the noise in the measurement
now comes from the cognitive abilities of the participant, it still results
in the measurement not being precise. The structure we incorporated, en-
sures that if repeatability is violated in such cases, the possible outcomes
of the repeated questions are neatly scattered around the original answer,
as the closer two subspaces are, the more likely it is that the outcomes
they represent are obtained after each other. The upper limit case of this
is the original outcome, which has the highest probability of being ob-
tained again. The lower limit case of this are outcome vectors orthogonal
to the vector representing the original outcome. They can not be obtained
in the repeated measurement. As such, the class of measurements where
repeatability does occur, is a subclass of the one we propose, by having
all relevant outcome vectors orthogonal.
Note that this idea of unsharp measurement can be empirically tested.
To do so, simply confront the participant with a different option than the
given reply and ask if the participant could agree with it. These ideas al-
low the model to be constructed in an empirical way. First, test or argue
which outcomes are mutually exclusive and represent these by orthogo-
nal subspaces (this also determines the dimension of the resulting Hilbert
space). Second, observe which outcomes are not excluded and define their
subspaces accordingly. We illustrate this type of reasoning in the second
example of the next section. Moreover, this approach allows for statisti-
cal testing of certain cognitive hypotheses concerning cognitive abilities
and/or ordered scaling by checking if allowing these ‘close’ subspaces re-
sults in (more) satisfying statistical fits of experimental data.
4.5 Revisiting the QP&B Model
4.5.1 QP&B Model
In this section, we will revisit the model of a player’s beliefs and prefer-
ences in a game theoretic setting that was discussed in Chapter 3. We
will construct different models, using the three structures (ordered scales,
POVM and PVM) described previously. This will allow us to contrast
these three measurement structures and list their uses and (dis)advantages.
For all three structures, we will take a look at both the mathematical side
(‘Does it results into a nice model’) and the interpretational side (‘What
does the model mean?’). As we aim to have all chapters to be readable
independently, we will start with a short overview of the experiment. For
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an in-depth discussion of the experiment and data, we refer to Chapter 3.
In this experiment three measurement are performed. Two measure-
ments are game theoretic actions in a sequential prisoner dilemma. We will
call these measurements the first move (I) and the second move (II). Both
measurements have two possible outcomes, cooperate and defect, which
we will label accordingly as CI, DI, CII and DII. The third measurement
is the belief measurement (B) in which players are asked how many out
of nine opponents they think have cooperated. This measurement has 10
possible outcomes labeled Bi, i ∈ 0 . . . 9. Clearly, these outcomes have an
order. The crux of the experiment is that the belief measurement is only
performed in a subgroup of participants. In this Elicit_Beliefs subgroup,
the order of measurements is: II-B-I. In the Baseline subgroup, only two
measurements are performed: II-I4. The comparison between these two
groups of the average cooperation rate as a first mover I, shows that the
act of performing the belief measurement B has a significant influence on
the first mover I behavior. This can be seen in the data as a violation
of the sure-thing principle. This influence of the act of measuring is the
incentive for constructing a quantum-like model
This overview skipped over a lot of details of the experiment, but allows
to summarize what this QP&B model should do: model two measurements
(I & II) with two possible outcomes, that are considered compatible and a
measurement (B) with ten possible outcomes, which have a natural order,
and is considered incompatible with the two other measurements (I & II).
This should be done in a way that has a satisfactory interpretation and
is feasible from a modeling point of view.
4.5.2 Using Ordered Scales
Just as with the Likert scales from Section 4.3.2 we will use the ordered
structure of the outcomes of the belief measurement to define the relevant
outcome vectors. Again, we will only summarize the reasoning presented
in Chapter 3. We argue that only two belief outcomes exclude each other:
the belief that all opponents cooperate and the belief that all opponent
defects. The main argument is that this information is used to form an
opinion about the direct opponent a player will face during the game.
It is this opinion that (partly) drives the decision making process when
the player chooses his first move action. The belief that all opponents
4Some caution is advised as the terminology is somewhat confusing. The second
move (II) is the first performed measurement in both groups. The first move (I) is the
second performed measurement.
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cooperate indicates that the player beliefs that his direct opponent will
cooperate. Likewise, the belief that all opponents defect indicates that
the player beliefs that his direct opponent will defect. Any belief between
these extremes indicates an uncertainty about the behavior of the direct
opponent, represented by a superposition between these extreme states.
This makes the belief space two dimensional. We also argue that the 8
remaining belief outcomes should be ordered symmetrically between these
two extreme outcomes:
|Bi〉 = (sin ipi18 , cos
ipi
18). (4.9)
This leads naturally to the basis shown in figure 4.3. Note that this
structure is completely parameter free. This also makes the belief elicita-
tion a rotation (as we still project the state vector on the relevant outcome
vector), which is identical as how the (non elicited) belief construction is
represented in Pothos & Busemeyer (2009).
|B0〉
|B9〉
|S〉
|B7〉
Figure 4.3 The outcome ‘i’ is represented by |Bi〉. The participant
is represented by state vector |S〉. Here, the participant replies that he
thinks 7 opponents have cooperated, projecting/rotating the state vector
onto |B7〉.
This construction allows us to define HI,B , the Hilbert space used to
model the first move action, the belief measurement and the interaction
of these two. As the belief measurement is considered incompatible with
the first move action, both measurements are represented by a different
basis in the Hilbert spaceHI,B , as depicted in figure 4.4. This construction
comes with one parameter, βI, the angle between both bases. An identical
construction can be made for HII,B , the Hilbert space used to model the
second move action, the belief measurement and the interaction of these
two. The angle between both bases is now defined as βII.
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|B9〉
|B0〉
|B7〉
|CI〉
|DI〉
βI
Figure 4.4 The Hilbert space HI,B , with the first move basis and the
(overcomplete) belief basis.
Since the first and second moves are considered compatible, we define
the resulting Hilbert space, modeling the entire experiment, asH = HI,B⊗
HII,B . As the dimension of H is only four, only three parameter are added
when fitting the starting state vector
|S〉 = (sCC , sCD, sDC , sDD) (4.10)
to the data, as we have the restriction:
s2CC + s2CD + s2DC + s2DD = 1. (4.11)
With si,j , we indicate decision i as a second move action and decision
j as first move action. As a result, the final model only has 5 parameters,
which is elegant from a modeling point of view. The resulting probabilities,
which should be matched to the observed proportions can be calculated
straightforwardly. We get for the second move measurement:
P (CII) = s2CC + s2CD
P (DII) = s2DC + s2DD
and for the first move measurement, after the second move measurement
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(which is the order in Baseline subgroup):
P (CI|CII) = s
2
CC
s2CC + s2CD
P (DI|CII) = s
2
CD
s2CC + s2CD
P (CI|DII) = s
2
DC
s2DC + s2DD
P (DI|DII) = s
2
DD
s2DC + s2DD
.
In the Elicit_Beliefs subgroup, we will use the ordered scales structure.
In this example we opt to use the scaling technique to deal with the
fact that our probabilities do not sum to one. Modeling odds would have
identical results. We obtain for the belief measurement, after the second
move measurement:
P (Bi|CII) = 〈Bi|CII〉2/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |CII〉2
= sin2
(
βII +
i
9
pi
2
)
/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |CII〉2 (4.12)
P (Bi|DII) = 〈Bi|DII〉2/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |DII〉2
= cos2
(
βII +
i
9
pi
2
)
/
9∑
j=0
〈Bj |DII〉2, (4.13)
and for the first move measurement, after the belief measurement:
P (CI |Bi) = 〈CI|Bi〉2
= sin2
(
βI +
i
9
pi
2
)
(4.14)
P (DI |Bi) = 〈DI|Bi〉2
= cos2
(
βI +
i
9
pi
2
)
. (4.15)
As shown in Chapter 4.4, this model has a good fit, using only 5 parame-
ters. Note that, as this structure uses non-orthogonal outcome vectors, it
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lacks repeatability.
4.5.3 Using a POVM Structure
To model the above example using a POVM structure, most of the con-
struction of the previous section can be retained. We define the belief base
in an identical way, with |B0〉 and |B9〉 orthogonal and the remaining |Bi〉
in between, with a constant angle between |Bi〉 and |Bi−1〉. The projectors
unto these outcome vectors are:
Pi = |Bi〉〈Bi|
=
(
sin ipi18
cos ipi18
)
.
(
sin ipi18 cos
ipi
18
)
=
(
sin2 ipi18 sin
ipi
18 cos
ipi
18
sin ipi18 cos
ipi
18 cos2
ipi
18
)
Straightforward calculation shows us that the completeness restriction,
needed to form a POVM, does not hold:∑
i
Pi 6= I2.
The most straightforward way (taken from Yearsley (2016)) to save
the construction, is to introduce a new operator PF which will make the
set of operators {P0N . . . P9N , PFN }5 satisfy completeness:
PF
N = I2 −
∑
i
Pi
N , (4.16)
where now the operator PiN represents the outcome Bi that the player
thinks i opponents have cooperated.
This is a variation on the method used in Section 4.3.1, where a third
|M3〉 outcome was introduced. This effectively embeds our wanted out-
come construction into a POVM structure, anchoring it firmly into ‘stan-
dard quantum theory’ and dismissing the need for scaling or odds mod-
eling. However, doing this gives rise to a new question: What does the
operator PF represents? As the operator PF does not have an associated
5The constant N = 12
(
10 + cot
(
pi
18
))
is needed during the calculation to ensure
that PF is a positive operator. As it will disappear during further calculations, we will
just refer to Yearsley (2016) where this is proven.
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outcome, it can be associated with the outcome BF , which represents ‘no
outcome obtained’, as suggested in Yearsley (2016). As this is not a valid
option during the experiment, we assume the measurement is simply done
again, when this (theoretically) would occur. This gives the following prob-
ability for obtaining outcome Bi, on the condition that the measurement
didn’t fail (BF ), for a given state vector |S〉:
P ′(Bi) = P (Bi|BF )
= P (Bi)1− P (BF )
= P (Bi)∑9
j=0 P (Bj)
=
〈S|PiN |S〉∑9
j=0 〈S|PjN |S〉
= 〈S|Pi|S〉∑9
j=0 〈S|Pj |S〉
= 〈S|Bi〉〈Bi|S〉∑9
j=0 〈S|Bj〉〈Bj |S〉
= 〈Bi|S〉
2∑9
j=0 〈Bj |S〉2
. (4.17)
With this newly defined belief basis, we can redefine HI,B and HII,B
in an identical way as in Section 4.5.2. Both HI,B and HII,B are again
two dimensional Hilbert spaces. In HI,B we have a basis associated with
the first move measurement consisting of |CI〉 and |DI〉, together with the
belief basis. The angle between |B9〉 and |CI〉 is again defined as βI. The
construction of HII,B is identical, with the angle between |B9〉 and |CII〉
defined as βII. The resulting Hilbert space, modeling the entire experiment
is again defined as H = HI,B ⊗HII,B .
As we didn’t change anything regarding the first and second move
basis, only the probabilities of performing the belief measurement after
the second move measurement, need to be recalculated, using result 4.17:
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P (Bi|CII) = 〈Bi|CII〉
2∑9
j=0 〈Bj |CII〉2
=
sin2
(
βII + i9
pi
2
)∑9
j=0 〈Bj |CII〉2
P (Bi|DII) = 〈Bi|DII〉
2∑9
j=0 〈Bj |DII〉2
=
cos2
(
βII + i9
pi
2
)∑9
j=0 〈Bj |DII〉2
.
This is exactly the same result as in equations 4.12 and 4.13, where
the ordered scales, not adhering to completeness are used! This makes
the only difference between using a POVM structure or ordered scales the
trade-off between a firm embedding in standard quantum theory, with no
need for scaling or odds modeling versus no need of an extra operator PF ,
representing that (theoretically) no outcome was obtained. In all other
aspects (fit of the model, lack of repeatability,. . . ) the two approaches are
identical.
4.5.4 Using a PVM Structure
We will construct two PVM models, one which mimics the two models
described in the previous sections and one alternative model, with different
predictions. Note that this sort of construction naturally conflicts with
our arguments about ordered scales in Section 4.3.1, as no order of the
outcomes is in any way represented in the outcome vectors. Therefore,
any sort of structure has to be represented in the state vector, something
we argued against.
As the POVM model of Section 4.5.3 resulted in a model having the
same predictions as the model of Section 4.5.2, at the cost of the ex-
tra outcome vector, the question whether the same results can be ob-
tained using a PVM model presents itself naturally. Naimark’s theorem
(Gelfand & Naimark, 1943) indeed ensures this. In short, Naimark’s the-
orem shows that any set of operators {O1, . . . , On} forming a POVM in
an m-dimensional Hilbert space (m < n) can be lifted into a PVM, de-
fined in a n-dimensional Hilbert space (see Aliakbarzadeh & Kitto (2016)
and Khrennikov & Basieva (2014)). This means that the construction per-
formed in 4.5.3 can be done in a PVM setting. To do so, we lift the Hilbert
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spaces HI,B and HII,B into HlI,B and HlII,B . Both HlI,B and HlII,B are 11-
dimensional as they each contain a set of 11 operators forming a PVM.
This makes the resulting Hilbert spaceHl = HlI,B⊗HlII,B 121-dimensional.
This model does adhere to repeatability, as do all models using only PVM
constructions. Note that this model also includes the ‘measurement failed
outcome. As the probabilities derived in Section 4.5.3 and Section 4.5.2
were shown to be identical, this PVM structure has also the same derived
probabilities (and statistical fit) as the model constructed in Section 4.5.2,
without the extra outcome. It is unclear if the construction without ex-
tra outcome can be lifted into an appropriate PVM setting, as Naimark’s
theorem is only proven for POVM structures. However, given the amount
of free parameters in the 121 dimensional Hl, this seems very plausible.
While the use of Naimark’s theorem proves that there is a valid PVM
model, the structure of this model is not entirely clear6. We will now build
a PVM model, not starting from previous models, in the hope of having
a clearer geometrical interpretation.
To perform a straightforward implementation of quantum techniques,
we should again need to define a Hilbert space HI,B and HII,B to repre-
sent the incompatibility of the belief and actions measurements. We then
should again tensor these two spaces into H = HI,B ⊗ HII,B , as both
action measurements are considered compatible. However, when using a
standard PVM structure, the outcomes associated with a single measure-
ment must be represented by a set of orthogonal vectors. Therefore, to
model the belief measurement a Hilbert space of dimension at least 10 is,
by definition, required. This means that bothHI,B andHII,B have to be at
least 10 dimensional, making H = HI,B ⊗HII,B at least 100 dimensional.
In the best case scenario of both HI,B and HII,B being 10 dimensional,
both move measurements are each represented by two 5-dimensional sub-
spaces7. This construction already results in twice 35 free parameters8, as
opposed to the two angles βI and βII in the previous approaches. The state
vector |S〉 in the 100 dimensional H results in an additional 99 (!) free pa-
6When all operators of the POVM structure are projectors, the structure of the
lifted PVM is more clear. Here, however, the extra operator BF is not necessarily a
projector.
7In what follows all subspaces will be considered Hilbert subspaces.
8We need two 5-dimensional subspaces in both HI,B and HII,B . So, for each space,
we have the following construction. A 5-dimensional subspace is spanned by 5 or-
thonormal vectors. The first vector gives us 9 free parameters, the second vector 8
free parameters,. . . . This gives us a total of 9+8+7+6+5=35 free parameters for one
5-dimensional subspace. These 35 parameters also fix the second 5-dimensional sub-
space, as this is the subspace orthogonal to the first 5-dimensional subspace.
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rameters, as opposed to three free parameters in the previous approaches.
Needless to say that such a model is completely overparametrized and,
even when a huge amount of data points would be available, completely
unwieldy9. As such, if one wishes to just employ PVM techniques, cer-
tain external restrictions have to be introduced. We will describe one
such model to showcase this possibility. We will specifically aim for this
alternative PVM model to have the same amount of parameters as the
previous model: three free parameters to fit the starting state vector (like
sCC , sCD and sDC previously), one parameter to model the incompati-
bility between the first move action and the belief measurement (like βI
previously) and one parameter to model the incompatibility between the
second move action and the belief measurement (like βII previously). This
way, this alternative is easy to compare to the previous approaches. It will
become apparent that even these relatively simple restrictions will results
in an overly complex model.
As mentioned before, since the belief measurement has ten different
outcomes, represented by the vectors |Bi〉, this measurement alone spans a
10-dimensional Hilbert space. As our main concern is to keep the number
of dimensions low, we opt to have our resulting Hilbert space H of this
minimal dimensionality. Thus, our state vector has the form
|S〉 =
9∑
i=0
bi|Bi〉 (4.18)
Note that the coordinates used in H now refer to the belief outcome
vectors, as opposed to the action outcome vectors previously. In this space,
we want to use the ordered structure of the belief measurement to induce
some restriction on the state vector10. Therefore, we also argue that the
state vector should, for some m ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, have the form:
|S〉 = bm−1|Bm−1〉+ bm|Bmi〉+ bm+1|Bm+1〉
or
|S〉 = (0, . . . , 0, bm−1, bm, bm+1, 0, . . . , 0).
This means that the player can only be in superposition between three
9This too high dimensionality was the initial incentive of looking into bases with
non-orthogonal vectors
10Restrictions on state vectors are more common in physics, as the particular form
of the state vector can often be deduced from the experimental setting. This is a lot
more difficult in quantum cognition.
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consecutive beliefs. This induces an order on the coordinates of the state
vector, which in turn induces an order on belief outcome vectors associated
with said coordinates. Using these restrictions, makes the state vector
result in only three free parameters: m, bm−1 and bm, as bm+1 is fixed due
to the normalization restriction.
If we consider both action measurements to be compatible, four sub-
spaces CICII,CIDII,DICII and DIDII need to be defined, each repre-
senting a combination of outcomes of the action measurements. Due to
symmetry reasons, it is impossible to define these 4 subspace adequately
in a 10-dimensional space. We will therefore abandon the requirement
that both action measurements are compatible. We will return to this
point later. The action measurements are each represented by a pair of
orthogonal 5-dimensional subspaces. This still leaves a lot of freedom, so
further restrictions will need to be implemented.
To construct restrictions for the 5-dimensional Hilbert subspace repre-
senting the first and second move outcomes in H, we infer from the data
that players believing that a high number (6,. . . ,9) of opponents have co-
operated are likely to cooperate themselves, while players believing that
a high number (6,. . . ,9) of opponents have defected are likely to defect
themselves. As such we argue that for the 5-dimensional subspace CI,
representing first move cooperation in H:
|B6〉, . . . , |B9〉 ∈ CI (4.19)
and for the subspace C⊥I =DI , representing first move defection in HI,B :
|B0〉, . . . , |B3〉 ∈DI . (4.20)
This defines CI as:
CI = 〈|B9〉, |B8〉, |B7〉, |B6〉, |BCI 〉〉
and DI as:
DI = 〈|BDI 〉, |B3〉, |B2〉, |B1〉, |B0〉〉 ,
where the vectors |BC〉 and |BD〉 are, by definition, orthogonal and nor-
malized vectors in the plane 〈|B5〉, |B4〉〉. Therefore, they have the form:
|BCI 〉 = (0, 0, 0, 0, cos θI, sin θI, 0, 0, 0, 0)
|BDI 〉 = (0, 0, 0, 0,− sin θI, cos θI, 0, 0, 0, 0).
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The projector PCI associated with cooperating on the first move is the
10× 10 matrix:
PCI =
0 . . . 0... BCI ...
0 . . . I4
 with BCI = ( cos2 θI cos θI sin θIcos θI sin θI sin2 θI
)
and the projector PDI associated with defecting on the first move:
PDI =
I4 . . . 0... BDI ...
0 . . . 0
 with BDI = ( sin2 θI − cos θI sin θI− cos θI sin θI cos2 θI
)
.
An identical construction can be done to define the 5-dimensional sub-
spaces CII and DII, representing cooperation and defection on the second
move in H. Each has an associated projector PCII and PDII , now with
the free parameter θII. Note that the subspaces associated with the first
move depend on one parameter, just as in the previous models. The same
holds for the subspaces associated with the second move. While the action
measurements are not completely compatible, the subspace spanned by
{|B0〉, . . . , |B3〉}, for example, does represent a player defecting on both
moves.
The restrictions on the starting state vector (resulting in the param-
eters m, bm−1 and bm) and on the first and second move subspaces (re-
sulting in the parameters θI and θII) define our alternative PVM model.
The resulting probabilities for the second move measurement are:
P (CII) = 〈S|PCII |S〉
= b24 cos2 θII + b25 sin2 θII
+2b4b5 cos θII sin θII
+b26 + . . .+ b29
= (b4 cos θII + b5 sin θII)2
+b26 + . . .+ b29. (4.21)
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Note that this gives us
P (CII) = 1 for m = 7 or 8 (4.22)
P (CII) = 0 for m = 1 or 2. (4.23)
Likewise we get:
P (DII) = 〈S|PDII |S〉
= b20 + . . .+ b23
+b24 sin2 θII + b25 cos2 θII
−2b4b5 cos θII sin θII
= b20 + . . .+ b23
+(b4 sin θII − b5 cos θII)2, (4.24)
which now gives us
P (DII) = 0 for m = 7 or 8 (4.25)
P (DII) = 1 for m = 1 or 2. (4.26)
The probability of the player cooperating on both the second and first
move in the Baseline subgroup are11:
P (CII).P (CI |CII) = 〈S|PCIIPCIPCII |S〉 (4.27)
= b20 + . . .+ b23
+b24f4(θI, θII) + b25f5(θI, θII)
+4b4b5f4,5(θI, θII), (4.28)
11Note that we now model an event of the form ‘A and then B’ instead of ‘B if A’, as
the P (B) in the denominator of P (B|A) = P (A and then B)
P (B) would make the resulting
formula even more unwieldy. If one wishes to derive the conditional probability, simply
divide by the appropriate formula 4.21 or 4.24.
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with
f4(θI, θII) = cos2 θI cos4 θII + 4 sin2 θII sin2 θI cos2 θII
+8 sin θII cos3 θII sin θI cos θI (4.29)
f5(θI, θII) = 4 sin4 θII sin2 θI + sin2 θII cos2 θII cos2 θI
+8 sin3 θII cos2 θII cos θI sin θI (4.30)
f4,5(θI, θII) = sin θII cos2 θI cos3 θII
= +sin3 θII cos θII sin2 θI
+5 sin2 θII cos2 θII cos θI sin θI. (4.31)
Likewise formulas can be derived for the other three cases. Luckily, these
formulas never have to be formally fitted, as this model is overparametrized:
only three proportions are observed in the Baseline subgroup and the
above formulas have 5 free parameters12. This derivation, however, shows
how quickly calculations increase in complexity when dealing with more
than two measurements with at least two outcomes. The reason is that,
even in the Baseline group, everything is described in terms of ten dimen-
sional belief coordinates.
The more interesting case is the Elicit_Beliefs subgroup, as now the
interactions between beliefs and actions come into play. When beliefs
are elicited, projections will occur on vectors in H (as opposed to 5-
dimensional subspaces). This will make calculations will also be more
manageable. Note that the probabilities P (CII) and P (DII) derived in
4.21 and 4.24 also hold in Elicit_Beliefs subgroup. The resulting proba-
bilities are
P (Bi|CII) = 〈S|PCII |Bi〉〈Bi|PCII |S〉
P (CII)
12In the non-PVM models, the similar formulas had only three parameters: sCC , sCD
and sDC .
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which gives us
P (Bi|CII) = b
2
i
P (CII)
for i = 6, 7, 8 or 9 (4.32)
P (B4|CII) = cos2 θII b
2
4 cos2 θII + 2b4b5 cos θII sin θII + b25 sin2 θII
P (CII)
(4.33)
= cos2 θII
(b4 cos θII + b5 sin θII)2
P (CII)
(4.34)
P (B5|CII) = sin2 θII b
2
4 cos2 θII + 2b4b5 cos θII sin θII + b25 sin2 θII
P (CII)
(4.35)
= sin2 θII
(b4 cos θII + b5 sin θII)2
P (CII)
P (Bi|CII) = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 or 3. (4.36)
Similar calculations give us:
P (Bi|DII) = 0 for i = 6, 7, 8 or 9 (4.37)
P (B4|DII) = sin2 θII b
2
4 sin2 θII − 2b4b5 cos θII sin θII + b25 cos2 θII
P (DII)
(4.38)
= sin2 θII
(b4 sin θII − b5 cos θII)2
P (DII)
(4.39)
P (B5|DII) = cos2 θII b
2
4 sin2 θII − 2b4b5 cos θII sin θII + b25 cos2 θII
P (DII)
(4.40)
= cos2 θII
(b4 sin θII − b5 cos θII)2
P (DII)
(4.41)
P (Bi|DII) = b
2
i
P (DII)
for i = 0, 1, 2 or 3. (4.42)
Lastly, the probabilities of cooperating as first mover, after the belief
elicitation are
P (CI |Bi) = 〈Bi|PCI |Bi〉 (4.43)
P (CI |Bi) = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2 or 3 (4.44)
P (CI |Bi) = 1 for i = 6, 7, 8 or 9 (4.45)
P (CI |B4) = cos2 θI (4.46)
P (CI |B5) = sin2 θI (4.47)
and the probabilities of defecting as first mover, after the belief elicitation
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are
P (DI |Bi) = 〈Bi|PDI |Bi〉 (4.48)
P (DI |Bi) = 1 (for i = 0, 1, 2 or 3) (4.49)
P (DI |Bi) = 0 (for i = 6, 7, 8 or 9) (4.50)
P (DI |B4) = sin2 θI (4.51)
P (DI |B5) = cos2 θI. (4.52)
The particular form of the model makes it hard to perform a sensible
complete fit to the data. Next to the very unwieldy formulas, the problem
lies in the restriction we placed on the initial state vector, as this makes
any player only in superposition between three consecutive beliefs. If we
would fit this to the data at hand, the ‘average player’ would also have
to be in a superposition between three consecutive beliefs, effectively dis-
carding most of the results, as the model would predict that most of its
outcomes can never be obtained, due to dependencies such as 4.22, 4.23,
4.25 and 4.26. The model only yields interesting results if a starting state
can be attributed to certain (group of) players13. As we only have data
consisting of proportions, we cannot infer this type of structure. If this
would be possible, density matrices could be used to model the ‘average
player’ and the entire model could be held against the data. This again
shows the limits of placing restrictions on the state vector, as opposed to
incorporating in it in the outcome vectors from both a mathematical and
an interpretational point of view.
However, a discussion of the conditional probabilities is interesting,
as this means that there is information about the state of the system.
As such, results 4.32 to 4.42, tell us that second move cooperators never
think that 0 . . . 3 opponents have cooperated and second move defectors
never think that 6 . . . 9 opponents have cooperated. The data follows this
same structure, with only one player violating this (Table 3.4 and Table
3.5). The same seemingly nice result can be seen when looking at the first
move cooperation probabilities, given a belief. Results 4.43 to 4.52 tell
us that players believing 0 . . . 3 opponents have cooperated, would always
defect and that players believing 6 . . . 9 opponents have cooperated, would
always cooperate. This again reflects the structure in the data very well,
13In physics, this means that a specific state preparations would be performed as the
first step of the experiment. While there are numerous ways of doing this in physics,
this is practically impossible in cognition: How could you make somebody certainly
only doubt between three out of ten options? See also footnote 10.
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with no violation (Table 3.6). It might be tempting to use this part of
the data set to calculate the estimated value of θI, but as this parameters
also appears elsewhere in the model, this cannot be considered a true fit
to the data14. While these results seem interesting at first, these predic-
tions do not flow naturally from the model, but were introduced when
implementing Restrictions 4.19 and 4.20.
It is clear that even a ‘simple’ PVM model, with very rough, but very
strict restrictions almost immediately results in a very complex model,
even though the amount of parameters is low, while it does not result in
any interesting new predictions. Even though this cannot strictly be held
against this PVM approach from a modeling point of view, it does show-
case the difficulties that arise when slightly more complex modeling situa-
tions are considered for a quantum-like treatment. Keep in mind that the
restrictions used here (the particular form of both state vectors and action
subspaces) are very ad hoc and only serve as an exploration of a possible
alternative PVM model. This reservation, however, does not mean that a
thorough researched PVM model will be less complex. On the contrary,
well fleshed-out restrictions probably would increase the complexity.
4.5.5 Comparison
We now wish to compare our three approaches, contrasting their strengths
and weaknesses. While we refer to the game theoretic models constructed
in this paper, this list also indicates strengths and weaknesses of the dif-
ferent approaches in a more general setting. The different comparisons
are listed in Table 4.1 Note that we have two different PVM models:
one which is the lift of the POVM models into a large enough Hilbert
space, using Naimark’s theorem (NaiPVM) and the alternative model,
using self-constructed restrictions (altPVM). We refrain from a thorough
comparison with classical models, as this falls outside the scope of the
paper. We just wish compare techniques within the quantum realm. We
do wish to mention that all models constructed here, explain the violation
of the sure-thing principle observed in the data. As such, their ‘quantum-
ness’ does what it was intended to do, as this violation was the incentive of
looking in quantum-like models. This is commented on more profoundly
in Chapter 3.
14In the non-PVM models, this was not a problem, as βI only appeared in the
probabilities 4.14 and 4.15.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose some tentative first steps towards modeling or-
dered scales using quantum-like techniques. After loosening some of the
restrictions used in the construction of projective measurements (and even
loosening restrictions placed upon POVMs), we use this lack of structure
to impose new structure, now originating from the structure that out-
comes themselves exhibit. These techniques also allow for a reduction
of the resulting dimensionality, as this can become problematic quickly in
slightly more complex situations than the common examples seen in quan-
tum cognition. We briefly mention the possibility to model Likert scales
as an example. We discuss the two biggest consequences of this approach,
the first one being the total sum across all probabilities exceeding one
and the second one being the loss of repeatability of outcomes. Exceeding
one when adding the probabilities makes scaling necessary or requires the
modeling of odds of outcomes instead of probabilities. We argue that the
loss of repeatability is not as problematic as it seems at first and provide
a possible interpretation of this phenomenon.
Finally, we use data of a game theoretic experiment to investigate
the merits of this new approach and contrast it with more traditional
quantum-like structures. The contrast between using the new projectors
and the POVM structure shows that they result in the same predictions.
So the choice between which approach is preferred, lies in the hand of
the modeler. The new projectors have a straightforward geometrical in-
terpretation, with its vectors clearly reflecting the ordered structure of the
experiment, at the cost of needing scaling or odds modeling. The POVM
approach, while now clearly embedded within standard quantum the-
ory, needed an extra operator, with its own theoretical outcome, thereby
muddying the straightforward interpretation. Both these methods lack re-
peatability, but represent the order structure of outcomes appropriately.
If the modeler desires to adhere to repeatability, PVM structures need
to be employed. There is a direct candidate for this, by lifting the POVM
structure using Naimark’s theorem, into a 121-dimensional Hilbert space.
While this approach results in the same probabilities, the structure itself
is unclear. This approach also does not model any ordered structures in
the outcome spaces, it just mimics the results of another approach that
does. We also construct an alternative PVM model to show that lifting a
POVM structure is not the only solution. This example shows that, when
trying to reduce the enormous amount of parameters, introducing even
114 Chapter 4
the simplest restrictions results in a very opaque model. This model only
shows a nice structure when conditional probabilities are considered.
This contribution is only a first step into modeling ordered scales in
a quantum-like way. The theoretical side of this story needs to be deep-
ened, with a more thorough discussion of the concepts sketched out in
Section 4.3.1, next to investigating structures similar in role to Naimark’s
Theorem for POVMs. Also, more data-driven applications than the one
presented here need to be formulated and statistically tested to investigate
the true merit of this new approach. Next to deepening the understanding
of our proposed projectors, other ways of incorporating an ordering should
be investigated. As mentioned in footnote 1, eigenvalues are used to rep-
resent ratio scales (and its ordering). While eigenvalues are not presently
used in quantum cognition, it might be interesting to incorporate them
to model ordered scales. To do so, outcomes would need an associated
numerical value. This is not a trivial task (Krantz et al., 2006; Suppes
et al., 2006; Luce et al., 2006), but might, e.g., be used to model utilities
in decision making.
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5.1 General Overview
In this thesis we examined what exactly makes the quantum-technical
framework successful in cognition and when its implementation becomes
problematic. We focus on two types of issues. The first type of issue con-
cerns the question when and why a quantum-like model naturally predicts
interesting non-classical results and when an easily deducible classical
equivalent can be found, meaning that the quantumness of the approach
doesn’t necessarily add much relevancy. The second type of issue is the
mathematical or modeling limits this approach in certain cases runs up
against. An example of such limits is a lack of tools to deal with certain
experimental phenomena (e.g. the outcomes having a certain relation to
each other). Another example is the situation in which a naturally im-
plied quantum-like model becomes too overly complex to result in sensible
predictions. We hope this discussion will lead to a better understanding
of how to construct successful quantum-like models, fully employing the
strengths of this approach.
We claim that in the cases we discussed the (non)-orthogonality of
basis vectors is a key feature, being both cause of and solution to men-
tioned issues. To argue this point, we opted for an applied and data-driven
approach. As opposed to a more theoretical approach, we discuss two ex-
perimental paradigms with collected data, show why they benefit from
certain quantum-like approaches and contrast these different quantum
models to discuss which is better suited. Even though our two examples
are very specific (from two very distinct fields), we think they can be
used to comment on quantum cognition in general. To do so, we will now
situate the previous chapters within the broader quantum cognition field.
5.2 CMT Model - Discussion
In Chapter 2 we took a critical look at a quantum-like model, viz. the
QEMmodel, constructed in Brainerd et al. (2013) for an experiment about
word recollection. In these types of experiments a violation of the classical
disjunction rule is frequently observed. This phenomenon is commonly
attributed to the existence of two distinct types of memory traces: gist and
verbatim. The authors sought to explain this violation of a Kolmogorovian
rule by considering a quantum approach. Such violations are commonly
the first indicator of and the incentive to consider a quantum-like model.
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However, we showed that a straightforward classical equivalent1 can easily
be constructed, because Brainerd et al. represent the different memory
traces by orthogonal structures. This means that the disjunction violation
can easily be explained by the equivalent classical model, not using any
quantum-like structure. In this classical model the reason for this violation
is clear: the conjunction part of the disjunction equation disappears (see
2.3.3 for details). As this model is equivalent to the QEM model, the
similar disappearance of the conjunction part when defining the QEM
model is also the reason why the disjunction fallacy is exhibited in the
QEM model. While the quantum nature of the QEM model might obscure
this peculiar disappearance, it is certainly not the reason for the violation
itself2.
We then argued that the relevance of the model might be saved by
one simple change: make the subspaces representing the two distinct but
interacting memory traces non-orthogonal. By using the implied com-
plementarity between these traces, this intervention effectively made the
quantum-like approach explain the violation, without a clear natural clas-
sical equivalent. The interpretational advantage over the QEM model is
that the violation is now a natural consequence of our quantum-like struc-
ture, not an inconsistency explained by redefining the disjunction rule.
Our alternative CMT model had a satisfying statistical fit, slightly out-
performing the QEM model.
We claim that the type of reasoning adopted in this chapter, can be
applied in a broader setting. We can construct a clear classical equivalent
for quantum-like models with all outcome subspaces orthogonal and, for
that reason, those ventures within the quantum-technical realm should
be met with some skepticism. We do not claim that there are no classical
models that can exhibit violations of statistical laws or, in this particular
case, that the CMT model is ‘wrong’. However, in the quantum formal-
ism these violations are not considered ‘inconsistencies that should be
explained’ (which is the case in a classical approach), but naturally im-
plied consequences. To us, the natural rise of this behavior lies at the
heart of the quantum approach. As such, quantum-like models with a
clear classical equivalent lack one of the main draws of the quantum-like
approach, as their exhibition of the violation of interest is not a natural,
unparadoxical consequence.
1By ‘equivalent’ we mean resulting in identical predictions.
2By no means do we claim that quantum approaches fail to explain violations of
classical statistical rules. We just wish to show that this is the case in this particular
paradigm
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Note that we do not mean that different incompatible measurements
(associated with different, non-orthogonal bases) should be performed
to observe any quantum-like, non-classical behavior. For example the
Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem is a clearly non-classical result, with only
one measurement performed. However, even in the KS theorem, some
non-orthogonal outcome vectors are introduced, see for example Cabello
(1997).
5.3 The QP&B Model - Discussion
In Chapter 3 we investigated a sequential prisoner dilemma experiment
from Blanco et al. (2014), in which not only the moves of players were
recorded, but, in a subgroup of the sample, the beliefs about the behavior
of opponents were also elicited. We identified three effects, two of which
pointed towards a quantum-like approach. It quickly became apparent
that a straightforward quantum-like construction resulted in an unsatis-
factory model. These problems were countered by allowing non-orthogonal
subspaces to represent outcomes of one measurement. The end result was
an elegant, statistically well-fitting model.
There are two points of interest about this construction in a broader
view. First, it serves as a nice quantum-like venture into a game-theoretical
setting. Most research concerning strategic decision-making, using the
quantum toolbox is quite theoretical and/or does not go beyond the clas-
sical simultaneous prisoner dilemma setting. As such, this QP&B model
is one of the first attempts at tackling a data set from a slightly more
complicated game. The fact that the model performs statistically well,
makes us hopeful about future research into other game-theoretical struc-
tures. As the projections on the non-orthogonal subspaces actually induce
a rotation on the state vector, this model is firmly embedded into other
quantum-like game-theoretical approaches. For example, for the standard
prisoner dilemma Pothos & Busemeyer (2009) introduce a Hamiltonian
which also rotates the state vector in a Hilbert space. This Hamiltonian is
said “to produce the change in beliefs about the opponent towards defec-
tion or cooperation". It causes the model to violate the sure-thing princi-
ple. This is very similar to what our non-orthogonal belief vectors do: to
rotate the state vector to represent belief construction, while explaining
the sure-thing principle violation. The main difference between the two
models is that in our QP&B model these beliefs are explicitly elicited.
This means we wish to derive predictions which we then fit (successfully)
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to the experimental data.
Secondly, even though POVM structures, for instance, have been the-
oretically discussed, the QP&B model is the first application3 in social
sciences that uses quantum-like measurements beyond the PVM struc-
ture, even though they are used in physics to model, e.g., noise in mea-
surement. The abandonment of the orthogonal subspaces was a necessity
at first in order to avoid an overparametrized model, but was also used to
incorporate the ordered structure of the outcomes in a natural way. This
was explored further in Chapter 4.
This development mirrors the advances made in Chapter 2 and is the
recurring theme in this thesis. In both paradigms, viz. the memory exper-
iment and sequential prisoner dilemma, the possible use of a quantum-
technical framework becomes clear quite quickly. The construction itself,
however, runs into fundamental issues twice. Even though the problems
at hand show a different nature, the proposed solutions follow the same
pattern: by making previously orthogonal subspaces non-orthogonal, we
twice obtained a well-fitting model, exhibiting the observed violations of
classical statistics as a direct consequence of their quantum-like nature.
5.4 Ordered Scales - Discussion
In Chapter 4 we investigated a possible representation of ordered structure
in outcomes. We loosened restrictions of the P(O)VM structures, using the
freedom gained to add structure emerging from the experimental setting.
The two major consequences, viz. loss of repeatability and need for scaling
or odds modeling, were discussed. An overview of the (dis)advantages of
all considered approaches was given. This idea was introduced and imple-
mented in Chapter 3, but the introduction there was ad hoc, specifically
meant to solve the issues emerging in that particular setting. Therefore,
this structure deserved a more thorough look and an investigation in a
broader sense.
This research can be placed in a broader movement within quantum
cognition. Recently, an increasing amount of research papers have ap-
peared, focusing on structures beyond the PVM framework. For example,
an interesting foray into the use of POVMs can be found in Aliakbarzadeh
& Kitto (2016) and Yearsley (2016). The former is a more theoretical
work, discussing how Bell-type inequalities can be obtained using so called
3Or at least the first application known to us.
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‘non-ideal measurements’ represented by POVMs. While the applications
presented focus on the modeling of semantic memory, the discussion is
interesting for other fields as well. The latter is part of a tutorial which
aims at providing a relatively simple method of applying POVMs (among
other quantum techniques) in social sciences.
However, we propose a structure that generalizes beyond the POVM
structure. While situations in which POVMs are too strict were known in,
for instance, quantum computation (see Chapter 8 of Nielsen & Chuang
(2010)), this need for generalization was first mentioned quite recently in
the quantum cognition field in Khrennikov et al. (2014). In this paper the
authors discuss the fact that it is impossible to use conventional techniques
in order to construct a model adhering to both repeatability4 and order
effects. This situation didn’t emerge before in known quantum cognition
models, as the concept of repeating a measurement did not occur in any
experimental setting. Whereas Khrennikov et al. (2014) provide a metic-
ulous mathematical proof, we can briefly sketch the issue using a simple
example, relying on conventional techniques. If we go back to the Clin-
ton/Gore experiment, discussed in Section 1.3.1, we have a clear example
of an experimental setting exhibiting question order effects. As such, if
a participant was asked if he thought Clinton was trustworthy, it was
assumed his position about the trustworthiness of Gore, is changed. How-
ever, a simple symmetry argument shows that the Gore question should
consequently also change the position regarding Clinton’s trustworthiness.
So, if a third question, identical to the first, is asked, this framework does
not predict that the first answer will be repeated. Khrennikov et al. prove
that this cannot be solved using a POVM structure. Although our or-
dered scales lack first kindness repeatability (two identical measurements
not yielding the same outcome when performed without any other mea-
surement in between) and Khrennikov et al. discuss the lack of second
kindness repeatability (two identical measurements not yielding the same
outcome when performed with one other measurement in between), the
discussion in Khrennikov et al. (2014) is still relevant for our analysis in
Chapter 4. One possible solution to this is presented in Aerts & de Bianchi
(2015), where the General Tension Reduction (GTR) model is proposed.
An overview of this model falls outside the scope of this thesis, but we
mention it to show that POVM generalizations are emerging elsewhere as
well, next to other types of research beyond the standard quantum setting
4The type of repeatability is different from the one discussed in Chapter 4. See the
example infra.
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such as quantum pseudo-logics (Matvejchuk & Widdows, 2015) and the
use of negative probabilities (de Barros & Oas, 2014).
So far, none of the ventures mentioned here have investigated other
types of scales nor focused on structure within the set of outcomes. Even
in the GTR model, which is the most generalized model known to us,
all outcomes play an identical role towards each other. One area where
some sort of internal structure is incorporated in a quantum-like model
is semantic representations. In, for instance., Widdows & Cohen (2015),
graded (and thus structure exhibiting) semantic quantities are represented
by graded semantic vectors in a Hilbert space. While the fields of game-
theory and semantic representation are far apart, some crossover of ideas
for this problem might prove fruitful. It is clear that much research along
these lines still needs to be done.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Research
This brings us back to our initial research question: what drives the power
behind quantum cognition and how is this power best harnessed? It turns
out that in both of the models we presented, the non-orthogonality of
relevant outcome vectors transformed a problematic model into a well-
functioning one. As pointed out in Chapter 2, non-orthogonal outcome
vectors transform the QEM model into the CMT model, which was shown
to be clearly non-classical. In Chapter 3, the non-orthogonality solved the
overparametrization problem and incorporated the ordered structure of
outcomes. Note that the use of the mentioned non-orthogonality is differ-
ent in both examples. In Chapter 2 the non-orthogonality was between
vectors from different measurements, signifying complementarity between
these measurements. In Chapter 3 the non-orthogonality was not only
used to model incompatible measurements, but was also between vectors
from the same measurement, signifying an unsharp measurement lead-
ing to noise, as with a POVM structure. However, in both cases, the
non-orthogonality (and its resulting non-commuting operators) plays a
central role. When looking at formal tests for ‘quantumness’, as opposed
to our example-driven approach, the same story emerges. For example,
the q-test, from Busemeyer & Bruza (2012), essentially tests if two mea-
surements commute. A second example, also containing non-commuting
operators, are the grand reciprocity (GR) equations, discussed in Boyer-
Kassem et al. (2016). Here, it is shown that most basic “quantum”5 mod-
5The quotation marks are deliberate.
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els, actually fail the GR equations. A suggested solution is to construct
degenerate models6, as these do not need to adhere to the GR equations.
We will come back to this point later.
This leads us to the idea of the ‘general quantum recipe’. It should
be clear from the discussions in Section 3.4.3 and Section 4.5.1 that a
naive straightforward implementation of an experimental setting into the
standard PVM structure can run into trouble fast, where it concerns sit-
uations more complex than the standard examples. Due to quick over-
parametrization (the number of dimensions rises exponentially with more
outcomes) extra structure needs somehow to be incorporated. How and
which structure is an open question. This need for extra complexity be-
comes even more pressing if we consider the previously mentioned ob-
servation of Boyer-Kassem et al. (2016) that degenerate (and therefore
larger) models are required to ensure good predictions, even for the sim-
ple models. This, combined with the already highlighted questions related
to second kindness, makes it clear that the quantum cognition field is fac-
ing a big task.
It is evident that the use of quantum techniques in cognition leads
to compelling, viable models. Both on a mathematical and an interpre-
tational level, they offer insights and interesting predictions. This point
has been proven abundantly. However, in our opinion, to evolve the field
beyond these first successful steps, we presently need more models that
go beyond the standard exemplary (toy) models. The issues mentioned
in this thesis (quantumness, overparametrization, structure in outcomes,
second kindness . . . ) make it appear as if a technical hurdle needs to be
taken. As a result, a lot of recent research has been focused on theoret-
ical ideas, discussions and techniques, which seek to investigate or push
the boundaries of the theoretical side of the quantum cognition field. On
the other hand, (complex) applications in cognition seem rather sparse.
To put this in perspective, during the recent tenth Quantum Interaction
Conference in San Francisco only 5 out of 26 presented papers or posters
included discussions of a tested quantum-like model in an experimental
setting7. We do not mean to diminish the importance of any of these the-
oretical ventures (our Chapter 4 is also a rather theoretical discussion of
techniques beyond the standard quantum theory). They seem currently
necessary to forward the field.
6By degenerate models, we mean models containing degenerate outcomes. A de-
generate outcome is an outcome represented by a subspace of dimension more than
one.
7An observation made by Sebastien Duchêne at said conference.
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However, it is important that this theoretical research does not lose
sight of the possible applications. In this thesis, we have advocated this
by always trying to present the more theoretical discussions through an
application. These applications were not toy models, but interesting in
themselves. The drawback of this approach is that one successful applica-
tion of a certain new technique does not mean that the technique is ap-
plicable in other cases. Therefore, more applications of our ordered scales
structure in particular, other ‘beyond PVM’ structures in general and
more sophisticated PVM applications are needed. We mention one such
possible research program in our conclusion to Chapter 4. The introduc-
tion of the use of eigenvalues seems a promising idea, as this would allow
more (ordered) structure to be represented in the model. This is again no
small task as the assignment of numerical values to ordered scales is no
trivial problem (Krantz et al., 2006; Suppes et al., 2006; Luce et al., 2006).
These numerical values might, for instance, be used to represent utilities,
opening up possibilities of deeper connections to decision making.
Let us conclude by voicing the firm belief that quantum cognition says
something very fundamental about human behavior. It takes into account
aspects of the contextuality of human decision making in a manner that
revolutionizes the way we think about and deal with cognition. We are
looking forward to see how the field deals with the challenges we discussed
and continues to grow.
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6.1 Inleiding
Kwantumcognitie is een relatief nieuw veld waarin gebruikt wordt ge-
maakt van het wiskundig formalisme uit kwantummechanica, om fenome-
nen uit menswetenschappen te modelleren. Dit formalisme herdefinieert
concepten zoals ‘meting’ en ‘gebeurtenis’. Door gebruik te maken van deze
hergedefinieerde aspecten, worden statistische modellen gebouwd die niet
per se de klassieke statistische regels (conjunctie regel, disjunctie regel,
. . . ) hoeven te volgen. Hoewel we de klassieke statistische regels traditio-
neel associëren met ‘rationeel denken’ zijn er talloze experimentele voor-
beelden die aantonen dat menselijk gedrag deze regels niet noodzakelijk
volgt. Het kwantumformalisme slaagt er in dit gedrag te verklaren door
te veronderstellen dat tijdens deze menswetenschappelijke experimenten
concepten zoals ‘meting’ en ‘gebeurtenis’ meer gemeen hebben met de
varianten uit kwantummechanica dan uit traditionele theorieën.
Het fundamenteel verschil tussen een traditioneel en een kwantumsys-
teem, is dat een systeem zich in een superpositie kan bevinden. Dit impli-
ceert, in deeltjesfysica, dat, bijvoorbeeld, een subatomair deeltje zich niet
noodzakelijk op één welomlijnde positie bevindt, maar tussen meerdere
posities tegelijk1. Dit superpositie concept, van een systeem die balan-
ceert tussen verschillende uitkomsten, wordt gebruikt om te modelleren
dat een persoon kan twijfelen of onzeker zijn. Naast deze interpretati-
onele verandering, resulteert het invoeren van het superpositie principe
ook in wiskundige veranderingen, die succesvol zijn in het verklaren van
menselijk gedrag die de klassieke probabilistische wetten niet volgt.
Om dit idee van superpositie mathematisch voor te stellen, wordt ge-
bruik gemaakt van een Hilbertruimte2. Mogelijke (atomaire) uitkomsten
van een meting worden in deze Hilbert ruimte voorgesteld als vectoren die
een orthonormale basis van de Hilbertruimte vormen. Niet-atomaire ge-
beurtenissen worden gerepresenteerd door deelruimten opgespannen door
de vectoren geassocieerd met de relevante atomaire gebeurtenissen. De
toestand van de persoon die deelneemt aan het experiment is geassoci-
eerd met een genormalizeerde toestandsvector in dezelfde Hilbertruimte.
Aangezien de uitkomstvectoren een basis vormen van deze Hilbertruimte,
1Deze bewering is niet 100% accuraat, aangezien het deeltje zich eigenlijk op geen
enkele positie bevindt. Het deeltje heeft de mogelijk om zich op meerdere plaatsen te
manifesteren. Aangezien deze introductie erg summier is, dienen we erg oppervlakkig
te gaan over de fundamentele concepten van kwantummechanica. Een gedetailleerde
introductie kan gevonden worden in Nielsen & Chuang (2010) voor kwantummechanica
en in Busemeyer & Bruza (2012) voor kwantumcognitie.
2Een Hilbertruimte is een vectorruimte met een inproduct.
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kan de toestandsvector beschreven worden in coördinaten ten opzichte
van deze uitkomstbasis. Deze coördinaten zijn de wiskundige uitdrukking
van de superpositie, ze stellen voor hoe het systeem zich tussen verschil-
lende uitkomsten bevindt. Met deze nieuwe manier van representeren van
uitkomsten, komen ook een nieuwe regels voor het toekennen van proba-
biliteiten aan deze uitkomsten. Intuïtief komen deze nieuwe regels neer op
kijken hoe dicht een toestandsvector ligt bij een relevante uikomstdeel-
ruimte of -vector. Aangezien een systeem zich in superpositie tussen ver-
schillende uitkomsten kan bevinden, maar een meting slechts één resultaat
kan uitkomen, zorgt een meting ervoor dat het systeem de superpositie
moet verlaten. Dit wordt mathematisch voorgesteld door het projecteren
en normalizeren van de toestandsvectoren op de vector of deelruimte ge-
associeerd met de bekomen uitkomst. Dit concept maakt ‘het meten’ iets
actief, die een invloed uitoefent op het systeem. Dit verandert fundamen-
teel de relatie tussen ‘de observator’ en ‘het subject’. Het is deze nieuwe
relatie, waarin het meten zelf het systeem beïnvloedt, die leidt tot schen-
dingen van de klassieke probabiliteitsregels. De belangrijkste uitdrukking
van deze contextualiteit van een meting is het concept van incompatibele
metingen. Dit zijn metingen, waarvan het uitvoeren van de ene meting
een invloed heeft op het resultaat van de andere meting. Op deze manier
kunnen sommige uitkomsten van de ene meting niet tegelijk met sommige
uitkomsten van de andere meting geobserveerd worden. Mathematisch
wordt dit gemodelleerd door elke meting te associëren met een eigen ba-
sis in dezelfde Hilbertruimte. Het bekendste voorbeeld in fysica van dit
fenomeen zijn de positie en de impuls van een subatomair deeltje.
Deze kwantumtechnieken zijn reeds succesvol toegepast in, o.a., be-
slissingstheorie (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2009), semantische represen-
taties (Widdows & Cohen, 2015), speltheorie (Martínez-Martínez, 2014),
modelleren van menselijk geheugen (Bruza, 2010) en modelleren van per-
ceptie (Atmanspacher et al., 2004).
Het doel van dit proefschrift is onderzoeken van het ‘waarom’ en het
‘wanneer’ van het succes van deze benadering. We kozen ervoor om dit
aan de hand van uitgewerkte voorbeelden te doen, in tegenstelling tot een
eerder theoretische benadering. Dit heeft als voordelen dat onze twee uit-
gewerkte voorbeelden op zichzelf staande onderzoekspistes zijn, die ook
hun waarde hebben buiten het vermelde overkoepelend onderzoek. Daar-
naast verliezen we op deze manier ook geen contact met de toegepaste,
modellerende kant van het veld. Dit is een reëel gevaar bij erg theoretische
onderzoeken, zoals we bespreken in Hoofdstuk 5.
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6.2 Samenvatting Hoofdstuk 2
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een experiment over menselijke geheugen besproken
en gemodelleerd. In dit experiment, oorspronkelijk uitgevoerd door Brai-
nerd & Reyna (2008), werden proefpersonen gevraagd om drie verschil-
lende woordlijsten te memoriseren. Vervolgens kregen de proefpersonen
uitspraken voorgeschoteld waarmee ze akkoord moesten gaan of verwer-
pen. Deze uitspraken hadden twee mogelijke vormen. De eerste vorm was
de bewering dat een bepaald woord op een specifieke lijst stond. De tweede
vorm was dat een bepaald woord ergens op een (niet gespecifieerde) lijst
stond. De verkregen data toonde dat de proefpersonen tijdens dit expe-
riment een schending van de klassieke disjunctie regel vertoonden. Deze
schending wordt traditioneel verklaard door het bestaan van twee types
geheugen: een verbatim geheugen, geassocieerd met de vorm en fonologie
van een woord, en een ‘gist’ geheugen, geassocieerd met de betekenis en
associaties van een woord.
Brainerd et al. (2013) construeerden reeds een kwantumtechnisch mo-
del voor dit experiment, het QEM model. In dit model worden de proef-
personen veronderstelt zich in een superpositie te bevinden tussen vijf
orthogonale vectoren. Drie vectoren, die elk geassocieerd worden met ver-
batim herinneringen van een woordlijst, een vector geassocieerd met ‘gist’
herinneringen (over de drie lijsten heen) en een vector geassocieerd met
het zich herinneren dat het woord zich niet op een lijst bevond. Dit model
verklaart de schending van de disjunctie regel. We beargumenteren dat,
hoewel het idee om dit probleem kwantumtechnisch te benaderen inte-
ressant is, het QEM model problematisch is. Zo zijn er interpretationele
problemen met hoe de verschillende geheugentypes voorgesteld worden
en tonen we aan dat we erg eenvoudig een klassiek equivalent kunnen
construeren. Aangezien ons eenvoudig klassiek model exact dezelfde voor-
spellingen maakt, kan het verklaren van de schending van de disjunctie
regel niet liggen aan de kwantumtechnische benadering van Brainerd et
al.. Het blijkt dat het QEM model deze schending verklaart, omdat de
conjunctie regel (ad hoc) anders gedefinieerd wordt. Dit is duidelijk in
ons eenvoudig klassiek equivalent, maar is in het QEM model moeilijker
te zien.
Aangezien we wel akkoord gingen met de argumentatie om een kwan-
tummodel te gebruiken, enkel niet met de concrete uitwerking, construeren
we een alternatief kwantumtechnisch model, het CMT model. In dit model
worden de verschillende geheugen types niet voorgesteld door orthogonale
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vectoren, die samen één basis van de Hilbertruimte vormen, maar opteren
we voor het beschouwen van het verbatim en ‘gist’ geheugen als comple-
mentair3. Het mathematisch gevolg is dat de drie vectoren geassocieerd
met het verbatim geheugen enerzijds en de vector geassocieerd met het
gist geheugen anderzijds niet meer orthogonaal zijn. Deze relatief kleine
verandering zorgt ervoor dat de interpretationele problemen verdwijnen
en er geen duidelijk eenvoudig klassiek equivalent is, terwijl de schending
van de disjunctie regel nog steeds verklaard wordt. Ook heeft ons CMT
model een betere statistische fit dan het QEM model, onder meer om-
dat het leidt tot minder vrije parameters. Op deze manier bereiken we in
Hoofdstuk 2 onze twee beoogde doelstellingen. Ten eerste is het nieuwe
CMT model een succesvol kwantumtechnisch model, die er in slaagt een
paradox in het menselijk geheugen te verklaren. Ten tweede maken we ook
een punt over de kwantumtechnische benadering in het algemeen, namelijk
dat we voor kwantumtechnische modellen, met alle relevante vectoren or-
thogonaal, een eenvoudig klassiek alternatief kunnen construeren. Hiermee
illustreren we dat het al dan niet orthogonaal zijn van uitkomstvectoren
een belangrijke factor is in het succes van een kwantumtechnisch model.
6.3 Samenvatting Hoofdstuk 3
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een kwantumtechnisch model, het QP&B model,
gemaakt gebaseerd op een speltheoretisch experiment die origineel bespro-
ken werd in Blanco et al. (2014). In dit experiment werden proefpersonen
geconfronteerd met een sequentieel dilemma van de gevange. De proefper-
sonen werden gevraagd om het spel tweemaal te spelen, eerst als tweede
speler (in de veronderstelling dat de eerste speler heeft meegewerkt) en
vervolgens als eerste speler. Bij een deel van de proefpersonen werd ook
gevraagd om, voor ze zelf hun zet als eerste speler deden, in te schatten
hoeveel van hun negen mogelijke tegenstanders hadden samengewerkt als
tweede speler. Deze extra meting veroorzaakte een significante verande-
ring in het geobserveerd gedrag. De expliciete inschatting van het gedrag
van de tegenstander zorgde voor een verdubbeling van het aantal samen-
werkers. Mathematisch leidt dit tot een schending van het zogenaamde
‘sure thing’ principe. Deze invloed van het meten zelf wijst op de mo-
gelijkheid van een interessant kwantumtechnisch model, waarbij de twee
spelacties (zet als eerste speler en zet als tweede speler) incompatibel zijn
met de inschatting van de tegenstanders.
3Complementaire metingen zijn maximaal incompatibel.
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Wanneer deze situatie op een naïeve standaardmanier gegoten wordt
in een kwantumtechnische model, is de resulterende Hilbertruimte (min-
stens) honderddimensionaal. Dit model is bijgevolg volledig overgepara-
metriseerd. De reden voor de hoge dimensionaliteit is dat de inschatting
van de tegenstanders tien mogelijke antwoorden geeft. Het modelleren van
enkel deze meting resulteert bijgevolg op zich al in een ruimte van dimen-
sie tien. Door de relatie tussen de verschillende metingen (de spelacties
compatibel met elkaar, maar incompatibel met de inschatting van de te-
genstanders), dienen twee tiendimensionele ruimten getensord te worden,
wat tot de honderd dimensies leidt.
Dit probleem wordt opgelost door toe te laten dat de vectoren die de
inschatting van het aantal meewerkende tegenstanders voorstellen, niet
orthogonaal hoeven te zijn. Aangezien deze vector eigenlijk de resultaten
van één meting voorstellen, verlaten we hiermee de standaardvorm van
het kwantumformalisme. Op deze manier kunnen we de inschattingsme-
ting representeren in een tweedimensionele ruimte. De uiteindelijke vorm
van de overcomplete, niet orthogonale inschattingsbasis binnen de tweedi-
mensionale ruimte wordt afgeleid uit de geordende structuur van de ver-
schillende mogelijke uitkomsten (0 meewerkende tegenstanders, . . . , negen
meewerkende tegenstanders). De drie metingen samen worden hierdoor ge-
modelleerd in een ruimte van (bevattelijke) dimensie vier. Deze oplossing
is verwant met het model uit Busemeyer & Pothos (2012), waarin veron-
dersteld wordt dat het vormen van overtuigingen over een tegenstander de
toestandsvector roteert. Het verschil tussen ons model en het model van
Busemeyer & Pothos (2012) is dat in ons gemodelleerd experiment deze
overtuigingen expliciet gevraagd worden aan de spelers. De statistische fit
van ons model is goed.
Het verlaten van het eenvoudige standaard kwantumtechnisch forma-
lisme (het PVM formalisme) heeft gevolgen. Zo is de som van de pro-
babiliteiten bij de inschattingsmeting niet meer noodzakelijk gelijk aan
één. Hier worden twee oplossingen voor besproken. Bij de eerste oplossing
wordt een schalingsfactor ingevoerd die de totale som naar één herleidt. Bij
de tweede oplossing wordt een elfde operator toegevoegd aan de inschat-
tingsprojectoren. Op deze manier krijgt het model een POVM structuur,
een gekende uitbreiding van PVM structuren binnen kwantummechanica
(Yearsley, 2016). Dit zorgt er voor dat de som van probabiliteiten één
wordt, maar aangezien deze nieuwe operator ook iets binnen de meting
voorstelt, moet een elfde (theoretische) uitkomst toegevoegd worden aan
de mogelijke uitkomsten van de inschattingsmeting. We stellen voor (geba-
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seerd op een gelijkaardige constructie uit Yearsley (2016)) om deze vector
te associëren met de uitkomst ‘de meting faalde en wordt herdaan’. Deze
oplossing, die nu wel binnen kwantumtheorie past, leidt, statistisch ge-
zien, tot een identiek model als deze met de schalingsfactor, zonder extra
uitkomst. Een tweede gevolg van het niet orthogonaal zijn van de inschat-
tingsvectoren is dat voor twee identieke metingen, zonder manipulatie
ertussen, niet voorspeld wordt dat ze noodzakelijk in eenzelfde uitkomst
zullen resulteren. Deze eigenschap wordt gedefinieerd als herhaalbaarheid.
In de bespreking van dit fenomeen voeren we het concept van onscherpe
metingen in.
De opbouw van dit hoofdstuk volgt dezelfde structuur als van Hoofd-
stuk 2. In een dataset wordt een schending van een klassieke probabilisti-
sche wet geobserveerd. Een eerste poging tot een kwantumtechnisch model
voldoet niet. Hierop worden bepaalde vectoren hergedefinieerd als niet or-
thogonaal. Deze aanpassing leidt wel tot een succesvol model. Het verschil
tussen de aanpak in beide hoofdstukken ligt hem in dat in Hoofdstuk 2
de vectoren die niet orthogonaal werden gemaakt, horen bij verschillende
metingen. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt nog een stap verder gegaan en worden
vectoren die horen bij één meting ook als niet orthogonaal gedefinieerd.
6.4 Samenvatting Hoofdstuk 4
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt dieper ingegaan op de wiskundige techniek met niet
orthogonale basis die ontwikkeld werd voor het modelleren van spelthe-
oretisch experiment in Hoofdstuk 3. In Hoofdstuk 3 werd deze techniek
ad hoc ontwikkeld om de te grote dimensionaliteit van de resulterende
Hilbertruimte te verlagen en zo het aantal vrije parameter drastisch te
reduceren. Hiervoor werd gebruikt gemaakt van de geordende structuur
van de uikomstenverzameling van de inschattingsmeting. Aangezien deze
techniek in dit paradigma erg succesvol werkt, stellen we ons de vraag of
ze in andere experimentele modelleringssituaties (met geordende uitkom-
sten) even succesvol kan zijn. We tonen eerst aan dat POVM structuren,
hoewel ze ook niet orthogonale uitkomstvectoren bevatten, nog steeds
te restrictief zijn. Om dit op te lossen wordt een veralgemening van het
POVM formalisme gedefinieerd, die ons toelaat om een orde te definiëren
op vectoren (of deelruimten). Op deze manier wordt orde op uitkomsten,
geassocieerd met een vector of deelruimte, wiskundig voorgesteld in de
relevante Hilbertruimte. We beargumenteren dat dit in kwantumcognitie
de meest natuurlijk representatie van orde in de uitkomstverzameling is,
136 Chapter 6
aangezien het enige alternatief is dat deze orde gerepresenteerd wordt in
de vorm de toestandsvector. Dit is voor ons paradoxaal, aangezien de toe-
standsvector de proefpersoon voorstelt en de orde een eigenschap is van
de meting, niet van de proefpersoon.
De twee gevolgen van deze veralgemening van kwantumtechnische me-
tingen die in Hoofdstuk 3 naar voor kwamen, worden in een algemener
kader besproken. Zo kan niet gegarandeerd worden dat de som van alle
probabiliteiten geassocieerd met één meting gelijk is aan één. We stel-
len twee oplossingen voor. Als eerste oplossing construeren we algemene
schalingsfactoren. Als tweede oplossing stellen we voor dat de odds op een
bepaalde uitkomt gemodelleerd worden. Er wordt aangetoond dat beide
oplossingen tot eenzelfde model leiden. Ook kan nog steeds herhaalbaar-
heid niet gegarandeerd worden zodat het model niet noodzakelijk voor-
spelt dat twee identieke metingen, die na elkaar uitgevoerd worden, de-
zelfde uitkomst zullen hebben. Ook hier wordt het concept van onscherpe
metingen, ad hoc ingevoerd in Hoofdstuk 3 in een algemene setting be-
sproken. Als voorbeeld wordt een voorstel voor het modelleren van Likert
schalen gepresenteerd. Aangezien Likert schalen een duidelijke geordende
structuur hebben en vaak meer dan vijf verschillende uitkomsten bezitten,
zijn deze schalen een prima kandidaat voor het nieuwe formalisme.
Ten slotte wordt het speltheoretische experiment uit Hoofdstuk 3 ge-
modelleerd aan de hand van de verschillende besproken formalismen. Dit
leidt tot vier verschillende modellen. Deze worden onderling vergeleken en
we contrasteren hun verschillende voor- en nadelen. Ook al is deze verge-
lijking aan de hand van slechts één datatset, maakt ze het mogelijk om
iets te zeggen over de verschillende technieken in het algemeen. Het eer-
ste model is het model die gebruik maakt van de geordende schalen. Dit
model heeft als grote voordelen dat ze een natuurlijk representatie is van
het experiment, de geordende aard van de inschattingsmeting opneemt
en in een laag aantal parameters resulteert. De belangrijkste nadelen zijn
het verlaten van de orthodoxe kwantumtheorie en de hierboven vermelde
twee gevolgen (som van probabiliteiten en verlies van herhaalbaarheid).
Het tweede model verandert het eerste model in een model die gebruik
maakt van een POVM formalisme. Om dit te bekomen, dient een extra
theoretische uitkomst toegevoegd te worden. Deze uitkomst is de (fictieve)
gebeurtenis dat de meting faalt en herdaan wordt. Dit model resulteert
in dezelfde predicties (en bijgevolg dezelfde statistische fit) als het eerste
model. Ook wordt de orde binnen de uitkomstverzameling gerepresenteerd
in de respectievelijke vectoren en deelruimten. Dit model bevindt zich nu
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wel in de orthodoxe kwantumtheorie. De som van alle probabiliteiten van
een meting is altijd één. Herhaalbaarheid kan nog steeds niet gegaran-
deerd worden. Als prijs hiervoor verschijnt de fictieve uitkomst, waardoor
dit model een minder natuurlijke representatie van het experiment is. Het
derde en vierde model maken beiden gebruik van een PVM formalisme.
Hierdoor voldoen ze beiden aan herhaalbaarbeid en is de som van alle
probabiliteiten van een meting één. Alle vectoren die geassocieerd worden
met één meting zijn orthogonaal, wat geen orde kan modelleren. De orde
van de uitkomstverzameling moet bijgevolg vervat zitten in de vorm van
de toestandsvector, iets waar we tegen argumenteerden. Desalniettemin
is een vergelijking van deze twee modelen met de eerste twee modelen
interessant. Het derde model maakt gebruikt van de stelling van Naimark
(Gelfand & Naimark, 1943), om de resultaten van het tweede model na
te bootsen. Aangezien de resultaten van het tweede model identiek waren
aan deze van het eerste model, zijn deze van het derde model ook identiek
aan die van het eerste model. De stelling van Naimark garandeert het
bestaan van het derde model, maar de precieze vorm ervan is onduidelijk.
Dit ten gevolge van de vorm van theoretisch toegevoegde uitkomst in het
tweede model. Wanneer alle operatoren van een POVM structuur projec-
toren zijn, is het resulturende model na het gebruik van de stelling van
Naimark duidelijk. Dit is echter niet het geval, aangezien de operator van
de theoretische uitkomst niet noodzakelijk een projector is. Het vierde en
laatste model maakt gebruik van een PVM structuur zonder te vertrekken
van de voorgaande modellen. Zonder het toevoegen van extra restricties
resulteert dit in een model met een gigantisch aantal vrije parameters. Om
de vergelijking met de voorgaande modellen mogelijk te maken voeren we
enkel extra restricties in die leiden tot een model met hetzelfde aantal
vrije parameters als de vorige. Een eerste verzameling van restricties zijn
specifieke vormen van de deelruimten geassocieerd met de eerste en tweede
acties van het spel, waardoor deze niet meer compatibel zijn. Een tweede
verzameling restricties zijn een specifieke vorm van de toestandsvector, die
het geordend karakter van de inschattingsmeting weerspiegelen. Ondanks
deze (zware) restricties blijven de resulterende gemodelleerde restricties
erg complex van vorm, waarvoor een statistische fit praktisch ondoenbaar
blijkt.
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6.5 Conclusie
In dit proefschrift werd onderzocht welke wiskundige technieken binnen
kwantumcognitie de drijvende kracht zijn. In beide uitgewerkte para-
digma’s kwam hetzelfde verhaal naar boven, waarin de orthogonaliteit van
uitkomstvectoren een cruciale rol speelt. Een geobserveerde schending van
een klassieke statistische wet in experimentele data wees op de mogelijk-
heid om een kwantumtechnisch model te ontwikkelen. In beide gevallen
werd eerst een naïef model voorgesteld, die op problemen van interpre-
tationale en/of wiskundige aard stootte. Deze problemen werden telkens
opgelost door uitkomstvectoren te herdefiniëren als niet ortogonaal. De
nieuwe modellen waren telkens eleganter, interpretationeel duidelijker en
hadden een betere statistische fit. Het verschil tussen beide modellen is
dat bij het ene model vectoren geassocieerd met verschillende metingen als
niet orthogonaal gedefinieerd werden, terwijl het ander model nog verder
ging door ook vectoren geassocieerd met één meting als niet orthogonaal
te definiëren. Deze laatste techniek slaagt er ook in om geordende schalen
op een adequate manier voor te stellen binnen kwantumcognitie. Hoewel
deze nieuwe technieken nog weinig getest zijn tegen experimentele data,
denken we dat ze kunnen bijdragen aan de verdere evolutie van het veld.
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